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INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
Neoliberal policies in the 1980s focused on opening up markets through the enhancement of 
international capital mobility and intensified competition (Kotz & McDonough, 2010). It was believed 
that unregulated and competitive markets, free from any state regulation, were going to lead to 
economic development (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). The freedom of movement of capital however 
changed the balance between capital and labour decisively in capital’s favour as it gave corporations 
the means to relocate their investments to low wage countries marked by low coverage of labour 
protection (Kotz & McDonough, 2010; Walker, 1999). The growing reach of capital has exceeded the 
ability of states to regulate it. These corporations have considerable leverage over national 
governments as they can threaten with removal of investment or transfer money to avoid high national 
taxes (Kiely, 1998).  
By the mid-1980s and early 1990s, the consequences of trade liberalization for labour in global 
production systems became clear (Arnold & Bongiovi, 2012). Exposure from NGOs, trade unions and 
media raised awareness among western consumers about the precarious working conditions under 
which many of the consumer goods were produced (Barrientos & Smith, 2007). What followed was a 
proliferation of private social standards aiming at ensuring minimum social and environmental 
conditions (Riisgaard, 2011). Private social standards (PSS) constitute a new form of regulation 
whereby private actors such as NGOs and businesses enter into negotiations to design, monitor and 
enforce the rules and standards regulating firm behaviour (Riisgaard, 2011; Riisgaard & Hammer, 
2011). These new forms of regulation are driven in part by the failures of traditional regulation by 
national governments (Haufler, 2003).   
When exploring the social consequences for labour of global production systems and the potential of 
private social standards, labour as an actor seems an essential ingredient in the analysis (Riisgaard, 
2009). It is then also surprising how little efforts have been made to include the voice of the workers 
themselves (Rodríguez-Garavito, 2005). Scholars, activists, governments and consumer groups have all 
engaged into debates on fair trade, ethical consumerism and corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
(Gereffi & Lee, 2016). However workers at the tail end of these value chains remain the ‘missing 
element’ in this debate (Elliott & Freeman, 2003; Rodríguez-Garavito, 2005, p. 205). Labour is 
frequently reduced to just an ‘input’ factor of the production process and as Coe and Jordhus-Lier 
(2011, p. 221) have described it, they have often been put aside as ‘passive victims’ of capital’s 
unstoppable global search for lower wages.  
Recently, Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011) called for more refined conceptualisations of labour. The 
starting point here is the recognition that workers are not mere reactors (i.e. responsive towards the 
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environments produced by capitalism), but that they are actors who have the ability to act and 
enhance their relative position vis-à-vis capital (Carswell & De Neve, 2013). In response to this recent 
call, several researchers have directed their research focus to explore the agency of labour (Carswell 
& De Neve, 2013; Lund-Thomsen, 2013). 
Labour agency has been understood as those ‘strategies that shift the capitalist status quo in favour of 
workers’ (Coe & Jordhus-Lier, 2011, p. 216). Following this definition, many researchers have focused 
on labour agency that is articulated as collectively organized strategies (Herod, 1998, 2001; Riisgaard, 
2009; Wills, 2005). Indeed, the most visible strategies which aim to reform the existing system and to 
redistribute resources and to ensure better working conditions have been through collective 
organisation. But labour agency is not limited to the collective articulation of one’s grievances by using 
its voice. Unorganized labour can also engage in significant forms of agency through their every day, 
micro-level decision-making processes (Lund-Thomsen, 2013). For example, when workers decide to 
start a job or not, to migrate or not, to swap factories or not, they consider their own interests, and 
these acts have ramifications for the wider structuring of the economy (Carswell & De Neve, 2013). It 
requires capital to act upon and to adjust to these acts. So even though workers are restricted in many 
ways, lacking material, social and human assets, they engage in different forms of agency to make 
viable lives and to make the best out of their situation (Carswell & De Neve, 2013; Lund-Thomsen, 
2013). How small and hardly visible these acts may be, they do shape the landscape within which 
capital operates and need to be accounted for (Rogaly, 2009).   
In this thesis, the objective is to examine the potential for labour agency in the cut flower industry in 
Ethiopia. I specifically seek to understand if and how workers themselves can improve their working 
conditions through two strategies: ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ (Hirschman, 1970). The ‘exit’ strategy refers to the 
quitting behaviour of flower farm workers. I argue that the ‘exit’ option which many individual flower 
farm workers opt for, is a significant form of agency because not only does it offer these workers a 
means to avoid an undesired, exploitative work situation and access to new sources of livelihood, it is 
also a strategy that capital has to reckon with and adjust to (Rogaly, 2009). An unpredictable, slippery 
workforce makes labour somewhat difficult to control, and possibly opens up opportunities to 
reconfigure social structures in favour of labour (Katz, 2004).  
The ‘voice’ option then refers to collectively organized strategies. It entails the articulation of one’s 
grievances (Hirschman, 1970; Wills, 2005). It builds on a critical consciousness of the exploitation of 
labour and it is about labour trying to actively rework the work environment by making changes in the 
current system (Carswell & De Neve, 2013; Katz, 2004). Cut flowers however are mostly produced in 
countries where unionization and collective bargaining tend to be lower than is the case in Europe and 
North America (Lund-Thomsen, 2013). With regards to Ethiopia, trade unionism has only a short 
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history and the majority of cut flower workers remain unorganized (Cramer, Johnston, Oya, & Sender, 
2014; Praeg, 2006). The question that arises from this is why the ‘voice’ option in the cut flower 
industry in Ethiopia is a less likely chosen strategy and how this voice option could become more viable 
in the future.  
In the following section, I introduce the research context and some key concepts to understand the 
objective of the research. Hereafter, I introduce the research questions which will be answered in this 
thesis which is then followed by a short outline of the methodology used to answer all three questions. 
Finally, I present the structure of the thesis. My research consists of three academic articles, each 
exploring a specific question to better understand the challenges labour agency faces at the bottom of 
the Global Value Chain.  
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THE CHALLENGES FOR LABOUR: CONTEXT AND CONCEPTS 
Cut flower value chain 
The cut flower sector has seen much structural change over the last decades. Whereas the number of 
producers globally increased, the number went down in Western Europe. These shifts in production 
have been made possible by the increased adoption of free market policies and trade agreements. The 
combination of environmental factors and a low-wage work force as well as reduced trade barriers 
made countries close to the equator less expensive places to produce flowers, even with shipping 
costs, than consumer countries situated in the northern hemisphere (Dehnen-Schmutz, Holdenrieder, 
Jeger, & Pautasso, 2010; Hughes, 2000; Miller, 2012; Steen, 2010).  
South-American producers such as Ecuador and Colombia target the US market, while flowers 
produced in African countries such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Uganda and Ethiopia largely target 
the European market (Melese & Helmsing, 2010). Most flowers go through the auction market in the 
Netherlands before reaching their final destination (Riisgaard & Hammer, 2011). In recent years 
however, the direct market has gained importance. These direct chains are controlled by large retailers 
with strong market power (Riisgaard, 2009).  
For many years, the cut flower industry has been a target for NGO and consumer campaigns who 
criticize the environmentally damaging production processes and poor working conditions set in the 
sector (Korovkin & Sanmiguel-Valderrama, 2007). Because of the seasonal demand for flowers, the 
sector has the reputation of hiring workers on an insecure basis. The perishability of flowers implies 
long working days, sometimes even during holidays, as critical tasks cannot be postponed. Working 
overtime is not exceptional nor is it always on a voluntary basis or at a better wage rate. Another 
concern is the potential health hazard workers face. The sector makes intensive use of chemicals and 
fertilizers to which workers are easily exposed to (Raynolds, 2012; Riisgaard, 2011; Tallontire, Dolan, 
Smith, & Barrientos, 2005). In response to these campaigns, the sector has adopted a range of private 
social standards since the mid-1990s. In total there are twenty different social and/or environmental 
standards for cut flower exports (Dolan & Opondo, 2005; Riisgaard, 2011). 
The evolution of the Ethiopian cut flower industry 
Ethiopia is a latecomer in this sector. The earliest records are of two Ethiopian farms producing 
summer flowers in the early nineties (Melese & Helmsing, 2010). Yet, their success remained limited 
and both farms stopped their operations after a few years of operation. It was only in 1999 when a 
first foreign investor, Golden Rose, arrived that Ethiopia started to see its potential to grow roses. In 
the years that followed, other investors entered the country so that at the beginning of 2004, Ethiopia 
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counted four flower producing companies. Since then, the sector expanded enormously and currently 
hosts between 80 to 90 farms (Mano, Yamano, Suzuki, & Matsumoto, 2011; Melese & Helmsing, 2010) 
The expansion of the sector can be explained by several factors. To begin with, the country has rich 
natural endowments making it possible to grow both large and small-bud flowers. In addition, the 
country has a comparative advantage over other African countries due to its close proximity to the 
European market (Belwal & Chala, 2008). Government support however is probably the best reason to 
explain the sector’s rapid growth. The ‘Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty 
(PASDEP)’ drafted in 2004 formulates the Ethiopian government’s policy towards poverty reduction 
and economic growth. It focuses on the acceleration of private sector development and agricultural 
commercialization. In lines with these policy priorities, the Ethiopian government has relaxed taxation, 
relaxed regulations, offered affordable land rents and bank loans which all contributed to a positive 
investment climate (Gebreeyesus & Iizuka, 2012; Gebreeyesus & Sonobe, 2012; Melese & Helmsing, 
2010). In addition, wages are low compared to other African countries (Mano et al., 2011). A final 
factor explaining the expansion of the Ethiopian cut flower industry is the shift of production sites from 
Kenya towards Ethiopia. Several reasons explain this shift: the water pollution in Lake Naivasha, the 
expiration of the WTO/GATT Waiver that continued the previous Lomé trade preferences for the ACP 
(until 2008) and the political violence in the aftermath of the presidential election in 2007, made that 
Kenya was perceived as unstable and unsafe for investments (Mano et al., 2011; Muhammad, D’Souza, 
& Amponsah, 2013).  
Because of all these factors, the cut flower industry in Ethiopia has grown tremendously and is now 
the second largest exporter of small-bud flowers and third largest exporter of large-bud flowers of all 
African countries. This makes flowers one of the top exports of Ethiopia (346 million dollars), after 
coffee (732 million dollars), other vegetables (550 million dollars) and oilseeds (465 million dollars) 
(OEC, 2013).  
As flowers are a perishable export commodity, flower farms are located in clusters around the capital 
Addis Ababa, in the vicinity of the airport. These clusters are to be found in the highlands, at an altitude 
of at least 2,000 meters above sea level (Melese & Helmsing, 2010). Out of the 67 farms that were 
operating in 2007, 42 percent were foreign owned, 36 percent were domestic owned and 22 percent 
were joint ventures. The majority of foreign owned firms belong to Dutch entrepreneurs, but there are 
also Indian and Israeli entrepreneurs investing in the cut flower sector (Gebreeyesus & Sonobe, 2012). 
Around 2,031 ha in Ethiopia are allocated to flower production and each farm grows between 3 to 10 
varieties of roses (Mano et al., 2011; Melese & Helmsing, 2010).   
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The Ethiopian cut flower industry is an important generator of employment, though exact figures are 
missing. According to a study conducted by Melese and Helmsing (2010), the sector has generated 
around 15,200 permanent jobs and an additional 8,800 casual jobs. Mano et al. (2011) makes reference 
to 21,786 direct employees, while Islam and Islam (2015) estimate the job creation at 35,000 to 50,000 
jobs. However, even when exact figures are lacking, it can still be said that the jobs created by the cut 
flower industry are an important source of income for many local people living in the surroundings of 
these flower farm clusters and that these new created job opportunities can help these people to 
diversify their income sources and lift them out of extreme poverty (Melese & Helmsing, 2010).   
High levels of labour turnover 
Against this background, I undertook an explorative fieldtrip In September-October 2012. The 
objective of this fieldtrip was to get familiarized with the sector and to identify the main challenges 
and opportunities this relatively new sector was facing at that time. One theme emerged during this 
explorative field study which drew my attention. Whenever I asked questions related to the workforce 
of the flower farm, managers responded a bit agitated. They mentioned that they were facing high 
levels of labour turnover and that this was a large concern requiring all their attention because it 
negatively affected their operations.  
At first I had difficulties believing that high levels of labour turnover could be of major concern to 
managers. Ethiopia is a developing country, marked by high levels of unemployment. I could not 
believe that in such setting permanently hired workers would voluntarily give up their job. Yet, the 
issue of high labour turnover was raised by several managers, independently from each other, running 
farms located in different clusters and they complained that it was a serious concern.  
Looking back to it now, I realise that I interviewed those managers in the midst of a high peak of labour 
turnover. I interviewed these managers in September, a month in which a whole range of workers left 
the farm: student returned to school, rural workers returned to their own fields and several workers 
left the farm to celebrate New Year and Meskel. This massive quitting had negative effects on the 
moral and stability of the remaining workers. These workers suddenly had to put in extra work to cover 
for those who left, making alternative job opportunities very attractive. However at that moment I did 
not have this information at hand and I decided to dig into this intriguing phenomenon and to devote 
my entire research to it.  
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Voluntary labour turnover 
Labour turnover is ‘the movement of people into and out of employment within an organisation’ 
(Denvir & McMahon, 1992, p. 143). It can be voluntary or involuntary (Cheng & Brown, 1998). In this 
thesis I focus on the voluntary quitting behaviour of flower farm workers. Voluntary quitting a job 
might be usefully conceptualized with reference to the work of Hirschman (1970) who distinguishes 
two possible responses for when someone experiences dissatisfaction: one can exit (withdraw from a 
job); or, one can voice (articulate one’s complaints and grievances to repair or improve the work 
situation).  
Exit is considered a market-based economic response to discontent (Hirschman, 1970). It is 
straightforward, impersonal and indirect (Goodman, Louche, Van Cranenburgh, & Arenas, 2014). Exit 
provides a warning sign that something is wrong, but it does not provide reasons or explanations for 
what exactly is going wrong. There are various forms of ‘exit behaviour’: quitting a job, absenteeism, 
reduction of work effort or in extreme cases ‘sabotage’. It destroys employer-employee relationships 
(Freeman, 1976). Voice on the other hand, represents a political response to dissatisfaction 
(Hirschman, 1970). It requires communication and the articulation of one’s opinion. It is much more 
messy, direct and at times confrontational (Goodman et al., 2014). It is by nature more informative in 
the sense that it provides reasons for the dissatisfaction. It tries to re-work employer-employee 
relationships (Freeman, 1976).  
While both exit and voice are responses to dissatisfaction, they are often, but not always, considered 
mutually exclusive options (Hirschman, 1970). What’s more is that the greater the availability of the 
exit option, the less likely the voice option will be used. This general principle however needs to be 
nuanced. Within the context of employment, workers need to make a trade-off between the cost of 
exiting against the chances of changing something positively on the work floor through using their 
voice. In addition, workers need to outweigh the impact of using their voice. An individual worker who 
uses his or her voice, may be labelled as disloyal by management, miss out on promotions or even be 
fired (Elger & Smith, 1998; Freeman, 1976).  
The ‘exit’ strategies of flower farm workers seemed to me powerful responses, sending the message 
that workers did not want to stay in these type of jobs.  Somehow I was wondering if such actions, 
which I considered actions of resistance, could lead to positive changes on the work floor in favour of 
labour.  
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THESIS OBJECTIVE 
The main objective of this thesis can be summarized as follows:  
To examine the potential of workers to improve their working conditions through two 
strategies: ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ 
Following this research objective, I formulated three research questions:  
1. Why do workers voluntarily ‘exit’ their job?
2. How do managers make sense of high levels of labour turnover? What kind of strategies do
they develop to deal with labour turnover?
3. Why do workers not use their ‘voice’ to formulate their grievances and improve their 
conditions of employment? 
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METHODOLOGY 
The thesis objective and research questions were approached by means of a mixed methods approach 
(Creswell, 2013; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). I employed a combination of both qualitative and 
quantitative research to understand the complex phenomenon of labour turnover, given that the use 
of a single approach would have been inadequate to fully address the complexity. Whereas a 
quantitative approach was most suitable to test the hypotheses formulated in Article 1, a qualitative 
approach was more appropriate to advance our understandings of under researched topics studied in 
Articles 2 and 3. 
There have been two primary data collection phases. Table 1 provides an overview of the multiple data 
which have been collected and where the data was used across the different articles. Each article 
(Articles 1-3) contains a section in which the methodology is explained and motivated. From these 
methodology sections it will become clear that though each type of data served the purpose of 
answering a specific research question, there was quite some overlap. Different types of data have 
been used in several papers to increase reliability as it provided a basis for data triangulation.  
First round of data collection  
The first round of data collection took place in September – October 2012. The main objective of this 
preliminary study was to get familiarized with the cut flower sector and to identify the main challenges 
and opportunities this relatively new sector was facing at that time.  
I interviewed key stakeholders at sector level, including representatives of the Ethiopian Horticulture 
Producer Exporters Association (EHPEA), the Ethiopian Horticulture Development Agency (EHDA) and 
the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions (CETU). Moreover I conducted 22 interviews with 
managers from 21 flower farms which were located in one of seven clusters Ethiopia counts. Most 
often, these interviews took place on the farms and also included a tour of the farm. This gave me the 
opportunity to observe the working conditions set in these farms and to ask the ‘tour guide’ questions 
informally. On average, an interview lasted one hour up to one hour and a half. Each interview was 
recorded and transcribed.  
This set of data has been used to give further guidance to the research project. Upon my return, the 
analysis of this data revealed that the sole reason for flower farms to get certified was to access the 
direct market. Without certification flower farms could only sell their flowers to the auction strand. 
More interestingly, the analysis also showed that high levels of labour turnover had been raised by 
several managers independently from each other and was said to be a major concern.  
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Second round of data collection  
The second round of data collection took place in June-July 2013. To investigate the phenomenon of 
high levels of labour turnover more in-depth, the research area was refined by focusing on one single 
cluster of flower farms. This specific cluster is located close to the city of Debre Zeyit. This cluster is 
particularly interesting because at the time of the study, light manufacturing companies (including 
garments, footwear and plastics) were starting operations in the city centre, causing additional 
competition for labour with the neighbouring flower farms.  
The decision to focus on one single cluster of flower farms flows from the research objectives of this 
study. Focusing on a single cluster of flower farms allowed me to investigate the responses to high 
labour turnover by different farms situated in the same setting, and subjected to the same institutional 
pressures (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004), and to minimize extraneous variability (Eisenhardt, 1989). At 
the same time, this focus enabled me to investigate labour turnover meticulously and to collect data 
from multiple data sources who all viewed the phenomenon of labour turnover from different 
perspectives (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  
There are of course potential risks involved with selecting a single cluster to focus on. It is not entirely 
certain that the findings of this study are generalizable to other flower farm clusters. Though the first 
round of data collection revealed that labour turnover was mentioned as a challenge by several 
managers operating in different clusters, the cluster of Debre Zeyit does have some features which 
makes this cluster also unique. For example, there are few flower farm clusters which are situated 
close to such a large city as is the city of Debre Zeyit  (171,115 inhabitants according to Wikipedia). 
Moreover in recent years, this city has attracted many other investors. Hence, flower farm workers 
may have more job alternatives in this cluster than in any of the other flower farm clusters. By way of 
example, close to the city of Debre Zeyit, in Dukem (less than 20km away from Debre Zeyit), a Chinese 
shoe factory started its operations in 2011, creating over 4,000 jobs for low skilled labourers. 
Nevertheless, given the reasons above, selecting one cluster to focus on was the most appropriate 
method to get a thorough understanding of high levels of voluntary labour turnover.   
Within a single cluster of flower farms, I mainly expected to find differences on the variables of interest 
of this study (working conditions, job satisfaction, levels of labour turnover, managerial practices and 
workers’ access to voice strategies) between certified and non-certified farms. Consequently, I 
selected five farms which differed in terms of certification (3 adopters of private social standards (PSS) 
of which one was a very recent adopter; and 2 non-adopters of PSS) but which were very similar in 
terms of (Ethiopian) ownership, size and geographical location. This approach allowed me to study 
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potential differences between certified and non-certified farms while ruling out that any of the 
differences found between these farms could be attributed to other farm characteristics.  
Again, while such an approach has its advantages, it also brings with it some limitations. Most 
importantly, the inclusion of only Ethiopian flower farms in the second round of data collection at the 
level of workers, raises again the question of generalizability. The findings of article 1 on job 
satisfaction and workers’ quitting behaviour and the findings of article 3 on workers’ voice strategies, 
need to be read in this light. I do not have data at workers’ level from foreign owned flower farms (e.g. 
Dutch, Belgian, Indian or Israeli farms) and consequently cannot be certain that the findings in article 
1 and 3 are applicable to all flower farms. Nonetheless, in article 2 I do show that both foreign and 
Ethiopian managers have a very similar interpretation of labour turnover and apply very similar 
practices in relation to turnover. This gives reasons to believe that our findings related to the exit and 
voice strategies of workers may have been similar in foreign owned farms. Yet, to be entirely certain 
further research would be required, examining more in-depth the differences and similarities between 
foreign and local owned flower farms in terms of workers’ job satisfaction, quitting behaviour and 
union representation.  
Within the cluster of Debre Zeyit, a team of three MSc students, five Ethiopian enumerators, one 
colleague and I, collected data at different levels (cluster level, management level, and workers level) 
and combined data collection methods (in-depth interviews, surveys and focus group discussions). As 
is shown in table 1, we managed to collect a comprehensive and impressive amount of data during 
only two months of data collection. Nevertheless, during both field trips I encountered some 
difficulties associated with the data collection. These difficulties are very common when undertaking 
research in a developing country context, and are aggravated when the researcher is a foreigner or 
outsider, unfamiliar with the cultural context. In the following paragraphs, I unfold the difficulties and 
consequently the methodological concerns there are with each type of data we’ve collected.  
During both data collection rounds, poor infrastructure was one of the major challenges hampering 
the data collection. Given the poor quality of roads and the lack of street names, it was very time 
consuming to reach the flower farms which were situated in the rural surroundings of cities or 
highways. The dirt roads which were leading to the flower farms in Debre Zeyit were only allowed to 
be reached by private cars, which impacted the costs of data collection. Moreover, it was difficult to 
contact potential interviewees given the poor telephone penetration and telephone reception. In 
other words, poor infrastructure in general slowed down the data collection process substantially.  
In the second round of data collection, I conducted one in-depth interview with two representatives 
of the Labour and Social Affairs department of the region of Debre Zeyit. This interview had a duration 
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of one hour and was recorded and transcribed. The information retrieved from these external 
informants provided me the specific understanding of the context within which the flower farms were 
operating. However, given the basic level of English of both interviewees, more detailed information 
may have been lost in translation.  
At the level of managers, I interviewed 8 general managers of flower farms and one vegetable farm 
located in the cluster of Debre Zeyit. Six of these managers I also interviewed during the first data 
collection round. The purpose was to increase my understandings of the type of practices they engaged 
in to deal with labour turnover and how they perceived high turnover. An interview approximately 
took one hour and a half, was recorded and transcribed. During these interviews, I made use of 
timeline cards to visualise the labour turnover dynamics. A major advantage of these interviews was 
that there was no language barrier. All managers spoke fluent English (or Dutch). A disadvantage was 
that it appeared to be difficult to gain managers’ trust. Several managers had to be convinced that I 
wasn’t working for an NGO, and that I was not going to set up a negative publicity against these farms. 
The hesitance to cooperate of several managers hindsight that there may have been a potential 
desirability bias throughout the interviews. By this I mean that managers may have given answers that 
were meant to please me, a western researcher interested in decent working conditions and corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), rather than giving honest answers. To overcome this potential bias, I 
introduced myself as a researcher of Ghent University, and gave them a letter of Ghent University 
which included more details on the research. Moreover, at the beginning of each interview I assured 
the interviewee that the information would be treated as confidential, that there were no wrong 
answers, and that their names would be protected. Each interview also started with more general and 
easy questions as to make the interviewee feel at ease.  
The in-depth interviews I undertook with labour union representatives (three in total) took place in an 
informal setting. These interviews had a duration of approximately one hour. Purpose of these 
interviews was to gain insights on the origins and structure of the union and the challenges and 
opportunities these representatives were facing. The most important challenge was the language 
barrier between the interviewees who only spoke Amharic and myself as researcher. In trying to 
overcome this challenge, one of the more experienced enumerators, fluent in both English and 
Amharic, served as mediator. The interviews were recorded and transcribed by another enumerator 
and a colleague as to cross check the data. 
At workers level, we conducted six focus groups: one per farm and one focus group including workers 
from all five flower farms. Focus groups only targeted female workers and included 4 to 14 participants. 
Each focus group took approximately two hours and was held in an informal setting. Participants were 
asked about their experiences with high labour turnover, the causes of this turnover according to 
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them, and how this related with their personal situations. We made use of comparisons between farms 
and other job opportunities in the area in order to unravel the working conditions that really mattered 
and to gain more insights into workers’ perceptions.  
This type of data was probably the most challenging to obtain. Flower farms operate seven days on 
seven. While workers have one day off, this is not the same day for all workers. We chose to conduct 
the focus groups on a Thursday. One of the challenges we faced was to find female workers who also 
had their day off on a Thursday and who were willing to spend almost their entire free afternoon on a 
focus group, knowing that the advantages of participation where limited to none. Female workers 
were approached after working hours and given the time and place of the focus group. As most of 
these women did not have a telephone or an alternative way of contacting them, we could not be 
entirely sure of their attendance. This is nicely illustrated by the wide variation of attendance of 
participants: one focus group counted only 4 participants, while another focus group had up to 14 
participants. Because of the constrained mobility of most female workers and the fact that they are 
responsible for many other tasks on their day off, each focus group started a bit chaotic. Often focus 
groups only started one hour later than planned as we had to wait until enough participants had 
arrived.  
Next to this, the job of the moderator was not made easy. Most female workers were shy and very 
quiet at the beginning of the discussion. There was a language barrier between participants and the 
researcher. Because of this, the moderator had to translate the main narratives in between which 
slowed down the conversation substantially. Furthermore this also implicated that researcher could 
not get the full picture during the focus group discussion and so interesting information only came up 
while transcribing the focus group the day after. To aggravate the situation, there was sometimes also 
a language barrier between participants.  Often it only became clear during the focus group that some 
participants spoke Oromo, whereas all others spoke Amharic. Hence, the job description of the 
moderator was highly demanding: the moderator had to be a woman who could connect easier with 
these female workers than probably a male moderator would have. She had to be capable of 
conversing in three languages (Amharic, Oromo and English) and she needed to have enough soft skills 
to make the participants feel comfortable in sharing their thoughts and feelings in a group setting. 
Though I could count on a great locally trained female moderator, we both shared the feeling that the 
participants, which were low-educated female flower farm workers, felt with times intimidated by this 
highly educated moderator with strong communication skills. Most of these female workers were not 
used to articulating their own opinion and this also affected the richness of data we could collect 
through this method.  
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Finally, at workers level we also collected survey data (n=375). The survey included questions on socio-
demographics, working conditions, workers’ perceptions of these working conditions, job satisfaction, 
and intentions-to-leave. The advantage of collecting survey data was that it allowed us to retrieve 
information from many workers in a relatively short time span. Per farm, we surveyed 75 workers who 
had different job functions within the farm. These functions included packaging, grading, spraying, 
crop maintenance and supervising. Data was collected both on and off farm. The main challenge was 
to convince workers to participate in the survey after working hours. In teams of two persons (one 
enumerator and one MSc student), we would wait at different bus stops for workers to arrive when  
their work shift was finished (this would be either at 4 p.m. or 5 p.m.) and invite them to participate in 
the survey. Given that most workers still needed to walk for quite some time to get to their homes, 
and that it gets dark at 6 p.m., many female workers were very hesitant at first to participate. Because 
of this, we invited two or three workers who lived closely to one another at the same time and we 
made them wait for each other until all three interviews were finished so that they could walk back 
home together. This meant that workers stayed with the enumerators for one hour and a half or more 
(while one interview lasted only 40 minutes). We also compensated their participation by giving them 
at the end of the survey 20 birr (0.83 euro) to thank them for their time and to cover their 
transportation. We checked whether there were differences in answers between the on and off farm 
surveys and found both on and off farm surveys to be reliable sources of information. The 
questionnaire was directly translated from English into Amharic or Oromo by Ethiopian Master’s 
graduates who were trained before the data collection phase began. This training continued 
throughout the testing phase which lasted three days. During this training we made sure that all 
questions were correctly translated and that all enumerators had the same interpretation of each 
question. Nevertheless, given that these are standardized, mostly close-ended questions, a limitation 
of survey data is that the respondents are limited in the answers they can give. New and unexpected 
information may therefore be lost.   
In sum, each type of data has its advantages and disadvantages. Because of this, we decided to 
collected data at different levels (workers, representatives, managers) and using different methods 
(surveys, focus groups, in-depth interviews). This approach allowed us to triangulate the data and to 
get a more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon of turnover than the use of a single method 
would have allowed us to. All data we’ve collected pointed in the same directions. In combining data, 
I was able to augment and to validate my findings.   
As mentioned earlier, the data has been collected in two periods of time: in September-October 2012 
and in June-July 2013. It is important to take into account that this also influenced the data we’ve 
collected. September is a month in which flower farms face a peak in labour turnover. Consequently it 
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is not surprising that managers mentioned high levels of turnover in the first round of data collection. 
It is possible however that if the first round of data collection would have taken place on another 
moment, labour turnover would not have been raised as a current issue requiring managers’ attention. 
June and July are months in which there is a low demand of flowers. Consequently the answers we 
received from workers on questions related to working hours and overtime may have been entirely 
different than if we would have asked them these questions between February and May, when there 
is a peak demand for flowers. Nevertheless, though there are limitations with engaging in two short 
fieldwork experiences, there are also several advantages (budget and time) and practical 
considerations which needed to be taken into account. As an academic assistant it would not have 
been possible for me to stay for a long period of fieldwork given that I was responsible for assistant 
several courses throughout the academic year. Because of this, my fieldtrips took place in the summer 
(June-July) or early start of the semester (September-October). Luckily, this summer period is also a 
period of low demand for flowers. During peak production moments, when workers need to work up 
to 60 hours a week, it would have been extremely difficult to survey them or to have convinced them 
to participate in a focus group.   
  
27
INTRODUCTION 
Table 1. Summary table of data  
Source level Type of data  Main purpose of data 
1st round of data 
collection 
September- 
October 2012  
Cut flower 
industry 
Ethiopia  
Sector  In-depth interviews (3) with 
representatives of  
Ethiopian Horticulture 
Producer Exporters 
Association (EHPEA), Ethiopian 
Horticulture Development 
Agency (EHDA), and  
Confederation of Ethiopian 
Trade Unions (CETU) 
Familiarizing with cut flower 
industry 
Triangulation and 
corroboration of research 
results 
Management  In-depth interviews (22) with 
general managers of 21 flower 
farms (12 in Ethiopian 
ownership, 9 in foreign 
ownership) 
Article 2: How do managers 
make sense of high levels of 
turnover? What kind of 
strategies do they develop 
to deal with turnover? 
2nd round of data 
collection 
June-July 2013 
Cut flower cluster  
Debre Zeyit 
Cluster  In-depth interview (1) with 2 
representatives of the labour 
and social affairs department 
situated in Debre Zeyit 
Triangulation and 
corroboration of research 
results 
Management  In-depth interviews (8) with 
general managers of 
7 flower farms (5 Ethiopian 
ownership, 2 foreign 
ownership) and 
1 vegetable farm (foreign 
ownership) 
Article 2: How do managers 
make sense of high levels of 
turnover? What kind of 
strategies do they develop 
to deal with turnover? 
Union  In-depth interviews (3) with 
union representatives  
from three flower farms  
Article 3: Why do workers 
not use their ‘voice’? 
Workers  Focus group discussions (6) 
were organised, 1 per targeted 
farm (4 to 14 female 
participants) and 1 bringing 
together workers from all five 
farms (9 female participants)  
Article 1: Why do workers 
voluntarily ‘exit’ their job? 
Article 3: Why do workers 
not use their ‘voice’?  
Surveys (375) of workers from 
five targeted farms in Debre 
Zeyit 
Article 1: Why do workers 
voluntarily ‘exit’ their job? 
Article 3: Why do workers 
not use their ‘voice’? 
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THESIS STRUCTURE AND ARTICLE FLOW   
This thesis is built around three academic articles. Figure 1 below presents the overall structure of the 
chapters and the flow of the dissertation in a graphical manner, illustrating the way each article builds 
further on each other.  
I first lay out the Context in which flower farm workers are employed. To understand the potential of 
workers to improve their working conditions, one must first have a clear understanding of the current 
working conditions of flower farm workers. In the next section, I give an overview of the existing 
governance systems which have been developed to regulate working conditions in the Ethiopian 
context and compare nine social criteria set by these different systems. Finally, I examine the 
implementation of these nine criteria in the five flower farms studied in this PhD project. I show that 
there are differences in working conditions between the three certified farms (inserted in the direct 
market strand) and the two non-certified farms (selling at the auction).  
Central in this thesis is the quitting behaviour of flower farm workers. Article 1 seeks to understand 
why flower farm workers exited their formal wage work in the flower farms. To do so, I turn to the 
literature of human resources (HR). Past research has shown that there is a clear link between job 
satisfaction and labour turnover/ decisions about quitting (Mobley, 1977; Mueller & Price, 1990). In 
the absence of high levels of job satisfaction, one might expect high rates of labour turnover, here 
defined as voluntary leaving a job (Jiang, Baker, & Frazier, 2009). According to HR literature, the most 
important predictors of job satisfaction are the characteristics of a job (Aletraris, 2010), which can be 
separated into extrinsic rewards and intrinsic rewards. Extrinsic rewards include work aspects not 
directly associated with the job activity itself, which are more a by-product of the work (Tietjen & 
Myers, 1998). They occur as a consequence of job performance (e.g. wage, a contract). By contrast, 
intrinsic rewards are said to be related with the job activity itself (Aletraris, 2010). They satisfy workers’ 
immaterial needs by allowing for self-expression, giving a worker the feeling that he/she accomplishes 
something worthwhile on the job (e.g. job variation, job autonomy) (Linz & Semykina, 2012). Article 1 
investigates two linkages. First, it explores the link between job satisfaction and workers’ quitting 
behaviour. Second, it explores the link between job satisfaction and job characteristics (left panel of 
figure 1). Both linkages serve the purpose of improving our understandings of why flower farm workers 
voluntarily ‘exited’ or left their job. The results show that workers left their formal wage work because 
they were dissatisfied with the extrinsic job rewards (wage, job security and a healthy work 
environment) offered by flower farms. Hence, this article concludes with the powerful message that 
flower farms aiming at securing a stable work force need to focus on improving these three job 
attributes.  
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Article 2 researches how managers made sense of high levels of labour turnover and the type of 
strategies they developed to deal with this turnover. If the purpose was to reduce high labour turnover, 
one might expect that managers came up with actions to increase workers’ job satisfaction (Porter, 
Steers, Mowday, & Boulian, 1974). Much scholarly attention has been devoted to understand the 
impact of human resource management (HRM) policies and practices on workers performance. An 
increasing body of work contains the argument that the use of certain HRM practices can increase 
motivation and enhance retention among workers (Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Huselid, 1995; Tooksoon, 
2011). In particular, those job characteristics which are the factors that trigger job dissatisfaction and 
are leading to workers’ exiting or quitting a job, need to be adjusted (Firth, Mellor, Moore, & Loquet, 
2004). In theory, it could thus be argued that when managers interpreted the exit strategies of workers 
as warning signs of job dissatisfaction and accordingly undertook practices to improve those working 
conditions which mattered to flower farm workers, then the exit strategies of workers indeed had 
great potential for workers to improve their working conditions. The analysis however shows that 
managers did not attempt to reduce turnover, instead they engaged in practices that sustained labour 
turnover. This is because labour turnover was considered functional: the costs of facing labour 
turnover were lower than the costs of actually reducing turnover (Wallace & Gaylor, 2012). In the 
second part of this article I then explain how managers legitimized having high levels of labour turnover 
on their work floor. I show that managers constructed a mind-set that supported the notion that labour 
turnover was entirely caused by external institutional elements and had nothing to do with the work 
environment.  
Article 3 examines why workers did not use their ‘voice’ to formulate their grievances and to improve 
their conditions of employment. Given that the exit option which many flower farm workers exercised, 
did not result in positive changes in favour of labour, the question arises why workers did not exploit 
other options, such as the ‘voice’ option. From a political perspective the voice option is a higher form 
of response (Dowding, John, Mergoupis, & Vugt, 2000). It includes different degrees of activity and 
leadership and attempts to achieve changes ‘from within’ (Hirschman, 1970). Though it is more costly 
and messy because it involves the articulation of one’s thoughts (Goodman et al., 2014), it is more 
informative in the sense that it provides reasons for dissatisfaction and therefore could be more 
effective in re-working the capital-labour relation in favour of labour. Several flower farms had to allow 
trade unions on the work floor because of their private social standards (Barrientos & Smith, 2007; 
Riisgaard, 2011). In essence, the trade union represents the ‘voice’ option for workers to articulate 
their grievances. However, the fact that workers were choosing the ‘exit’ option signals that the ‘voice’ 
option was not a credible option (Hirschman, 1970). Article 3 examines why workers did not use their 
‘voice’ to formulate their grievances and to improve their conditions of employment. This is 
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represented with the dotted line in figure 1. In this article, we build a two-levels framework to identify 
the impediments to workplace unionism in the cut flower industry in Ethiopia. This framework 
recognises the need to study both ‘vertical’ (structure and governance of GVCs) and ‘horizontal’ (the 
socio-economic context) barriers to collective organizing at the work floor. The article concludes with 
providing recommendations on how to overcome these impediments.   
The Conclusion summarizes and discusses the main findings of the thesis. The findings of the thesis 
suggest that the potential of workers to improve their own working conditions through exit and voice 
is limited. In this chapter I argue for a more participatory approach to improve working conditions in 
flower farms. I offer suggestions on how several actors could be of more assistance and could become 
more effective in improving working conditions in line with workers’ needs.   
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Abstract. There are multiple and overlapping governance systems aiming at regulating the working 
conditions in the cut flower industry in Ethiopia. In this chapter we first give an overview of the 
development of the cut flower sector and its main characteristics. Next, we provide an overview of the 
existing governance systems and compare how these systems regulate or standardise nine social 
criteria related to the working conditions in the cut flower farms. We then investigate the 
implementation of the nine social criteria in the five flower farms studied in this PhD project.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This chapter draws the background for this dissertation. Because the potential for labour agency in the 
cut flower industry in Ethiopia must be understood in the context in which flower farm workers are 
employed, the purpose of this chapter is to give the reader a detailed overview of the current working 
conditions of flower farm workers.  
This chapter has four main parts. First, it gives an overview of the development of the cut flower sector 
and its main characteristics. Second, it gives an overview of the existing governance systems which 
have been developed to regulate working conditions in the Ethiopian context. Third, it provides a 
detailed comparison of nine social criteria/ regulations set by these different governance systems. 
Fourth, it presents an examination of the implementation of these nine social criteria in the five flower 
farms studied in this PhD project. 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE ETHIOPIAN CUT FLOWER INDUSTRY 
The objective of this section is make the reader familiar with the cut flower sector in Ethiopia. We first 
give a brief overview of the development of the sector, highlighting some key moments that steered 
the development of the Ethiopian cut flower industry. Next, we provide some more information about 
the geographical location of this sector in Ethiopia. Finally, we describe the daily practices and routines 
of the sector.  
Brief history  
After the fall of the Derg regime in 1991, two flower farms pioneered floriculture in Ethiopia: Ethioflora 
and Meskel Flower. These farms produced summer flowers. By the mid-nineties, Meskel Flower shifted 
its production to roses. However, due to limited experience and an unfavourable investment climate, 
both operations faced difficulties especially in acquiring sufficient inputs, financing and transporting 
the flowers to the market. It was only in 1999 when the first foreign investor from the United Kingdom, 
Golden Rose, arrived that Ethiopia started to see its potential to grow roses (Melese & Helmsing, 2010). 
From the end of 2002 and onwards, the government provided sector-specific supports (Mano, 
Yamano, Suzuki, & Matsumoto, 2011). In that same year, the Ethiopian Horticulture Producer 
Exporters Association (EHPEA) was established. This association represents the interests of the 
horticulture farms and promotes the expansion of the horticulture export sector in Ethiopia.  
An important reason why Ethiopia became attractive to grow roses was its ‘Plan for Accelerated and 
Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP)’ which was drafted in 2004 and formulates the 
Ethiopian government’s policy towards poverty reduction and economic growth. It focuses on the 
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acceleration of private sector development and agricultural commercialization. In line with these 
policy priorities, the Ethiopian government has relaxed taxation, relaxed regulations, offered 
affordable land rents and bank loans which all contributed to a positive investment climate 
(Gebreeyesus & Iizuka, 2012; Gebreeyesus & Sonobe, 2012; Melese & Helmsing, 2010). At the end of 
2004, there were four companies exporting roses: ENYI Rose (Ethiopian ownership), Summit (Ethiopian 
ownership), Ethio-Dream (joint venture) and Golden Rose (UK ownership) (Melese & Helmsing, 2010).  
Another milestone for the sector was the start of Sher Ethiopia Ltd’s operations in June 2005. Sher 
Ethiopia is a subsidiary of Sher Holland BV, which is the largest rose company in the world. It is located 
in Ziway and leases 350 hectares of land from the Ethiopian government. Sher Ethiopia Ltd prepares 
‘ready to operate’ greenhouses which it rents out to other investors. In this way, Sher Ethiopia 
facilitated the entry of new growers (Melese & Helmsing, 2010). In the years that followed, the sector 
expanded rapidly and almost 80 farms were actively operating by 2008 (Mano et al., 2011). 
In 2008, the Ethiopian Horticulture Development Agency (EHDA) was created under the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development. This agency was the upgraded version of the Horticulture 
Development Team which had been established in 2002. It is a governmental organization which aims 
to direct the sector and to provide holistic support to investors particularly in the areas of investment 
support, capacity building and marketing (Gebreeyesus & Iizuka, 2012). In that same year however, 
the global financial crisis hit the economy. The wholesale market prices for cut flowers in the 
Netherlands declined substantially. For the cut flower industry in Ethiopia this meant that only 47% of 
a projected $280 million from flower exports was earned. Several flower farms faced difficulties to 
repay their debts to the Development Bank of Ethiopia (Te Velde et al., 2010).  
Geographical structure  
Currently there are 77 farms situated in 7 clusters of flower farms, which are located within a 200 km 
radius of Addis Ababa (see figure 1). By clusters we mean those ‘geographical spaces, or regions, where 
farms in similar and cognate activities are located within well-defined spatial boundaries wherein 
proximity promotes a range of economic benefits’ (Lund-Thomsen & Nadvi, 2010, p. 204). The reason 
why flower farms are located so close to one another is because they have the same needs: a 
geographical proximity to the national airport, abundant water and land resources, and a location in 
the highlands (at an altitude of 2000 meters above sea level). Being part of a cluster also has several 
advantages. Farms that are closely located to one another often maintain a good relationship. They 
discuss common problems (e.g. a problem related to a customs or taxation issue, bad roads, problems 
related to safety and burglary) and try to come up with solutions themselves or decide to lobby for 
solutions together at government level. Farms from the same cluster also often take initiatives 
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together (e.g. building a school together, engaging in social activities) and exchange knowledge and 
information.  
In the first round of data collection (September-October 2012), I interviewed 22 managers from farms 
situated in different clusters. In the second round of data collection (June-July 2013), I focused on one 
single cluster of flower farms situated nearby the city of Debre Zeyit. In total, there are 10 flower farms 
in this cluster. From these 10 farms, I selected 5 flower farms which were very similar in terms of 
ownership, size and geographical location, they did differ in terms of certification: two of the flower 
farms were already certified for more than three years with at least one PSS, one flower farm had 
recently been certified with MPS-SQ and the other two flower farms had not adopted any 
internationally recognized PSS. More detailed information on these five farms is given in the final 
section of this chapter.  
 
 
Figure 1. Map of Ethiopian flower farm clusters 
Practices  
There are four main components in the cut flower value chain: farming, post-harvest, transport and 
marketing (Melese & Helmsing, 2010). The first component ‘farming’ includes activities such as 
selecting the appropriate variety, planting, weeding, irrigating and providing the necessary inputs such 
that the flowers grow at the required quality while controlling for diseases. Given that the right variety 
of flowers is a decisive determinant of the success of the farm, breeders are essential actors in the 
Legend (distance to capital):  
1. Addis Alem/Holeta (39.3km) 
2. Menagesha (32.8km) 
3. Sebeta (25.9km) 
4. Sendafa (38.4km) 
5. Debre Zeyit (49.6km) 
6. Koka (98km) 
7. Ziway (163km) 
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chain. In Ethiopia, there used to be three breeders: Olij Roses (Dutch ownership), Joy Tech Plc. (joint 
venture Israel- Ethiopia), and Ethio Plants Plc. (Dutch ownership). The latter stopped its operations in 
2013 because the government had decided that the new railway that would link the capital Addis 
Ababa to the port of Djibouti was going to cross the land of this flower farm.  
In the greenhouses, there are both male and female workers. Male workers are mainly involved in 
spraying, irrigation and maintenance sections. Female workers are mainly involved in the production 
and harvesting sections. Female workers responsible for a number of beds of flowers. Their tasks 
include weeding, cleaning and harvesting the flowers according to their cut stage and quality. On a 
normal day, greenhouse workers harvest three times a day. Once the flowers are harvested, they are 
brought to the pack houses where the post-harvesting takes place. In the pack houses female workers 
sort, cut, bunch and pack the flowers according to length and quality. The flowers are then brought to 
the refrigerators. This is a task mainly undertaken by male workers. From there, flowers are 
transported in cool trucks to the airport in Addis Ababa. Officers of the Ethiopian Customs Authority 
(ECA) and the Ministry of Agriculture inspect the flowers at the airport. Ethiopian Airlines transports is 
the main airfreight carrier of flower. Other flight companies that transport flowers are KLM, Lufthansa 
and Etihad. The majority of flowers (67%) are sold at the auctions in The Netherlands (Melese & 
Helmsing, 2010).  
IDENTIFYING ACTORS AND GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS 
The objective of this section is to identify the actors who are involved in providing standards to improve 
or guaranty (good) working conditions in the cut flower farms in Ethiopia. For this purpose we draw 
on the typology of governance systems developed by Gereffi and Lee (2016). According to Gereffi and 
Lee (2016) governance systems differ in terms of scope and in terms of actors.  
In terms of scope, Gereffi and Lee (2016) distinguish between horizontal (cluster) governance which 
refers to place-based forms of governance and vertical (Global Value Chain) governance which is cross-
national by nature, operating along the value chain. In terms of actors, they identify a wide range of 
actors across value chains and clusters, including ‘public actors’ such as national governments and 
international organisations as the International Labour Organisation (ILO), ‘private actors’ such as 
global lead firms and cluster firms, and ‘social actors’ such as civil society actors like non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and trade unions (Gereffi & Lee, 2016; Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014).  
Whereas some of these actors operate at the horizontal governance level, other actors operate at the 
vertical governance level. These levels interact and produce various forms of ‘synergistic’ governance 
which aim to improve social conditions. By good social conditions we refer to the quality of the 
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employment environment. It includes issues such as fair remuneration, job security, good physical 
environmentally safe working conditions, rights of collective bargaining, opportunities for social 
dialogue and absence of child labour (Pyke & Lund-Thomsen, 2015).  
Public governance  
Public governance is exercised by public actors. At the horizontal level, we identified the Ethiopian 
government as the most important public actor influencing both directly and indirectly the social 
conditions in the cut flower industry in Ethiopia. On the one hand, through the Ethiopian labour law 
the Ethiopian government directly affects various aspects of labour conditions and standards to which 
flower farms need to adhere to. On the other hand, favourable investment laws and incentives 
promulgated by the state have an indirect effect on workers because they create an investment 
environment which facilitates and constrains actions affecting social conditions. For example, to 
attract foreign investors, the Ethiopian government relaxed taxation, relaxed regulations, offered 
affordable land rents and bank loans. More importantly however, they also advertised Ethiopian 
labour as to be ‘abundant’ and ‘cheap’ (Ethiopian Embassy, 2005; Getu, 2009). Such discourse creates 
a climate in which investors seemingly are allowed to pay extremely low wages. A point which was also 
raised by one of the union representatives I interviewed during the data collection phase in June-July 
2013:  
“One thing we expect from the government is: When investors come to this country, they will 
tell them that they can get extra manpower for a cheap price.  But if they wouldn't do this, they 
[investors] would respect the workers more. And they [government] don't follow up what 's 
going on in the companies after they gave a license” (union representative, non-certified farm)  
Government regulations have a strong legal basis and are mandatory. However in many developing 
countries, governments lack the desire or capacity to enforce labour standards. Moreover labour 
regulations often seem ill designed or incomplete which raises the question to which extent they 
actually are designed to raise social conditions (Candland, 2007; Gereffi & Lee, 2016; Pyke & Lund-
Thomsen, 2015). Especially in the neo-liberal world of today, there has been a trend towards 
‘deregulating’ labour markets, whereby countries that provided labour protection often were being 
accused of providing a poor investment climate or of being ‘anti-competitive’ (Utting, 2005).  
At the vertical (GVC) governance level, public governance is exercised by international organisations 
such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) or World Trade Organisation (WTO). It can also be 
exercised through bilateral or multilateral trade agreements, such as the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) (Gereffi & Lee, 2016). With regards to social conditions in the Ethiopian cut 
flower industry, Core Conventions of the ILO constitute a central element of flower farms 
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accountability. These Conventions have been negotiated at an international level on a tripartite basis 
between governments, employers and trade unions (Barrientos & Smith, 2007). ILO Conventions are 
widely referred to in social labels regulating the cut flower sector and often form the basis for national 
laws, such as the Ethiopian labour law.  
Private governance  
Private governance at the horizontal level often involves business associations whose main objective 
is representing and promoting the interests of the industry at local, national and international levels 
(Pyke & Lund-Thomsen, 2015). In the context of governing social conditions, business associations may 
develop their own Codes of Practice to monitor and self-regulate the sector (Gereffi & Lee, 2016). They 
don’t do this out of altruistic motivations but because self-regulation is in the industry’s self-interest. 
There are several reasons why industries would conduct codes of conduct, ranging from managing 
risks, being pressured by investors, consumers and/or activists, or a desire to retain and attract 
employees (Graham & Woods, 2006). Some practitioners worry that self-regulation may be an attempt 
to avoid stricter state regulations and as such need to be considered as a threat to local labour 
institutions and trade unions (Amengual, 2010).  
In Ethiopia, cut flower farms are united in the Ethiopian Horticulture Producers and Exporters 
Association (EHPEA). This association has developed a Code of Practice together with the Ethiopia 
Netherlands Horticulture Partnership Programme in 2006-2007. The Code includes three levels: 
bronze, silver and gold. The bronze level sets minimum standards for operation. The silver level sets 
standards which are equivalent to internationally recognized social standards. Finally the gold level 
goes beyond the sector benchmarks. Adherence to the bronze level is a perquisite for farms who want 
to export their flowers. Silver and gold levels are voluntary and were at the time of data collection 
(2012-2013) still under development.   
According to EHPEA, the main motivation of the association to develop this Code of Practice is because 
they recognise the need and responsibility of the industry to implement sustainable practices, to 
provide safe working conditions and to protect the local environment. By doing so they hope to remain 
competitive and to enhance the reputation of the Ethiopian flower sector at international level. 
Moreover this code of practice tries to be a response to the concerns raised by the Ethiopian 
government, civil society and the wider international public.  
The sector is very vulnerable to negative publicity. Cut flowers are a luxury product which are often 
bought as a gift to friends or relatives. Flowers are easily substitutable. One can simply decide to buy 
a bottle of wine or chocolates instead of flowers to give as a present (Alexandra Hughes, 2000; 
Rodriguez, Hernandez, & Quevedo, 2015). Hence, it is very important that the sector maintains a good 
40
CONTEXT 
reputation. Especially because consumers do not know from which farm the flowers originate, there 
is the potential risk that one badly performing farm damages the reputation of the entire sector. 
Because of the vulnerable position the sector finds itself in, there are also industry initiatives taken at 
the vertical (GVC) governance level. Most important initiative came from the Netherlands, which is the 
international market leader for flowers. In 1995, Dutch growers together with the Dutch flower 
auctions founded a business standard called Milieu Programma Sierteelt (MPS). It is one of the oldest 
labelling schemes for flowers and until today one of the most popular schemes for the sector. It is 
active in more than 55 countries, counting over 4000 certified growers. It has an environmental label 
(MPS A, B and C) with a social option (MPS-SQ). The social option is based on universal human rights 
and requires the enforcement of core ILO conventions, including promoting freedom of association 
and collective bargaining, no discrimination, no child and no forced labour (Barrientos, 2008).  
Social governance 
In the 1980s it became clear that host governments were not able to defend labour rights and so civil 
society actors, such as NGOs and trade unions, became favoured partners for guaranteeing decent 
working conditions in the 1990s and beyond (Amengual, 2010). It was believed that the social 
standards these actors were setting, were much more efficient and therefore more able to pressure 
firms to adhere to minimum labour practices than host government regulations (Graham & Woods, 
2006).  
This form of governance is mostly voluntary, and generally relies on the willingness and actions of firms 
to implement these standards and to allow third-party audits to take place on their factories. Partly 
for this reason, most social governance systems involve multiple stakeholders (including public, private 
and civil society actors) pursuing common goals and acting together to regulate workers’ rights and 
labour conditions (Gereffi & Lee, 2016).  
This form of joint governance can be more effective than one type of governance alone in achieving 
improved social conditions (Gereffi & Lee, 2016; Locke, 2013; Mayer, 2014). Moreover, social 
governance can complement public regulation. Instead of replacing state labour regulation, social 
governance actors can relieve pressure from scarce state resources so that local governments can use 
these scarce resources to those sectors in the country which are exclusively producing for the domestic 
market and which are often characterised by even worse labour conditions than found in export-
oriented industries (Amengual, 2010).  
On the other hand however, the proliferation of ‘sustainability’ standard initiatives has created an 
entire market of standards leading to competition between these standard initiatives. This competition 
can be counterproductive in terms of empowerment, making room for a race towards the lowest 
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standards. Past studies have warned us for the potential risk that certifications which seek to raise 
social expectations, are going to be challenged by those certification schemes that simply seek to 
uphold current conditions (Raynolds, Murray, & Heller, 2007; Riisgaard, 2011). 
The cut flower industry is a textbook example of an industry in which many certification schemes exist 
in parallel. In all, there are at least 20 different social and/ or environmental schemes regulating cut 
flower exporti (Dolan & Opondo, 2005; Riisgaard, 2011). With regards to the cut flower industry in 
Ethiopia, there are two well-established certification schemes operating, with new initiatives entering 
Ethiopia in recent years. The two well-known multi-stakeholder initiatives in Ethiopia are the Ethical 
Trading Initiative (ETI) and Fair Flowers Fair Plants (FFP).  
The Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) originates from an alliance of UK companies, NGOs and trade unions. 
This UK initiative promotes the implementation of corporate codes of practice, covering international 
supply chain working conditions. It is a generic label, focusing on a broad range of products including 
flowers, clothing, shoes, food and drinks and other products (Barrientos & Smith, 2007; Alex Hughes, 
Buttle, & Wrigley, 2007). As is stated on the MPS website, MPS-SQ is practically equal to the ETI label. 
Fair Flowers Fair Plants (FFP) was founded in 2005 by the international floricultural trade association 
Union Fleurs and several NGOs and unions (Riisgaard, 2011). It is estimated that FFP has around 160 
flower growers certified (of which 65 cut flowers) in four countries (the Netherlands, Kenya, Ecuador 
and Ethiopia). Together these growers have a 4% market share of worldwide production volume (ITC, 
2013). It has both an environmental and a social component. Growers who have implemented MPS-A 
together with MPS-SQ, can easily obtain FFP as both MPS schemes have been benchmarked to FFP.  
In terms of horizontal social governance in Ethiopia, local NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs) 
in Ethiopia face many legal barriers posed by the government. Hence, social governance at the 
horizontal level is considered the weakest form of governance for pressuring good social conditions in 
the Ethiopian cut flower industry. In 2009, the Ethiopian government adopted the Charities and 
Societies Proclamation (CSP) which has made the work of NGOs and human rights organisations 
virtually impossible. The law violates ILO standards relating to the freedom of association, especially 
with regards to access to funding. The Proclamation restricts NGOs and CSOs that receive more than 
10% of their funding from abroad from involvement and participation in essentially all human rights 
and advocacy activities. This Proclamation has been heavily criticised by international organisations 
because the legal barriers this Proclamation sets for civil society seem to serve one purpose only and 
that is of silencing civil society in Ethiopia (Bader, 2013; ICNL, 2015).   
Nevertheless, there are some civil society organisations which advocate and lobby at the national level 
for improving or implementing labour laws aiming to improve the working conditions on flower farms. 
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These organisations include for instance Women Working Worldwide (WWW) and Global Horticultural 
Workers and Environmental Rights Network (GHOWERN). WWW is a leading member of the Gender 
Working Group with the ETI. Their main activities are to support and empower female workers 
employed in value chains supplying to European markets. GHOWERN is a regional network of activists 
and trade unionists across East Africa. Their aim is to eliminate sexual harassment from the workplace 
and communities surround the farms (Women Working Worldwide, 2012). To end, the Confederation 
of Ethiopian Trade Unions is the largest workers’ organisation in Ethiopia whose main purpose is to 
defend workers’ rights and labour conditions. Table 1 summarises the distinct forms of governance 
regulating the cut flower industry in Ethiopia.  
 
 
  
Table 1. Distinct forms of governance regulating the cut flower industry in Ethiopia 
Actor Scope  
 Horizontal (cluster)  
governance 
Vertical (GVC)  
governance 
Public 
governance 
Ethiopian labour law ILO Conventions  
 
Private 
governance 
EHPEA’s Code of Practice MPS-SQ (business standard) 
Social 
governance   
Local civil society (GHOWERN, WWW) 
 and trade union (CETU) 
ETI, FFP (collective standards) 
Based on Gereffi and Lee (2016) 
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COMPARING THE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS  
In this section we examine all governance systems identified in the previous section, with the exception 
of social governance systems at the horizontal level. Though the trade union (CETU) and local civil 
society organisations (GHOWERN, WWW) are important advocators of good working conditions, they 
do not set out specific criteria governing the cut flower industry. Hence, these governance actors are 
left out of the analysis in this section.  
We compare the other five governance systems through the examination of nine social criteria. We 
selected these nine criteria based on the checklist of the international business standard MPS-SQ, 
because this standard is the most comprehensive one governing the cut flower industry. With the 
exception of three criteria -discrimination, maternity leave and forced labour-, all social criteria listed 
in MPS-SQ were included in the analysis. The other three criteria were excluded because of the 
following reasons: with regards to discrimination, we did not have the data to check whether there 
was no discrimination in hiring, compensation, access to training, promotion, termination or 
retirement. With regards to maternity leave, only 7 respondents (of a total of 237 female respondents) 
answered they had been pregnant while working on a flower farm. Though this is an interesting finding 
in itself, the lack of sufficient responses makes it difficult to make conclusive statements on this matter. 
Finally, forced labour was not an issue on these flower farms. 
Table 2 provides an overview of the nine social criteria and how the different actors of the five 
governance systems analysed, take these criteria into account. The first column provides a detailed 
explanation of each criteria as set by MPS-SQ. The second column presents the corresponding ILO 
Conventions which are widely referred to in the social standards governing the cut flower industry and 
which form the basis for the Ethiopian labour law. In the following columns, it is shown if public (the 
Ethiopian labour law), private (MPS-SQ and Code of Practice bronze and silver level) and social (ETI and 
FFP) governance systems, demand adherence to each specific social criteria or not. Where there is 
written a ‘minor’ it means that according to that specific standard, the criteria is a ‘minor must’.  
The Ethiopian labour law is less strict than the vertical governance systems in terms of wages, paid 
leave, healthy work environment, trade union rights and child labour. With regards to wages, the 
Ethiopian government does not set minimum wages nor does it make reference to what would be an 
appropriate minimum standard of wage. Payments in kind are allowed (as long as it does not exceed 
30% of the wage paid) and in certain situations wage deductions as disciplinary measures are also 
allowed (as long as it does not exceed one-third of a monthly wage). With regards to the other social 
criteria, it is shown that the labour law is less strict in terms of paid leave (2 weeks instead of 3 weeks), 
44
CONTEXT 
has not ratified the chemical convention (C170) and the Workers' Representatives Convention (C135), 
and allows child labour from the age of 14 years onwards (instead of 15 years) (C138).  
When studying the internationally recognized private social standards, it is clear that MPS-SQ is the 
most comprehensive standard setting the strictest regulations. FFP is almost the same as MPS-SQ and 
uses this standard as a benchmark. The only difference is that FFP does not make explicit reference to 
wage deductions whereas MPS-SQ does.  
ETI differs from both standards in the sense that this standard is less comprehensive. It comprises nine 
principles which are based on core ILO and related Conventions. This standard does not mention 
anything about paid leave nor about the necessity of a women’s committee. It is less detailed with 
regards to criteria on health and safety. Moreover ETI’s definition of child labour is less strict than MPS-
SQ and FFP. They consider the local minimum age law which is set at 14 years of age appropriate 
because it is in accordance to developing country exceptions under ILO Convention 138.  
With regards to EHPEA’s Code of Practice it is clear that the minimum bronze level which is necessary 
for flower farms to be able to export their flowers, follows to a large extent the Ethiopian labour law. 
Criteria set on wages and paid leave are copied from the labour law. In addition, the bronze level is 
less strict when it comes to monitoring workers’ health and safety because it is limited to personnel 
handling pesticides. The silver level of EHPEA’s Code of Practice on the other hand includes 
requirements which are already more equivalent to the content of the internationally recognized 
standards. With the exception of paid leave which is still set at 2 weeks rather than 3 weeks, it is similar 
to the criteria set by MPS-SQ. 
Hence, from the analysis of the different criteria summarized in table 2 it follows that the horizontal 
governance systems (Ethiopian labour law and EHPEA’s minimum Code of Practice Bronze) are less 
strict than the vertical governance systems (ILO Conventions, MPS-SQ, ETI, FFP) in terms of setting 
working conditions.
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ANALYSING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS IN THE FARMS  
After comparing the social criteria set by the different governance systems, we now continue by 
analysing if and how the five flower farms in this study implemented these nine criteria. Table 3 gives 
an overview of the five farms and the private social standards (PSS) these farms were certified with. At 
the time of the fieldwork, two of the flower farms were already certified for more than three years 
with at least one PSS, one flower farm had recentlyxi been certified with MPS-SQ and the other two 
flower farms had not adopted any internationally recognized PSS. All five farms off course had to follow 
the Ethiopian labour law and the bronze level of the Code of Practice to be permitted to export.  
Table 3. Description of farms  
Start of 
operation 
Number of 
workers 
Internationally 
recognized 
PSS? 
Since when 
recognized?  
Certified farms Farm A 2005 400-450 MPS-SQ 
FFP 
ETI 
2010 
2011 
2013 
Farm B 2005 390-455 MPS-SQ 2010 
Recently certified 
farm 
Farm C 2005 300-340 MPS-SQ 2013 
Non-certified farms Farm D 2006 260-330 - 
Farm E 2008 220-250 - 
To analyse the nine social criteria in the flower farms, we built on several of the data collected for the 
thesis: the survey, the focus groups and the interviews with managers. We surveyed about 75 workers 
per farm. These workers performed different job functions within the farm, including packaging, 
grading, spraying, crop maintenance and supervising. The survey included, among other things, 
questions related to the nine working conditions criteria examined in this study. In total we surveyed 
375 workers and after removal of uncompleted questionnaires, we obtained a final sample of 358 
cases (237 women, 121 men). To help to interpret the empirical data, we conducted six focus group 
discussions: one per farm and one combining workers from all five farms. These focus groups only 
targeted female workers and included 4 to 14 participants. During these discussions we compared 
working conditions between farms and other job opportunities in the area to understand which 
working conditions really mattered and to gain insights into workers’ perceptions about these 
conditions. All focus groups were recorded and transcribed. 
Throughout the result section we also draw on quotes from managements’ in-depth interviews, which 
we conducted in June-July 2013 on each of the five flower farms. These quotes serve the purpose of 
illustrating how labour turnover sometimes affected the implementation of the criteria set. Each of 
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these five interviews took approximately one to one hour and a half, and was recorded and 
transcribed. In the following sub-sections, we now turn our attention to explain each of the nine social 
criteria and how these have been implemented in the certified farms, recently certified farm and non-
certified farms.  
Wage 
All farms paid similar wages to their workers. On average a monthly wage was between 550 and 600 
birr/ month (23 to 25 euro/ month). The main reason we found such similar wages across both certified 
and non-certified farms can be attributed to the high levels of labour turnover that these farms were 
facing: in order to reduce internal competition, flower farms had entered into unofficial wage 
agreements which included paying comparable wages and increasing wage rates on the same day.  
This oral, informal collusion at cluster level however kept wages low. Around 84% of our respondents 
answered that their wages were not enough to meet their basic needs, meaning that their wages were 
not enough for the worker and his/her dependents to feed, clothe and house themselves. During the 
focus groups, women explained that because their wages were too low, they had to restrict their 
needs. Examples of how to do so included buying second hand clothing instead of new clothing, buying 
cosmetics or shoes only twice or three times a year, renting a cheap house and sharing one room with 
two or three people. Others said they were living on a ‘credit after credit’ basis.  
“When we start working, we didn't expect the money to cover all our expenses. At least, the 
money would cover half of our expenses and our family would support the other half of our 
expenses. For example, for me the money I get paid is only for home rent and for school for my 
kid” (focus group participant, certified farm)     
“When I think of the work and the money I get paid, sometimes I'll get angry. This is my first 
work and when I think of it, it’s true that I deserve 50 birr a day. But we don't have a choice” 
(focus group participant, certified farm)  
Moreover, the survey data and focus groups highlighted that workers did not understand how their 
wages were structured. Besides their formal wage, they also received bonuses and penalties for a 
variety of reasons, making it very hard for workers to understand why their wages differed from month 
to month. Reasons given by workers why they sometimes received a bonus included: hard working, no 
absenteeism (attendance bonus), having met targets (productivity bonus) and working during holidays 
(overtime premium rate). Reasons given by workers for being disciplined in the form of a wage 
deduction included: absenteeism, losing or breaking material, laziness and having a poor record 
system. All farms seemed to have adopted this complex carrot-stick approach, with the exception of 
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one farm. This farm, which was a not-certified farm, did not believe in bonuses but only foresaw in 
penalties. Though managers argued that a carrot-stick approach was the best way to motivate workers, 
our findings suggest the need to make the wage structure more transparent and more simple than it 
was at the time of our data collection.  
“If you're absent, you know that you'll get a reduction of wage, it's obvious. But this one is… 
they'll say sometimes it's the fault of the computer. That it [the computer] made a mistake. For 
example, we get 530 birr a month, but sometimes we'll get 500 or 490 birr. We will just talk to 
each other that they reduced our salary, but we won't say anything to the management, 
because you don't have any choice” (focus group participant, not-certified farm).  
Contract  
The majority of the workers we interviewed (68%) had a permanent contract. The main reason 
explaining why workers did not have a permanent contract was because they were still in their 
probation period (which has a duration of 45 days). However, we did find some small differences 
between certified and non-certified farms. In the two certified farms, it was shown that only 10% of 
the workers we interviewed, were employed on a temporary basis whereas over 28% of the workers 
in the newly certified and non-certified farms were employed on a temporary basis. Moreover, 
whereas all workers in the old certified farms received a permanent contract after their probation 
period, this did not appear to be the case in the newly certified and non-certified farms where we 
found several workers stating they still were employed on a temporary basis even after having worked 
there for more than two or three months.   
At first sight it may seem surprising that so many workers were hired on a permanent basis given the 
seasonal nature of flower production, however there are two reasons explaining our high figures. First, 
data collection took place in the low season and so there was no demand for seasonal labour. Second, 
in a context marked by high levels of labour turnover, giving workers a permanent contract is easily 
done. Managers are counting on the fact that workers will voluntarily leave their wage work after a 
given period. The fact that managers even admitted to hire more labour than was actually necessary, 
really shows that workers were considered a ‘disposable good’, having an expiration date, regardless 
of the type of contract they were employed on:  
“At least 40% are permanent, stable here. Then, about 30% you can take them, either next year 
they will go in the 40% or they will join the turnover. 30% is always [on the move]…” (manager, 
certified farm) 
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What is more is that this criteria which aims to give workers a sense of job security, though well-
intended, had a undesirable side effect of inducing labour turnover. Workers who received a 
permanent contract after 45 days, saw their wage decline because they suddenly had to start paying 
taxes and pensions contributions. Because the wages were already considered extremely low, several 
workers didn’t like this and therefore they continuously tried to move in and out of the farm, juggling 
between short term assignments like road construction and their flower farm job:   
“And then, maybe by that time they will come here to work for us and then when they get that 
advantage [of finding a short term alternative job opportunity] again, they will return back. 
And then also in the government policy, also they have to pay pension. So if they become 
permanent, after the 45 days, it means the wage will include to pay pension for them. It is the 
government regulation, we have to adapt! So they don’t want. They don’t want to pay for a 
pension [and because of this they leave]” (manager, certified farm) 
Work hours and overtime  
A regular working day consists of 8 working hours and a maximum of 2 overtime hours. Workers are 
allowed to work six days in a week and need to have one day off. In general, respondents answered 
they worked 48 hours per week. One limitation of our survey was that it did not ask workers about the 
maximum amount of overtime they did in one week, so we do not have any information on this. 
Nonetheless, our survey results did show that working overtime was mostly considered voluntary and 
that it was compensated at a premium rate. The majority of workers (70%) strongly agreed with the 
statement ‘I like to work overtime’. Our focus group discussions revealed that this was because 
workers heavily relied on overtime to make ends meet. So with regards to working hours and overtime 
all farms were complying with the regulations. However it needs to be mentioned that not all female 
workers were enthusiastic about having a work week of 48 hours, possibly topped with 12 hours 
overtime a week:  
“One thing that makes me really upset about [certified farm] is working very late night time. 
Because it is not safe when we walk home after the bus. Especially for ladies, it's really 
dangerous to walk home late at night. And after they get home, they have to cook and do other 
things; so they will go to sleep very late and wake up early to go to work” (focus group 
participant, certified farm)  
“That one day is never enough. And six days, in which you have to stand the whole day; and 
only one day you get off, and you have to go to the market and visit people, so it's not enough 
to get some rest” (focus group participant, not-certified farm)  
50
CONTEXT 
Paid leave  
Probably the most pronounced difference between certified and non-certified farms was in terms of 
paid leave. Whereas workers employed in certified farms stated they received 3 weeks of paid leave, 
workers employed in the two non-certified farms indicated they only had 2 weeks of holidays. Here it 
is clear that non-certified farms simply followed the Ethiopian labour law, while certified farms 
adhered to the criteria set by the social standards. This paid leave was also very much appreciated by 
workers in the certified farms because it gave them the opportunity to sometimes be absent without 
having a deduction in wage:  
“I don't think [certified farm] has a bad side. It’s my first farm where I started working, and one 
thing that I like about [this farm] is that if we are absent with a reason, we can change that 
day to our annual leave” (focus group participant, certified farm)   
Managers of certified farms also indicated that these three weeks of paid leave was an important tool 
to reduce absenteeism. Whereas in the past many workers became demotivated of having lost their 
attendance bonus when having been absent for one work day, or fired after having been absent for 
five consecutive days, they were now taught to inform their supervisors in advance and to use the paid 
leave to cover their absenteeism:  
“Sometimes most of the absenteeism is on a market days. In Debre Zeyit that is on Saturday 
and on Wednesday, yeah. You will find some absenteeism on that. But comparing to the 
previous, now it is better. Because we started teaching them a lot. We have a training officer. 
Every supervisor is training his people on duties and responsibilities, policies of the company. 
And they get to know that one. They have leave of maybe 21 days. They did not use it, they 
were just being absent without informing you. Once they were absent, they lost their wage, 
they lost their advantage. But now they are more aware of this policy. They have the right to 
ask leave and so absenteeism is now getting low” (manager, certified farm) 
“They will inform you to make the leave. And mostly they will take the leave. Absenteeism, no. 
absenteeism nowadays is low. Only in one department, mostly they are processing their 
passport, you know to go to Arab countries, for such things they will not take a leave. They will 
be afraid that you know and as such… such mentality” (manager, certified farm)  
Healthy work environment  
With regards to the first two criteria on health and safety issues (corresponding to ILO Conventions 
170 and 55) our data does not provide the necessary information to be able to evaluate these criteria. 
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However throughout all focus group discussions, examples were given indicating that safety 
regulations sometimes were bended or violated when there was time pressure:  
“If there are a lot of flower to harvest, they'll give them only ten minutes [for re-entering the 
greenhouses]” (focus group participant, certified farm) 
“Long time ago, I got in a fight with my supervisor, because I said I won't go in because the 
chemicals were not dry yet. But the others got in. Then they called me to the office and they 
took some money from my wage” (focus group participant, certified farm) 
With regards to the third criteria, our survey data revealed that workers in certified farms received 
medical check-ups whereas workers employed in non-certified farms did not. In the recently certified 
farm the number of workers having received a medical check-up was however substantially lower than 
in the other certified farms. Throughout the focus group discussions it became also clear that workers 
in certified farms received better health care than workers employed in non-certified farms when they 
got sick or when there was a work-related accident:  
“[In the certified farm] they 'll take us to the hospital immediately if we get sick. And there is 
no one who will abuse your rights and all workers know there rights and duties. And also, after 
spraying in [the certified farm] you don't have to work. You have to wait some time. But in [the 
not-certified farm], you have to work” (focus group participant, certified farm)   
“[In the not-certified farm] when we get sick, they'll take us to hospital, but they have only a 
limited budget for healthcare. So we get only painkillers. They give you a paper and when you 
take that paper to the hospital, they know that it is credit and that they can only give you 
painkillers and paracetamol” (focus group participant, not-certified farm)  
More specifically with regards to these medical examinations, both the Ethiopian labour law and social 
standards expect that the flower farms arranged a medical examination of newly employed workers 
and for those workers engaging in hazardous work. Given the high rate of labour turnover however, 
this brought in an extra cost to flower farm operations:  
“Look, with our turnover, they ask medical check-up upon employment. Okay, I can do it. It is 
costly, but I can do it. But how often? Turnover per month is going to be around 35% on average 
for the last year. 35, you employ them, check him, next month he’s out” (manager, certified 
farm) 
To end, based on the observations during field visits to the farms I concluded that workers in certified 
farms had access to drinking water, toilets, a cafeteria and storage facilities for food and drinks. In the 
non-certified farms most of this infrastructure was missing. In one not-certified farm there was only 
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one toilet for the entire pack house whereby workers had to ask for the key to unlock the toilet to the 
general manager. The general manager explained that this was to avoid sexual harassment taking place 
in the restrooms.   
Work clothing 
In terms of work clothing there was a large difference between certified and non-certified farms. In all 
three certified farms the majority of workers received overalls and gloves. Workers employed in the 
greenhouses sometimes also received boots. Workers employed in the non-certified farms however 
often just received gloves:  
“They [workers employed in certified farm] have overall clothing, and everything is complete. 
They have gloves. But in our farm [non-certified] we only have gloves and we work with our 
own clothes” (focus group participant, not-certified farm) 
In four out of the five flower farms, all sprayers received an overall, gloves, boots and respirators. In 
the non-certified farm which was breaching this criteria, sprayers only received gloves and a mask. 
Everyone (including sprayers, greenhouse and pack house workers) who received work clothing had to 
wash the clothing themselves.  
Work clothing was one of the major points that workers complained about. Our survey data shows 
that there was a gap between workers thinking they needed work clothing (75% strongly agreed with 
the statement ‘I need protective work clothing during my job’) and workers who actually received work 
clothing (only 63% received work clothing). During the focus group discussions, several workers 
complained that their own clothing became dirty and wet while working, or that the thorns snagged 
their clothing. Moreover they complained that they didn’t got soap to wash their clothing.  
Child labour  
Whereas the Ethiopian labour law and ETI prescribe that workers from the age of 14 years can be 
employed, all other governance systems prohibit the employment of workers under the age of 15 
years. Hence, as flower farms need to adhere to at least the bronze level of the Code of Practice to be 
able to export their flowers and ornamentals, one can expect that there are no workers under the age 
of 15 working in the flower farms. Our survey sample however counted two child workers (12 and 14 
years old). Though this does not guarantee that these are very big exceptions, we do find it appropriate 
to nuance this non-compliance found both in a recently certified and in a non-certified farm. Both 
children were still school-going and both of them reported the highest intention to leave the farm. This 
suggests that they were approaching their work in the flower farm as a student job and that they were 
planning on returning to school once the academic year started again.  
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With regards to the employment of young persons under 18, all certified farms hired from the age of 
sixteen (with the exception of the child worker of 12 years old) and onwards while non-certified farms 
hired from the age of fifteen and onwards (with the exception of the child worker of 14 years old). 
None of these workers however worked at night or were employed as sprayers. The motivation of 
certified farms to only start hiring at the age of 16 was that some of them had finished school at that 
age, while all 15 year olds were still supposed to attend school to finish their secondary education.  
Trade union 
When focusing solely on the criteria set out by different governance systems to regulate workers’ 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, it could be concluded that certified farms complied 
with this in practice. In all certified farms there are workers being a member of the trade union which 
indicates that the rights of all workers to form and join trade unions and bargain collectively, are 
recognized and workers representatives have access to all workplaces necessary to enable them to 
carry out their representation functions. A limitation of the workers’ survey is that it did not capture 
questions related to possible discrimination of workers representatives or members, making it hard to 
evaluate this condition. Trade union rights in the non-certified farms however show an entirely 
different picture. In one farm there was no union established while in the other farm, management 
strongly opposed the union. However as will be discussed in the third article on the impediments to 
workplace unionism, all existing unions were facing tremendous difficulties and were lacking serious 
bargaining power.  
Women committee 
Four out of five farms had a women committee established. Yet, the level of awareness amongst 
female workers of its existence differed between the farms. In the old certified farms, half of the 
respondents knew there was a women committee. In the newly certified, 33% of the respondents were 
aware of this committee whereas only 22% of the respondents in the non-certified farm knew that 
there was a women committee. Low levels of awareness may be attributed to the high rotation of 
workers. Regardless of these low levels of awareness, this women committee did appear to be useful 
for gender related issues:  
Moderator: “if you have a problem, can you talk to her [responsible of women committee] 
easily and can she change anything or help you?”  
Respondent: “Yes, for example, when I gave birth, she convinced the management that I could 
come on the second bus at 8 a.m.” (focus group participant, certified farm)  
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Summary of the nine social criteria  
Table 4 summarizes the working conditions set by the different governance systems and shows 
whether the different farms (certified, recently certified and non-certified farms) complied with the 
criteria set by the different standards (yes/no). Where it was considered relevant to show differences 
in levels of non-compliances, a distinction was made between ‘minor non-compliance’ and ‘major non-
compliance’. An * means that the farm was not in compliance with the strict regulations set by the 
private social standards, but that they were complying with the less strict regulations set by the 
Ethiopian government. 
Our findings suggest that certified farms indeed complied with the criteria of social standards. The 
findings also suggest that there may be a learning curve: whereas the older certified farms seemed to 
comply entirely with private social standards, we did encounter some violations of standard criteria in 
the newly certified farm. Given that standard criteria were in several aspects stricter than national 
regulations, certified farms performed better in terms of social conditions than non-certified farms. 
More specifically, we found better conditions in the certified farms in terms of job security, healthy 
work environment, paid leave and work clothing.  
Non-certified farms only had to comply to the Ethiopian labour law and the bronze level of EHPEA’s 
Code of Practice, both of which are very similar in terms of content. In the non-certified farms we did 
identify some breaches of these regulations. In these farms, workers often lacked work clothing and 
hadn’t received a medical check-up upon employment. Some of them were also employed on a daily 
contract, even after their probation period of 45 days. In one of the non-certified farms there was also 
no trade union nor was there a women committee. There are several potential explanations for these 
non-compliances. One explanation is that the Ethiopian government does not have the means to 
enforce these regulations (Amengual, 2010). It has often been argued that private social standards are 
in response to government’s failure to regulate foreign investments because they lack the resources 
to do so (Locke et al., 2009). Another explanation could be that the Ethiopian government is reluctant 
to punish investors for not complying with the law while they are still ‘starting up’ their businesses. 
The Ethiopian government has made tremendous efforts to attract flower farms, promising them 
abundant labour supplies and much lower wages than other flower producing countries (Gebreeyesus 
& Sonobe, 2012). Hence, it could be that the government doesn’t want to scare off current and future 
investors. A final explanation could be that some of the criteria are not considered a priority by the 
government. For instance, trade unions or women committees are probably not much valued by the 
Ethiopian government given that this government has tried to silence its own civil society in recent 
years (Bader, 2013).    
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i Riisgaard (2011) identified 20 social and environmental standards in cut flowers. These standards differ in geographical 
scope, origins and structure. Not all of these standards can be found in Ethiopia. Those that can be found in Ethiopia 
include: MPS-ABC, MPS-SQ, FFP, ETI, FLO, GlobalGAP. In this study we only focus on the three most popular private and 
social schemes regulating working conditions (MPS-SQ, FFP and ETI). 
ii Payment in kind is possible as long as it does not exceed 30% of wage paid in cash 
iii Except where it is provided otherwise by law or collective agreement or work rules or in accordance with a court order or 
a written agreement of the worker. The amount in aggregate that may be deducted at any one time, from the worker's 
wage shall in no case exceed one-third of his monthly wages 
iv  Follows the Ethiopian labour law  
v Workers must have at least 2 weeks of paid leave per year 
vi Follows the Ethiopian labour law 
vii Follows the Ethiopian labour law 
viii Only health of personnel handling pesticides must be monitored 
ix It is prohibited to employ persons under 14 years of age 
x Follows the Ethiopian labour law 
xi This farm was certified six months before the data collection took place 
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ARTICLE 1 
Predicting Job Satisfaction and Workers’ Intentions to Leave 
at the bottom of the High Value Agricultural Chain: Evidence 
from the Ethiopian Cut Flower Industry 
Abstract. While there is a large body of research focusing on working conditions in labour intensive 
industries, none has yet considered how workers themselves perceive their own working conditions. 
This article draws on a sample of workers from the cut flower sector industry in Ethiopia to examine 
the extent to which workers are satisfied with their jobs and to explore the relationship between job 
satisfaction and intention to leave. Results suggest that a positive evaluation of extrinsic organizational 
rewards (wage, job security and healthy environment) contributes to workers’ job satisfaction. 
Dissatisfied workers report higher intentions to leave their job in the flower farms. In addition to low 
levels of job satisfaction, having alternative livelihood strategies is a key determining factor in the 
intention to leave. Interestingly, being a member of an informal savings net organized at the work floor 
mitigates the intention to leave. The article ends with some implications for managers and policy 
makers, along with limitations and suggestions for future research.  
Based on: 
Staelens, L., Desiere, S., Louche, C. and D’Haese, M. (2016). Predicting job satisfaction and workers’ 
intentions to leave at the bottom of the high value agricultural chain: evidence from the Ethiopian cut 
flower industry. The International Journal of Human Resource Management. (Accepted) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Globalization and global competition has led to a relocation of low technology, labour intensive 
industries towards countries where labour is cheaper (Scott, 2006). These industries are often referred 
to as engines of growth in developing countries, since they perform well in terms of job creation and 
generating foreign earnings (Scott, 2006; Ulrich, 2014). At the same time however, there is a growing 
concern that the contributions these labour intensive industries make to development are highly 
uneven distributed within these countries as the workers themselves often face long working hours 
for low wages under poor working conditions (Hale & Opondo, 2005; Riisgaard, 2009).  
Past research has focused on the social and human consequences for workers employed in these 
industries. These studies mainly used objective measures of job quality in attempts to critically 
evaluate current working conditions (Hale & Opondo, 2005), analysing the existing disparities between 
current work practices and benchmarks for working conditions that are framed in several certification 
schemes, codes of conducts and in labour regulations (Barrientos & Smith, 2007; Locke, Amengual, & 
Mangla, 2009; Raynolds, 2012; Riisgaard, 2011; Yu, 2008) and researching the potential of different 
actors (including labour unions, local NGOs and accreditation bodies) to improve current working 
conditions (Lund-Thomsen & Nadvi, 2010; Riisgaard, 2009, 2011). To date, what is missing in this field 
of research is any inclusion of workers’ own perceptions about their working conditions; how workers 
themselves evaluate the quality of their working life.  
We consider this an important research gap in literature on working conditions at the bottom of global 
value chains, especially because several papers have demonstrated a clear link between workers’ levels 
of job satisfaction and labour market behaviour (Mobley, 1977; Mueller & Price, 1990). Workers with 
high levels of job satisfaction are less likely to quit (Aguiar Do Monte, 2012; Jiang, Baker, & Frazier, 
2009), tend to show positive workplace behaviour and perform better (Ellickson & Logsdon, 2001). 
Conversely, low levels of job satisfaction result in higher absenteeism and labour turnover rates 
(Aletraris, 2010; Lee & Bruvold, 2003; Linz & Semykina, 2012). To our knowledge, the theorised link 
between job satisfaction and voluntary labour turnover has not yet been empirically examined in the 
context of labour intensive industries where low skilled workers have few alternative job opportunities 
to turn to.  
This paper draws on the cut flower industry in Ethiopia, a sector chosen as it exhibits the key 
characteristics of a labour intensive industry. This paper addresses two research questions. What are 
the determinants of job satisfaction in cut flower farms in Ethiopia? And, does job satisfaction influence 
workers’ intentions to leave their job? This study is unique as it directly investigates workers’ own 
judgments about labour conditions at the bottom of a high value agricultural chain (in this case for 
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roses). In a country where agriculture provides work to many households and contributes significantly 
to export earnings, it is highly relevant for employers and policy makers alike to consider job 
satisfaction levels and quitting behaviour.  
From an employers’ perspective, this study may offer valuable information about workers’ labour 
market behaviour. Labour intensive industries are mostly part of buyer-driven value chains which 
means that key decisions about delivery, cost and quality of the products are taken by large retailers 
(Dolan & Humphrey, 2000). Adherence to these external requirements is decisive for companies 
inclusion within the chain, but requires a steady workforce, willing to work long hours and capable of 
providing high quality produce within specified delivery times (Riisgaard, 2009). Having satisfied 
workers with positive job attitudes (that is to say a steady and disciplined workforce) is a key ingredient 
in meeting these goals. 
From the perspective of development policy, our findings highlight the importance of having policies 
that do not limit themselves to job creation as it would be a too narrow approach. Job satisfaction has 
been recognised to be an important component of individual well-being (Green, 2010; OECD, 2013; 
Sousa-Poza & Sousa-Poza, 2000). Hence, policy makers need to take into account both the objective 
(externally evaluated) and the subjective (as perceived by workers) quality of the jobs provided, but 
the latter is under-researched for workers at the bottom of agricultural value chains. Understanding 
what makes people (dis)satisfied with their jobs should be central to any employment-oriented 
development policy.   
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
This section introduces the theoretical considerations that underpin our research. First, we review the 
literature on job satisfaction and its determinants and we contextualize these theoretical 
underpinnings by applying them to the Ethiopian cut flower industry. Second, building from human 
resource management we explore the link between job satisfaction and labour turnover/ decisions 
about quitting. We combine these insights with literature on livelihood strategies to identify the 
alternatives that workers have, which may play an influential role in their decision about quitting.  
Job satisfaction 
Job satisfaction has been defined in different ways, from the degree to which someone likes his/her 
job (Spector, 1997, p. 2), to the degree of fit between actual job rewards and workers expected job 
rewards (Clark, Oswald, & Warr, 1996), to job satisfaction as a positive (or negative) evaluative 
judgment one makes about one’s job or job situation (Weiss, 2002, p. 6). Implicit in all definitions is 
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the importance of on the one hand affect or feeling, and on the other hand cognition or thinking (Lan, 
Okechuku, Zhang, & Cao, 2013; Saari & Judge, 2004).  
Much research has attempted to predict job satisfaction. Theory explaining the determinants of job 
satisfaction can be categorized into content and process theories. Content theories assume that all 
individuals have needs and values which need to be met for employees to be satisfied with their job. 
Content theories include Maslow’s (1954) need hierarchy theory and Herzberg’s two-factory theory 
(Herzberg, Mausner, and Snyderman, 1958). Process theories on the other hand, attach less 
importance to the role of needs, and focus on the overall or cognitive process leading to job 
(dis)satisfaction. Process theories include expectancy (Vroom, 1964) and equity theories (Adams, 
1963).  
Both needs and content perspectives agree that job characteristics are the most important predictors 
of job satisfaction. We separate job characteristics into extrinsic rewards and intrinsic rewards 
(Aletraris, 2010). Extrinsic rewards include work aspects not directly associated with the job activity 
itself, which are more a by-product of the work (Tietjen & Myers, 1998). They occur as a consequence 
of job performance. They include both organizational and social rewards (Mottaz, 1985). The 
organizational dimension covers those rewards that are provided by the organization to motivate task 
performance while the social dimension covers those rewards that are derived from interacting with 
others in the workplace (Mulinge & Mueller, 1998).  
By contrast, intrinsic rewards are said to be related with the job activity itself (Aletraris, 2010). They 
satisfy a workers’ immaterial needs by allowing for self-expression, giving a worker the feeling that 
they accomplish something worthwhile on the job (Linz & Semykina, 2012). Both sets of rewards are 
considered important in predicting job satisfaction (Abdulla, Djebarni, & Mellahi, 2011; Mottaz, 1985).  
The aim of this study is to examine the determinants of job satisfaction among workers in the Ethiopian 
cut flower industry. In the following sub-section, we review how past studies on working conditions in 
the cut flower value chain have evaluated the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards associated with these 
jobs. Based on this discussion and the theoretical background, we then develop the hypotheses. 
Job satisfaction in the Ethiopian cut flower industry 
Labour conditions in high value agricultural chains have been subject to much criticism. This is 
especially true for the cut flower industry which has been regularly confronted with NGO campaigns, 
especially around Valentine’s Day, demanding better labour conditions for workers in the South 
(Riisgaard, 2009).  
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Cut flower value chains are increasingly organised along vertical south-north lines (Melese & Helmsing, 
2010). Producing countries are mainly situated nearby the equator, while consumers are mainly found 
in more affluent markets in the northern hemisphere. Flowers are a non-edible, perishable product 
and their production follows a seasonal demand. The demand for flowers peaks during western 
festivities such as Valentine’s Day, Mother’s Day and Easter, while the demand drops during the 
summer period in the northern hemisphere (Hale & Opondo, 2005).   
Because of these features the labour conditions within the industry are quite distinct. Extrinsic 
organizational rewards are generally limited. Workers are often hired on a seasonal or even less secure 
basis (Riisgaard, 2011) and wages are considered to be low (Hale & Opondo, 2005). Workers in the 
Ethiopian cut flower industry earn between US$0.78 and 1.67 a day, less than in other comparable 
flower producing countries (Melese & Helmsing, 2010). The industry makes intensive use of chemicals 
and fertilisers, more than are used on edible food products. Workers are often exposed to these 
agrochemicals which can pose a health hazard on them (Hale & Opondo, 2005; Riisgaard, 2011).  
By contrast the extrinsic social rewards are said to be positive, especially for female workers who make 
up the workforce in most agricultural chains (Barrientos, Dolan, & Tallontire, 2003). Most job functions 
(60-70%) are taken up by women as they are said to be more productive, more skilled at handling 
delicate flowers with care and more socially flexible than their male counterparts (Barrientos et al., 
2003). Much research has been done on the ‘feminization’ of this workforce. One theme to emerge 
from these studies is that women may have positive experiences of the new social relationships that 
come about through being in touch with other female colleagues or through committees organised at 
the workplace (for example a women’s committee, a labour union) (Friedemann-Sánchez, 2006; 
Kabeer, 2002).  
The intrinsic rewards appear to be mixed. On one hand, working in flower farms involves monotonous, 
repetitive work which requires little or no qualifications. The daily tasks for women consists of picking, 
sorting and packing the flowers while men are hired for jobs such as spraying, and maintaining and 
constructing the greenhouses (Melese & Helmsing, 2010). Equally, for most workers, it seems that this 
is their first experience with formal employment. Research has shown that wage employment in high 
value agricultural chains can be empowering and can increase women’s bargaining power 
(Friedemann-Sánchez, 2006). As such these workers may well have a sense of accomplishing 
something and doing something worthwhile. 
Following the lines of reasoning set out above, we might expect flower farm workers to evaluate the 
individual work facets related to intrinsic rewards and extrinsic social rewards as positive, but to report 
low levels of overall job satisfaction. Previous studies have shown that the importance of extrinsic 
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organizational rewards should not be underestimated. In the absence of decent wages or a sense of 
job security, low levels of job satisfaction are often found. This is because extrinsic organizational 
rewards are related to satisfying one’s basic needs and if these are not fulfilled, the other rewards may 
seem to matter less. Consequently, when basic needs such as income, job security and safety at the 
work place are met, workers will start to strive for more sophisticated needs related to extrinsic social 
rewards and intrinsic rewards (Centers & Bugental, 1966; Gruenberg, 1980).   
Therefore, the following hypotheses have been developed:  
H1: Job satisfaction is positively related to extrinsic organizational rewards  
H2: Extrinsic rewards moderate the positive relationship between intrinsic rewards and job 
satisfaction, such that when extrinsic rewards are low these rewards are not related to job 
satisfaction but when extrinsic rewards are high they are positively related to job satisfaction 
H3: Extrinsic rewards moderate the positive relationship between extrinsic social rewards and 
job satisfaction such that when extrinsic rewards are low these extrinsic social rewards are not 
related to job satisfaction but when extrinsic rewards are high, extrinsic social rewards are 
positively related to job satisfaction 
Intention to leave  
In the second part of the study we explore the link between job satisfaction and workers’ intention to 
leave. Many scholars have argued that job satisfaction directly influences absenteeism, levels of stress, 
individual wellbeing and general life satisfaction (Aletraris, 2010; Lee & Bruvold, 2003; Linz & Semykina, 
2012). Previous research has shown that workers’ dissatisfaction often results in higher probability of 
quitting one’s job (Mobley, 1977; Mobley, Griffeth, Hand, & Meglino, 1979). In the absence of high 
levels of job satisfaction, one might expect high rates of labour turnover, here defined as voluntary 
leaving a job. Hence, research in this area leads to the following hypothesis: 
H4: Job satisfaction is negatively related to workers’ intentions to leave 
However, it has also been noted that the link between job satisfaction and the quitting decision is 
complex and influenced by labour market variables (such as the availability of alternative job 
opportunities) (Lee, Mitchell, Wise, & Fireman, 1996). Labour turnover is generally seen as a 
consequence of low job satisfaction combined with alternative job opportunities that are perceived by 
an individual worker as having a higher utility (Jiang et al., 2009; Lambert, Hogan, & Barton, 2001; 
Mobley et al., 1979; Mueller & Price, 1990). While formal alternative job opportunities may be lacking 
for many of poorly educated workers in Ethiopia, there are other activities that workers can draw upon 
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to build their livelihoods, and the availability of these may influence their decision to quit their jobs at 
the flower farm.  
The availability of livelihood alternatives and the intention to leave in the Ethiopian context 
Households are said to draw on a portfolio of activities and social support capabilities on which they 
build their livelihoods (Ellis, 1998). The choice and combination of activities differs between 
households as it is influenced by many different factors such as location, access to assets (for example 
land), barriers to entry or seasonality. The goal however is the same, to survive and to improve one’s 
standards of living (Barrett, Reardon, & Webb, 2001; Ellis, 1998). The possibility of engaging in such 
activities can therefore play a role in each and every workers’ intention to leave. 
Urban and rural workers. The labour force is made up of both rural and urban workers (Mano, Yamano, 
Suzuki & Matsumoto, 2011). Rural workers come to the farms by foot, while urban workers are bussed 
in. Most of the rural workers live in households that rely on smallholder farming activities for their 
income and subsistence (Salami, Kamara & Brixioya, 2010). In the highlands, where the flower farms 
thrive, smallholder farmers cultivate teff on a seasonal basis (Lemlem, Bishop-Sambrook, Puskur & 
Tesema, 2010). The land is prepared by the men during the rainy season (in June and July) while the 
women are responsible for weeding from September onwards. Both men and women join in the 
harvesting: a task which finishes at the end of January (Lemlem, Bishop-Sambrook, Puskur & Tesema, 
2010). For rural households close to flower farms, a job in these farms may be attractive during those 
periods when their labour is not needed for their own farming activities. In other words, rural workers 
have alternative livelihood sources at certain periods of the year which the urban workers do not have. 
This may influence their intention to leave the flower farm. We hypothesize:  
H5: Rural workers report higher intentions to leave than urban workers 
Students. A job at a flower farm can also be attractive for students wanting to supplement the 
household income during the summer holidays. Ethiopia has made substantial improvements in terms 
of education and is on track to achieve the second Millennium Development Goal related to universal 
primary education (Wakiaga, Kibret, & Mamuye, 2014). Over the last decade Ethiopian households 
have increasingly chosen to invest in educating their children as a way of improving their future 
standard of living. The cut flower industry is a highly codified industry where different certification 
schemes and codes of conduct set strict social standards (Riisgaard, 2011). As a result, the farms are 
reluctant to hire workers under the age of 15. However at the end of the school year (at the end of 
May), many students aged 15 and older may try to find a short term job in the flower farms. Yet, at the 
end of May the cut flower season is almost over. Because of the low demand for cut flowers during 
the subsequent months (June until September), flower farms need less or even no temporary workers. 
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Rather they prefer to hire workers who want to become permanent workers so that they can train 
these workers during this slack period and turn them into experienced workers by the time there is 
again a peak demand for flowers (e.g. Christmas period, followed by Valentine’s day and Mother’s 
day). Students know that managers are reluctant to hire them and tend to hide they are students only 
seeking a temporary job. Still, they probably plan to return to their schooling activities at the beginning 
of September, when school restarts. We hypothesize:  
H6: Students report higher intentions to leave than workers who no longer attend school 
Social support. Workers at the flower farms have a very specific way of organizing themselves to create 
social support. They organize informal savings schemes called ‘ikub’ (sometimes spelled differently as 
‘iqub’ or ‘iqqub’) at the work unit level (for example a single greenhouse). People can voluntarily join 
a group which involves committing themselves to making a monthly financial contribution. All 
contributions are brought together into one ‘pot’ and the money is distributed by means of a rotation 
scheme (Baker, 1992). These ikubs are very common in Ethiopian society and have been described as 
the traditional means of savings (Begashaw, 1978). It implies that you -as a member- trust all the other 
ikub members and commit yourself for a lengthy period of time: one cannot simply leave the system 
without having made enough contributions. (Baker, 1992). As such, an ikub binds workers together 
but also binds them to the farm. Indeed if they want to benefit from an ikub they cannot leave. In other 
words, it can be said that these workers are embedded in their jobs (Allen, Bryant, & Vardaman, 2010). 
By job embeddedness we refer to ‘a net or a web in which an individual can become stuck’ (Mitchell, 
Holtom, Lee, Sablynski, & Erez, 2001, p. 1104). Because ikub members are linked to other ikub 
members on the work floor, leaving their job would sever the established links with other ikub 
members. In line with previous studies on job embeddedness (Allen et al., 2010; Mitchell et al., 2001), 
we therefore hypothesize:  
H7: Ikub members are more embedded in their jobs than non-members and therefore they report 
lower intentions to leave than non-members 
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METHODS 
Data   
The empirical data were collected through worker surveys undertaken in June-July 2013 in five 
floriculture farms in the Debre Zeit area. The total sample consisted of 375 responses. After removal 
of uncompleted questionnaires, we obtained a final sample of 358 cases (237 women, 121 men). The 
total number of flower farms at the time of research was estimated at about 80. Out of these, five 
farms were selected on the basis of comparabilityi. They were located relatively close to one another. 
All five farms produced roses destined for export, were rather similar in size and they were all owned 
by Ethiopian investors. Within each farm, random sampling procedures were used to ensure an 
adequate representation of on average 75 workers who had different job functions within the farm. 
These job functions included packaging, grading, spraying, crop maintenance and supervising.  
Due to time constraints of the research project, data was collected both on and off farm. We checked 
whether this biased between people’s answers and found both on and off farm surveys to be reliable 
sources of information. The questionnaire was directly translated from English into Amharic or Oromo 
by Ethiopian Master’s graduates who were trained before the data collection phase began. This 
training continued throughout the testing phase which lasted three days. At the end of this pilot test, 
we decided to exclude three survey questions which were meant to test workers’ awareness and 
knowledge of the existence of private social standards because we received a high number of non-
responses. The final questionnaire included questions on socio-demographics, working conditions, 
overall job satisfaction and job rewards.  
To enhance the quality of the answers and to reduce common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), respondents were assured anonymity at the start of the study. We 
emphasized that their responses were confidential and that individual responses were not 
communicated to their employer. We asked respondents to answer the questions as honestly as 
possible and that there were no right or wrong answers. To end, it was made explicit that their 
participation was voluntary, that they could choose not to answer a question or even choose to stop 
the discussion at any time.  
In addition, we organised five focus groups with workers, one per farm. The purpose of these focus 
groups was to obtain a deeper understanding of workers’ perceptions of their working life. The focus 
groups targeted female workers and included between 4 and 14 participants. Each focus group lasted 
almost two hours and took place on the participants’ day off. Focus groups were conducted on the 
university campus and were held in a separate classroom. This location was chosen because of its 
proximity to the city centre and because it was a well-known location among the workers. Each focus 
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group discussion was conducted by a moderator (an Ethiopian female Master’s student, fluent in 
Amharic and Oromo) and assisted by one of the authors of this article. The Ethiopian moderator 
received training in how to conduct focus groups and at the end of each focus group, both moderators 
discussed the quality of the discussions and how to potentially improve the next focus group 
discussion. There was a discussion guide, which was not intended to be strictly followed but to aid the 
researcher and moderator during the discussions. A range of themes were discussed related to working 
conditions, workers’ aspirations and needs and their perception of their ability to change their working 
conditions. The focus groups were tape recorded and transcribed into English, and during the focus 
group discussions the accompanying researcher took extensive notes. The survey data was 
quantitatively analysed and the focus groups provided qualitative data that enabled a deeper 
understanding and interpretation of the quantitative results.  
Variables  
Job satisfaction. There are two approaches to measuring job satisfaction. A single item may be used 
whereby individuals are asked to evaluate their overall job satisfaction by answering one single 
question, for example ‘how satisfied are you overall with your job, taking all facets into account?’ 
(Scarpello & Campbell, 1983; Sousa-Poza & Sousa-Poza, 2000; Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 1997). 
Alternatively job satisfaction can be constructed as the sum of the levels of satisfaction with specific 
job facets such as the wage and level of autonomy (Kalleberg, 1977; Skalli, Theodossiou, & Vasileiou, 
2008). Several authors (Highhouse & Becker, 1993; Linz & Semykina, 2012) have argued that a single 
concept of job satisfaction might be preferred to a constructed measure as overall job satisfaction is 
more than just a combination of different facets. Equally, single-item measures appear to be less likely 
to be influenced by temporal factors such as today’s emotions linked to a particular job facet (for 
example the evaluation of the job facet ‘work load’ may vary as a deadline approaches). Following this 
reasoning, we used a single item measure of job satisfaction in this study. Respondents were asked to 
answer the question ‘How satisfied are you with your overall job, considering all the job’s facets?’ on 
a five point Likert scale (ranging from ‘very dissatisfied’ (1) to ‘very satisfied’ (5)). 
Work environment factors. To identify those job attributes that contribute to job satisfaction, we 
included 10 aspects of work that are aligned with Herzberg et al. (1959) two-factor theory. We drew 
on commonly used questions and scales for measuring workers’ perceptions. The scales of the 
variables wage, job security, supervisory support, co-worker support, freedom at work, learning new 
skills and variation on the job were inspired by the work of Delobelle et al. (2011), the HILDA survey 
(2012) and Mulinge and Mueller (1998). Where ever possible each work aspect was measured using 
multiple items. Respondents were asked to rate each item on a five point Likert scale. During the focus 
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groups, two additional work aspects emerged which were also included in the analysis. The work 
aspect of a ‘healthy environment’ was included, as the use of pesticides and chemicals and their 
potential impact on workers’ health was a theme which emerged during each of the focus group 
discussions and appeared to be a major concern among female workers. This work aspect was 
measured using a multiple item based on three questions which were rated on a five point Likert scale. 
Secondly, we included a dichotomous variable ‘formal group cohesion’ which provides information on 
whether a respondent is a member of a formal organization such as a labour union, women’s 
committee or another type of committee. Appendix 1 gives a detailed overview of the different 
constructs for each work aspect.  
Demographic factors. Gender, age, educational level, work experience and rural-urban background 
have been theorised, and empirically shown, to be significant predictors of job satisfaction (Clark, 
1997; Hunt & Saul, 1975; Mobley et al., 1979; Schuler, 1973) and/ or voluntary labour turnover 
(Lambert et al., 2001; Mobley, 1977; Mobley et al., 1979). Hence these five demographic were included 
and controlled for in this study.  
Intention to leave. According to the literature, intent to leave is a good predictor of actual leaving (Jiang 
et al., 2009; Lambert et al., 2001). Intent to leave is the final cognitive step in the decision making 
process of quitting one’s job (Mobley, 1977). For this reason most studies include the variable that 
measures one’s intention to leave. In our study the variable reflecting one’s intention to leave was 
captured by the statement ‘I intend to leave my job in the near future’ which was rated on a five point 
Likert scale (ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5)).  
Livelihood activities and social support capabilities. A final area that was measured is the alternative 
livelihood activities workers have next to working in the flower farm and their social support 
capabilities. We included the variables ‘Are you currently attending school?’ (yes = 1/ no = 0), ‘where 
do you live?’ (rural = 0/ urban = 1) and ‘are you a member of an ikub?’ (yes = 1/ no = 0). 
Data analysis  
The research objectives were analysed using Stata 13.0 software. Due to the ordinal nature of our 
dependent variable we used an ordered probit model to determine the effects of both work 
environment and demographic factors on overall job satisfaction. This is a commonly used approach 
in job satisfaction research (Aguiar do Monte, 2012; Carr & Mellizo, 2013; Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Frijters, 
2004; Lange, Pacheco, & Shrotryia, 2010; Linz & Semykina, 2012; Litchfield, Reilly, & Veneziani, 2012; 
Sousa-Poza & Sousa-Poza, 2000).  
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The basic structure of the model is as follows (Liu & Nunnenkamp, 2011; Violette et al., 2013): 
?ꜟ? ? ?ꜟ? ???ꜟ 
?ꜟ ??
?
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?
?
?
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??????ꜟ? ? ? ?????????????
??????? ??? ?ꜟ? ? ??
??????? ? ?ꜟ? ? ????
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Where ?ꜟ???represents the latent cardinal valuation of job satisfaction of the ith worker, which is grouped 
into one of the five ordinal response options,  ?ꜟ , according to where ?ꜟ???falls relative to the unobserved 
cut points ?????. ?ꜟ is a vector of explanatory variables. ? is a vector of the parameters to be 
estimated and  ?ꜟ is the random error term.  
The full set of independent variables (?) include the following five subgroups: 
?ꜟ ? ??ꜟ??????? ?ꜟ???????? ?ꜟ?????? ?ꜟ????? ?ꜟ????? 
Where ?ꜟ?????? refers to the extrinsic organizational rewards, ?ꜟ??????? to extrinsic social rewards, ?ꜟ???? 
to intrinsic rewards, ?ꜟ???? to the demographic characteristics of the worker and ?ꜟ???? to the farm’s 
characteristics (see below). 
We then used a probit model to identify the determinants of a workers’ intention to leave. Because of 
the ease of interpretation, we decided to assign workers into two categories on the basis of their 
responses to the item ‘I intent to leave my job in the near future’. Those who ‘strongly agreed’ (5) and 
‘agreed’ (4) to the statement were considered most likely to leave the farm, while those who disagreed 
with the statement or answered neutral (score 1 to 3) were considered most likely to stay. This is a 
conservative approach as we considered those who answered ‘neutral’ were still undecided and 
therefore less likely to leave the farm, at least in the near future.   
There may well be unobserved differences in working conditions between the five farms in the sample 
and these could explain differences in job satisfaction and intention to leave between the farms, which 
could, in turn, bias the coefficients of our variables. To rule this out, all the estimations included farm 
specific dummies. It turned out that including or excluding these dummies did not alter the results, 
only improving the fit of the models. For conciseness, only the estimations that include the farm 
specific dummies will be reported. 
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RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics  
The descriptive data are summarised in table 1. The respondents’ ages ranged from 12 to 60 years oldii, 
and 69% of the sample were 25 years or younger. Most workers did not receive any education at all or 
only some primary or secondary education. The length of employment at the flower farms was rather 
low. On average, respondents had worked on the farm for 18.5 months, and 67% of the respondents 
indicated they had less than one year of work experience on their respective farms. This is an 
interesting finding as the Ethiopian labour law prescribes that any worker should receive a permanent 
contract after working for 45 days. This rule appeared to be followed as 69% of our sample indicated 
they had a permanent contract. Low levels of work experience therefore indicate that there are high 
levels of voluntary labour turnover.  
In general, our respondents were not particularly satisfied with their jobs. In total, less than half of our 
respondents (48%) reported to be satisfied overall. With regard to the evaluation of separate job facets 
we found that extrinsic social rewards were positively scored. However few respondents appeared to 
be a member of a formal group. This may be partially explained by our respondents’ low levels of work 
experience. Intrinsic rewards -with the exception of ‘variation on a job’- also received a relatively high 
score. Extrinsic organizational rewards of wage and healthy environment were negatively scored, while 
job security was positively scored. This may be related to most workers receiving a permanent contract 
after 45 days.  
Table 2 summarizes the means, standard deviations and the intercorrelation matrix of our study 
variables. As none of the correlations are above 0.70, the problem of multicollinearity is low (Nunnally, 
1994). Cronbach’s α coefficients for the scales in the questionnaire was between 0.69 and 0.84 which 
indicates high internal reliability for the scales used in this study (see Appendix 1 for detailed overview 
of the different constructs for each work aspect).  
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Table 1. Descriptive data for variables (n=358) 
  N° of items Mean Std. dev. 
Dependent variable    
 Job satisfaction (1-5) 1 3.36 1.31 
 Intention to leave (0-1) 1 0.47 0.50 
Explanatory variables    
Extrinsic organizational rewards    
 Wage (1-5) 3 2.36 1.09 
 Job security (1-5) 2 3.48 1.23 
 Healthy environment (1-5) 3 2.95 1.13 
Extrinsic social rewards    
 Supervisory support (1-5) 3 3.97 0.99 
 Co-worker support (1-5) 3 4.07 0.97 
 Formal cohesion (0-1) 3 0.24 0.43 
Intrinsic rewards    
 Freedom at work (1-5) 1 3.64 1.39 
 Learning new skills (1-5) 1 3.61 1.45 
 Variation on the job (1-5) 1 2.94 1.58 
Control variables    
 Gender (female =1; male =0) 1 0.66 0.47 
 Age  1 24.1 8.31 
 No or primary education (0-1) 1 0.55 0.50 
 Secondary education (0-1) 1 0.39 0.49 
 Higher education or formal training (0-1) 1 0.06 0.23 
 Location of living (0= rural; 1= urban) 1 0.81 0.39 
 Work experience (months) 1 18.5 24.9 
 Going to school (0-1) 1 0.21 0.41 
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Job satisfaction and its determinants 
Table 3 shows the results of the ordered probit model which estimates the relative importance of both 
the work environment and demographic factors on job satisfaction. Results suggest that all three 
extrinsic organizational rewards were statistically significant predictors of job satisfaction (p< 0.01) 
while none of the extrinsic social rewards or the intrinsic rewards were significant determinants of job 
satisfaction. Hence, hypothesis 1 which postulated that low levels of job satisfaction was explained by 
a negative evaluation of extrinsic organizational rewards is supported.  
Wage appears to be the most powerful determinant of job satisfaction. As Abdulla et al. (2011) notes, 
remuneration can mean different things in different contexts. For some it may be a source of 
recognition, for others it may mean security. We argue that workers in the flower industry put so much 
emphasis on the wages because of its large impact on their living standards. The industry provides 
minimum wages that are around the poverty line of 1 dollar a day. Losing this income stream would 
be devastating for many of these households.  
In line with these arguments, job security was found to be an important predictor of job satisfaction. 
Job insecurity, meaning that workers perceive a potential threat to continuity, is known to be an 
important cause of stress (Heaney, Israel, & House, 1994). For this reason, job security has been found 
to be one of the work facets that can most often be used to predict job satisfaction (Aletraris, 2010; 
Clark, 2001). If workers in the cut flower industry lose their job, it may cause additional stress as their 
wages are considered too low to cope with a shock in their income stream.  
A last job attribute that significantly contributed to job satisfaction was a positive perception of the 
healthy work environment. This did not come as a surprise, as many workers raised concerns about 
the health hazard implications of being exposed to agrochemicals. They frequently mentioned health 
problems included skin irritation, headaches and respiratory problems. Focus group participants said 
that female workers feared not being able to get pregnant if they worked in greenhouses for too long 
periods and that they had seen male workers fainting while they were spraying.  
With regard to the demographic characteristics our results suggest that higher educated workers 
tended to be less satisfied with their jobs than those who had received any education or only some 
primary education. These findings are in line with previous studies which have found that job 
satisfaction is higher among those individuals who are neither undereducated, nor overqualified for 
the job (Allen & De Weert, 2007; Peiró, Agut, & Grau, 2010). While most jobs provided in the cut flower 
industry are by nature low skilled, the industry does attract both skilled and unskilled workers. We 
argue that workers with higher educational levels are less satisfied with their job as these occupations 
are below their expectations. 
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The coefficients for age were also significant and suggested a U shaped relationship between age and 
job satisfaction. The turning point was found at the age of 26. Clark, Oswald, and Warr (1996) theorised 
that higher levels of job satisfaction among the younger workers may be explained by this being their 
first work experience and that they do not have enough information yet to compare their job with 
other jobs. Because of the novelty of the situation they may initially enjoy their job, but later they may 
discover that their expectations were too optimistic -which would explain the downward slope of the 
U shaped relationship. The rise in job satisfaction at an older age, the upward sloping part of the U 
shape, could be the result of declining aspirations (Clark et al., 1996). 
Table 3. Determinants of job satisfaction – ordered probit 
Extrinsic organizational rewards 
Wage (1-5) 0.376*** 
Job security  (1-5) 0.150** 
Healthy environment (1-5) 0.182** 
Extrinsic social rewards 
Supervisory support  (1-5) 0.076 
Co-worker support  (1-5) 0.088 
Formal cohesion  (yes=1) - 0.054 
Intrinsic rewards 
Freedom at work  (1-5) 0.038 
Learning new skills  (1-5) 0.017 
Variation on the job  (1-5) 0.014 
Control variables 
Urban dweller (yes=1) 0.111 
Goes to school (yes=1) 0.264 
Female (yes=1) - 0.193 
Age - 0.102* 
Age² 0.002** 
Secondary education (yes=1) - 0.302* 
Higher education or formal training (yes=1) - 0.666* 
Work experience (months) 0.005 
Firm fixed effects Yes
Cut off points 
1 - 0.084 
2 0.401 
3 1.428 
4 2.224** 
n 358 
Pseudo R² 14% 
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively 
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Ordered probit models were also used to test hypotheses 2 and 3. These hypotheses state that intrinsic 
rewards and extrinsic social rewards only influence job satisfaction if the extrinsic organizational 
rewards are high. In other words, only if basic needs such as wage, job security and safety at the 
workplace are met, will workers care about social and intrinsic rewards. To test this, overall scores for 
extrinsic organizational, extrinsic social and intrinsic rewards were calculated by summing up the 
underlying components. These overall scores range from 3 to 15 for the extrinsic organizational and 
intrinsic rewards and from 3 to 11 for the extrinsic social rewards. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are then tested 
by modelling job satisfaction in function of these overall scores and the usual set of control variables, 
while also including interaction terms between the overall scores. The results are presented in table 4. 
The first column shows the results of the ordered probit model without including interaction terms. 
This confirms that only extrinsic organizational rewards are strongly, positively related with job 
satisfaction. Workers who are relatively satisfied with their wage, the quality of the workplace and 
their job security tend to be satisfied with their job too. The second column includes an interaction 
term between extrinsic organizational rewards and intrinsic rewards. The interaction term is positive 
and significant, implying that intrinsic rewards are positively correlated with job satisfaction, but only 
if the extrinsic organizational rewards are high. This is illustrated in figure 1, which shows the 
probability of being very satisfied with one’s job in function of intrinsic rewards for low, medium and 
high levels of extrinsic organizational rewards. While intrinsic rewards are not positively related to job 
satisfaction at low levels of extrinsic organizational rewards, there is a strong positive correlation if 
extrinsic organizational rewards are high. This confirms hypotheses 2. The third column includes an 
interaction term between extrinsic organizational and extrinsic social rewards. This interaction is 
insignificant and we can therefore reject hypothesis 3.  
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Figure 1. Job satisfaction in function of intrinsic rewards for different levels  
of extrinsic organizational rewards 
Table 4. Job satisfaction: the moderator effect of organizational rewards – ordered probit model 
Intrinsic rewards (3-15) 0.033 - 0.125 0.034 
Extrinsic organizational rewards (3-15) 0.230*** 0.030 0.113 
Extrinsic social rewards (3-11) 0.070 0.075 - 0.042 
Interaction terms with extr. org. rewards 
Intrinsic rewards 0.019* 
 Extrinsic social rewards 0.014 
Control variables 
Urban dweller (yes=1) 0.040 0.069 0.032 
Goes to school (yes=1) 0.296 0.284 0.296 
Female (yes=1) - 0.195 - 0.181 - 0.198 
Age  - 0.106* - 0.105* - 0.106*
Age² 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
Secondary education (yes=1) - 0.269* - 0.285* - 0.266* 
Higher education or formal training (yes=1) 
- 0.655* - 0.670* - 0.664* 
Work experience in months 0.004 0.004 0.004
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Cut of points 
1 - 0.035 - 1.604 - 0.957 
2 0.438 - 1.126 - 0.484 
3 1.453 - 0.102 0.531 
4 2.243** 0.692 1.324 
n 358 358 358 
Pseudo R² 0.132 0.137 0.133 
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively 
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Intention to leave and its determinants 
Table 5 shows the results of the probit model estimating the importance of job satisfaction, alternative 
livelihood activities and demographic characteristics on workers’ intention to leave. As expected, all 
these factors are important predictors of the intention to leave the farmiii. The model fits the data well 
and correctly classifies 70% of the observations. Thus, hypotheses 4 to 7 were accepted.  
The large, negative correlation between job satisfaction and intention to leave is remarkable. A one 
point increase in job satisfaction reduces, on average, the probability of leaving the farm by 9 percent 
points. Nonetheless, even at high levels of job satisfaction, access to alternative livelihood strategies 
still play an important role in explaining an intention to leave. This is illustrated in figure 2, which shows 
the probability of leaving the farm, with its 95% confidence interval, as a function of job satisfaction 
for different groups within the sample. Rural households were always more likely to leave than urban 
households (figure 2, left panel). For instance, nearly 60% of the rural workers reporting the highest 
level of job satisfaction intended to leave the farm, while only 29% of the urban households with the 
same level of job satisfaction intended to do so. Additionally, the negative association between job 
satisfaction and intention to leave was less pronounced for rural than urban households due to the 
larger confidence intervals for the former group. Presumably, many rural households intended to quit 
their job to cultivate their land, even if they were satisfied with their job. Membership of an ikub also 
greatly reduced the probability of intending to leave the farm (figure 2, middle). This was to be 
expected as it could be argued that ikub members are more embedded in their jobs. They cannot easily 
quit their job as this implies breaking the trust between the members or losing one’s contribution to 
the shared savings. It may, however, also be the case that only workers who had no intention to leave 
the farm committed to this informal saving device. Finally, most workers who still went to school 
intended to leave the farm (figure 2, right). These students were only looking for seasonal work during 
summer holiday to make ends meet, and most of them intended to go back to school when the 
academic year started again in September. 
Except for age, other demographic factors were significantly correlated with an intention to leave. The 
result suggests that, while both men and women reported similar levels of job satisfaction, women 
were more likely to leave the farm than men. A possible explanation for this may be found in how 
gender roles are socialised. Men may be more likely to stay in a job, even when they are dissatisfied 
with it, because they are seen as the primary breadwinner. At the same time, women may prioritise 
their household activities and taking care of children or other relatives over their job satisfaction and, 
as such, may report higher intentions to leave their formal wage employment (Lambert et al., 2001). 
Our findings also show that better educated workers were more likely to quit their job. Given that 
educational level had a negative effect on job satisfaction (table 3), educational level had both a direct 
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and an indirect effect on people’s intention to leave. Consequently, better educated workers reported 
higher intentions of quitting their job. This may be because their education permits them to find more 
attractive, better paying jobs, as was confirmed in the focus groups.  
Figure 2. Intention to leave the farm 
Table 5. Determinants of intention to leave –probit model 
Job satisfaction - 0.223*** 
Alternative livelihood activities  
Member of Ikub (yes=1) - 0.700** 
Urban dweller (yes=1) - 0.807*** 
Going to school (yes=1) 0.880*** 
Control variables 
Female (yes=1) 0.523** 
Age 0.006 
Secondary education (yes=1) 0.279 
Higher education or formal training (yes=1) 1.041* 
Firm fixed effects  Yes  
n 358 
Pseudo R² 21% 
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively 
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DISCUSSION  
This paper addresses two research objectives. First it analyses levels of job satisfaction and its 
determinants for workers in the cut flower industry in Ethiopia. Second it investigates the link between 
job satisfaction and workers’ intentions to leave their jobs at flower farms. Our findings showed that 
these workers were not particularly satisfied with their jobs, with half of the respondents reporting a 
high intention to leave their job in the near future.  
Job satisfaction was mainly explained by extrinsic organizational rewards. These findings are in line 
with previous studies. Extrinsic organizational rewards are very much linked with meeting one’s basic 
needs (Centers & Bugental, 1966; Gruenberg, 1980). It could be said that these needs are not being 
sufficiently met to allow other extrinsic social or intrinsic needs to matter very much.  
Hence, our results suggest that human resource strategies focusing on increasing these extrinsic 
organizational rewards could help to obtain a more satisfied and subsequently more stable workforce. 
However, we realise that managers have few incentives to implement such strategies. First, the 
industry is relatively new in Ethiopia. Many of these start-up farms do not have a constant production 
pattern (yet) but target high peak production moments such as Valentine’s Day or Mother’s Day. In 
this situation voluntary labour turnover may not be seen as problematic as employment fluctuations 
may give farms the flexibility to grow and decline over short time spans (Smith, Daskalaki, Elger & 
Brown, 2004). In the Ethiopian context where workers get a permanent contract after a probation 
period of 45 days, it may be that voluntary labour turnover actually reduces dismissal costs.  
A second and more important argument is that flower farm managers can predict labour turnover 
fluctuations on the basis of three demographic characteristics. Our results showed that rural workers 
reported higher intentions to leave than their urban colleagues. We reasoned that this was because 
rural workers have their own farming activities to attend to at certain periods in time. Hence, being 
aware of where their workers come from -rural versus urban- can help managers to predict labour 
turnover. Secondly, workers who attended school during the academic year reported higher intentions 
to leave than their colleagues who already left school as they probably aim to return to school once 
the summer holidays are over. Again managers can take into account that those workers who apply 
for a job at the end of May are most likely students looking for a holiday job and probably will 
voluntarily leave at the beginning of the school year. And thirdly, our results showed that workers who 
participated in informal savings nets known as ‘ikubs’ reported lower intentions to leave than those 
workers who were not a member. Ikubs are organised at the work unit level. So again, identifying 
which greenhouses or pack houses have ikubs in place and how many members they have, can help to 
predict labour turnover. In sum, even though we’ve shown that there is a large, negative correlation 
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between job satisfaction and intention to leave, it appears that these three livelihood strategies can 
help managers to foresee labour fluctuations and offset any potentially negative side effects of this.  
Implications for theory and practice 
This study contributes to an increased understanding of job satisfaction and intentions to leave of low 
skilled workers in the cut flower industry in Ethiopia. Whereas past research has focused on objective 
measures of job quality in attempts to evaluate working conditions at the bottom of global value 
chains, we introduced a subjective measure of job satisfaction into this field of study. Hence, this study 
provides important implications for academics, and policy makers.  
For academics, our results show the importance to inject a more personal, subjective element into the 
study of working conditions at the bottom of value chains. Whereas past research has been successful 
to analyse the existing discrepancies between formal regulations and reality on the ground (Barrientos 
& Smith, 2007; Locke, Amengual, & Mangla, 2009; Raynolds, 2012; Riisgaard, 2011; Yu, 2008), most 
studies have neglected to include the voices of workers themselves into this research field. This paper 
has shown that workers are not simply passive victims of a capitalist system as has been argued 
elsewhere (Carswell & De Neve, 2013; Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2010). Rather they are active agents who 
seek to improve their livelihoods by actively searching alternatives to the flower farm jobs because 
they are currently not satisfied with the extrinsic rewards offered in these jobs.  
As for policy makers in Ethiopia, the insights of this study also provide important implications. The 
Ethiopian cut flower industry has received its share of applause as it has created direct jobs for over 
20,000 workers (Melese & Helmsing, 2010). It is also true that there are few alternative wage 
employment for these, mainly, low skilled women. However in this paper we have shown that it is not 
sufficient to just focus on the number of jobs created but that, in order to have a large development 
impact, one also needs to look at the benefits for workers. What is needed is an institutional 
framework that facilitates the creation of a working environment which satisfies workers, since 
satisfied workers have indirect and positive effects on society at large. Legislation over job security 
after 45 days employment is already in place and this is reflected in positive responses about job 
security. But there is room for legislation for a minimum wage and a strengthening of a tripartite 
system. The latter gives workers the rights to join a labour union –which is a way to express their 
grievances, to negotiate collective bargaining agreements and ensure that workers’ concerns are taken 
into account. In addition, trade unions can play an important role in disseminating information on 
occupational health and safety which may help to allay the existing concerns over this issue. According 
to one recent paper (Riisgaard & Gibbon, 2014) a revision in the Kenyan labour law, which made such 
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a tripartite system possible, led to positive changes in the Kenyan cut flower. In other words, Ethiopia 
can learn some important lessons from its neighbour which has a longer history of flower production.  
Limitations and future research 
Our research results have several limitations, some of which can be addressed in future research. First, 
some data limitations suggest that the results should be carefully interpreted. First, this study looked 
at intentions to leave rather than actual leaving. Second, our results are based on information gathered 
through oral interviews conducted by an interviewer. The rationale for this self-report data collection 
approach is very straightforward: we aimed to understand workers’ job satisfaction and how this 
influenced workers’ intentions to leave. At the same time however, having a single person assessing 
both independent and dependent variables in the same study can result in a bias (Podsakoff & Organ, 
1986). Ideally we would also have objective data on flower farms HR practices in order to triangulate 
the data; however obtaining these objective assessments would have been extremely difficult. 
Moreover it would not necessarily have yielded better results (Chan, 2009; Stevens et al., 2006). 
Consequently, one of the caveats of this study is the possibility of self-reported bias affecting the 
measurement of the variables. Third, our results are limited to workers employed in the Ethiopian cut 
flower industry. Cross industry and cross country research is needed to further explore the differences 
or similarities that may exist among workers employed in labour intensive industries.  
In considering other avenues for future research, it could be interesting to research how management 
practices can or do influence workers’ levels of job satisfaction and subsequent intentions to leave 
these flower farms. Moreover as many labour intensive industries are highly codified industries it 
would be interesting to see how certification schemes and related actors (NGOs, accreditation bodies) 
influence workers’ perceptions of their working environment.   
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Appendix. Scale items  
Scale Item Cronbach α 
Extrinsic Organizational Rewards 
Wage  I feel I am being paid a fair amount for the work I do 0.84 
I am satisfied with the salary I receive 
How satisfied are you with your total wage?  
Job security I have a secure future in my job 0.69 
How satisfied are you with your job security? 
Healthy environment  I am worried that I will have health problems caused by my 
job (R) 
0.81 
Does the company provide a safe and healthy working 
environment? 
I work in a healthy environment  
Extrinsic Social Rewards 
 Supervisory support My supervisor is friendly, helpful and supportive 0.77 
My supervisor praises me for a job well done 
My supervisor treats me fairly 
Co-worker support My co-workers are friendly, helpful and supportive  0.74 
The relationship with my co-workers is good 
There are people at work I can talk to when I need help  
Formal cohesion Are you a member of the labour union (1= yes) N/A 
Are you a member of a women’s committee (1= yes) 
Are you a member of any other formal organization within 
the farm? (1= yes) 
Intrinsic rewards 
Variation on the job I have a lot of variation on the job N/A 
Freedom at work I have a lot of freedom to decide how I do my work N/A 
Learning new skills I learn new skills and abilities in my job N/A 
Notes: Unless otherwise stated, all items were measured on a five point Likert scale. With regard to the multiple 
item measures, all items were first summed and then divided by the number of items. (R) indicates a reverse-
coded item. Initially we grouped the three intrinsic rewards, but as Cronbach α appeared to be very low (0.36) 
we decided to include these three intrinsic work facets separately in the analysis.  
i A first round of qualitative data collection at management level took place in September 2012 and included over 
20 flower farms. On the basis of this we carefully selected five farms located in the same cluster.   
ii While flower farm managers said that they did not hire workers under the age of 15, our sample counted 2 
respondents who admitted to be younger than this. It is not clear to what extent the flower farm managers were 
aware of this or whether these minors presented themselves as older than they really were.    
iii We also researched whether job satisfaction moderated the relationship between alternative livelihood 
strategies (of rural workers, students and ikub members) and intention to leave, such that when job satisfaction 
is low the relationship between alternative livelihood strategies and intent to leave is high and when job 
satisfaction is high, there is no relationship between alternative livelihood strategies and intent to leave. 
However, we did not find such moderating effects in any of the three types of livelihood strategies. 
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When the farm-gate becomes a revolving door: 
an institutional approach to functional labour turnover 
Abstract. The objective of the article is to better understand managers’ actions and mindset towards 
functional labour turnover in the cut flower industry in Ethiopia. Through a qualitative approach, we 
explore the way managers deal with and legitimize high levels of functional labour turnover. Our 
results show that they engage in practices that sustain labour turnover rather than reduce it. Three 
main types of practices were identified: predicting, containing and accommodating. To legitimize the 
constant high level of labour turnover, managers build on regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive 
elements coming from the institutional environment and which are out of their scope of control. As a 
result, managers feel caught in a deadlock, unable to change an unsatisfactory situation. This study 
extends the current research in functional labour turnover by adopting a subjective lens and informs 
the debate in human resource management research about managerial practices at the bottom of 
global value chains.  
Based on:  
Staelens, L. and Louche, C. (2016). When the farm-gate becomes a revolving door: an institutional 
approach to functional labour turnover. Submitted in January and currently in review process in 
Human Relations.
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INTRODUCTION  
Literature on labour turnover has taken two different perspectives. The first one is the dysfunctional 
approach where a high labour turnover is viewed as problematic (O'Connell & Kung, 2007; Shaw, 2011; 
Waldman, Kelly, Aurora, & Smith, 2004). From this perspective, it has been argued that turnover should 
be reduced whenever possible (Abbasi & Hollman, 2000; Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman, 1959). The 
second perspective is the functional approach, which argues that certain types of turnover can be 
beneficial for organizations as long as its benefits (e.g. poorly performing workers are replaced by 
better performing workers) outweigh its costs (e.g. costs related to replacement, training) (Abelson & 
Baysinger, 1984; Dalton, Todor & Krackhardt, 1982; Siebert & Zubanov, 2009; Williams, 2000).  
Whereas the dysfunctional perspective has been extensively explored, the functional perspective 
remains poorly understood. Moreover, although current studies on functional labour turnover have 
helped to identify the reasons why organizations do not always undertake action to reduce turnover, 
they all have taken a rational profit-maximizing perspective. Very little has been done to consider the 
subjective dimensions of functional labour turnover and to understand how managers legitimize 
persistent high levels of labour turnover in their organizations. Yet legitimization is important as it 
shapes managers’ mindsets and can help us to understand the practices they develop to deal with 
labour turnover. 
Considering that functional labour turnover is mainly to be found in low-skilled, labour-intensive 
industries (Smith, Daskalaki, Elger, & Brown, 2004) and that high labour turnover in these industries is 
often associated with the exploitative nature of the work, with an absence of respect for workers and 
a lack of care for their well-being (Andrijasevic & Sacchetto, 2014; Choi & Peng, 2015; Hale & Wills, 
2011), a purely profit-maximizing explanation claiming that the organisation enjoys high economic 
benefits from a high labour turnover may threaten organisational legitimacy, especially in Western 
countries — where there is a growing consumer awareness and concern about poor working 
conditions in low-wage countries (Riisgaard, 2009).  
In order to better understand how managers legitimize functional turnover, we focused our empirical 
efforts on the cut flower industry in Ethiopia. This low-skilled, labour-intensive sector is a typical 
example of an industry in which labour turnover can be considered beneficial for the organisation. In 
our empirical analysis we focused on two objectives: 1) identify the practices developed by managers 
to handle labour turnover, and 2) analyse how managers legitimize high labour turnover. We adopted 
a qualitative research design for the data collection and data analysis. Drawing on an institutional 
perspective and more exactly from Scott’s (1995) three pillars of institutions, we examined the way 
managers legitimize functional labour turnover.   
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This study offers three main contributions to the literature on functional labour turnover. First, our 
data shows that functional labour turnover does not equate with passive management, but actually 
requires active managerial practices to maintain and control labour turnover. Second, our analysis 
reveals that managers do not legitimize functional labour turnover through economic and profit-
maximization claims, as argued in the literature. Instead legitimation is based on regulative, normative, 
and cultural-cognitive elements. Third, we have developed a model to show the importance of 
understanding managers’ legitimization efforts, since these highly influence the types of practices that 
managers deem suitable. We posit that viewing labour turnover as being entirely caused by external 
institutional pressures hinders the development of effective retention strategies focused on improving 
the work environment. Our model captures this ‘deadlock’ that managers have put themselves in. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section starts with a literature review on 
functional labour turnover, followed by an introduction to Scott’s (1995) three pillars of institutional 
theory — regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive — which we use as an organising framework. 
Next the outline of the research context is presented, together with a detailed picture of our case 
study, and the methods used in this study. The empirical section presents managers’ coping practices 
and analyses the way in which managers legitimize labour turnover. The last section concludes by 
discussing our contributions to this research field, and the implications of our study.  
LITERATURE REVIEW: FUNCTIONAL LABOUR TURNOVER 
Labour turnover is ‘the movement of people into and out of employment within an organisation’ 
(Denvir & McMahon, 1992: p. 143). It can be voluntary or involuntary (Cheng & Brown, 1998). 
Traditionally, much research attention has been devoted to increase our understanding of the 
antecedents of voluntary labour turnover (Ma, Silva, Callan, & Trigo, 2015; Van der Aa, Bloemer, & 
Henseler, 2012); and to delineate successful retention strategies based on the assumption that 
voluntary labour turnover is expensive and has to be reduced at all time. 
This assumption however has altered when researchers such as Dalton and Todor (1979) started 
categorizing labour turnover into functional and dysfunctional labour turnover. In other words, 
scholars started to recognize that some kinds and extent of turnover may be considered ‘beneficial’ or 
‘functional’ for the organisation (Abelson et al., 1984; Dalton et al., 1982; Muchinsky & Morrow, 1980; 
Porter & Steers, 1973; Staw, 1980).  
Turnover functionality reflects the idea that different workers represent different values for the 
organisation (Wallace & Gaylor, 2012). The loss of one worker does not equal the loss of another 
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worker. If a poor performing worker is replaced by a better performing worker, it could be considered 
functional (Hollenbeck & Williams, 1986).  
In essence, labour turnover is considered functional when the benefits of turnover exceed the costs of 
turnover. Labour turnover can also be considered functional when the costs of facing labour turnover 
are lower than the costs of actually reducing turnover (Wallace & Gaylor, 2012). For example, a high 
rate of turnover among waitresses can perhaps be reduced by raising wages. However, this may not 
exactly be a cost effective strategy because it is far less expensive to cope with turnover than to 
prevent it  (Dalton et al., 1982).  
Costs of turnover generally include both replacement costs (selection, hiring, assigning, training of the 
new employees) and more ‘hidden’ costs related to the consequences of turnover, including a 
disruption of operations (Eckardt, Skaggs, & Youndt, 2014), a reduction in efficiency, and an erosion of 
morale and stability of the personnel who remain (Abbasi & Hollman, 2000). Often these ‘hidden’ costs 
are forgotten when calculating the real costs of turnover.  
Benefits of turnover generally include the flexibility for organizations to grow and decline over short 
time spans (Mount, 1995), dissatisfied labourers rather exit than organize themselves (Elger & Smith, 
1998), low dismissal costs (Smith et al., 2004), and there is an increase of work performance for routine 
jobs (Standing, 1989). Also here, it is argued that benefits of turnover are often underestimated (Dalton 
et al., 1982). In sum, when deciding whether to reduce turnover or not, organizations should weigh 
these costs and benefits. 
Examples of cases where labour turnover can be considered functional for the organisation includes 
seasonal industries such as fruit picking where the costs of stability are enormous (Dalton et al., 1982; 
Standing, 1989), and labour-intensive industries dependent on low skilled, low-salary, non-unionized 
labourers such as fast-food catering and hotels, and manufacturing companies (Andrijasevic & 
Sacchetto, 2014; O'Connell & Kung, 2007; Smith et al., 2004).  
This research focuses on the phenomenon of functional labour turnover in the cut flower industry, 
interpreted through the perceptions of managers within the sector. Whereas above mentioned studies 
have increased our understanding of the costs and benefits involved with turnover, it remains partial 
in that managers views and experiences have been largely neglected, despite the critical role of 
managers in creating and shaping the work environment and labour dynamics. The article shows that 
cost-benefit explanations based on the logics of profit-maximization are not mentioned by flower farm 
managers to legitimize functional turnover. Instead, managers seek social acceptance for not reducing 
turnover by arguing that they are conforming with the existing institutional environment.  
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THEORETICAL LENS: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE  
Institutional theory offers a useful lens to study functional turnover because it helps to understand 
that pure profit-maximizing claims do not suffice for organizations to be successful (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). Institutional theory is based on the notion that organizations need ‘legitimacy’ because 
this enhances stability, fosters continuity and improves the chances of acquiring various resources 
needed for its survival and growth (Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). Without legitimacy, 
organizations are vulnerable to claims that they are negligent, irrational and even unnecessary (Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977).  
Suchman (1995: p. 574) defines legitimacy as ‘a generalized perception or assumption that the actions 
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions.’ This socially constructed system refers to the rules and norms of the 
environment in which the organisation operates and in which it needs to demonstrate consistency. 
The institutional environment is heterogeneous and consists of multiple, often conflicting pressures. 
These societal and institutional pressures can be classified into international, national, regional and 
local (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002); they are made up of a multitude of expectations from stakeholders, 
both primary (e.g. owners, workers, buyers, suppliers, consumers) and secondary (e.g. NGOs or 
activists, local communities, or governments) (Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013). Hence, acquiring and 
maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of society is a challenging task (Suchman, 1995).  
One possible strategy for winning social acceptance is to conform to the existing institutional 
environment (Suchman, 1995). An organisation that conforms does not question or challenge the 
social and institutional structure. Rather, it acquires legitimacy by complying with existing rules and 
norms. Scott (1995) proposed a distinction between three pillars of legitimacy: regulative, normative 
and cultural-cognitive.  
The regulative pillar refers to ‘explicit regulatory processes of rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning 
activities’ (Scott, 1995: p. 59). Legitimacy is derived from obeying the rules, applying the standards and 
fulfilling expectations that stem from governmental legislation or industrial agreements. Enforcement 
of these rules and standards can be formalised through police and courts, or informalized through 
more diffuse channels, such as shaming or shunning (Scott, 1995). However, legitimacy goes beyond 
merely avoiding sanctions. It involves a widespread sense that the organisation is operating according 
to the letter and spirit of the law and that the organisation is a ‘good citizen’ (Zimmerman et al., 2002).  
The normative pillar encapsulates existing norms (what is preferred and considered desirable) and 
values (how things should be done) (Scott, 1995). Normative institutions prescribe what the 
appropriate or expected behaviour is in a given situation. They are less visible than the regulative pillar 
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because compliance does not spring from coercive rules and sanctions, but rather from social 
obligations, that is to say: ‘the way things should be done’ (Wicks, 2001). Legitimacy arises from 
obeying and endorsing the moral norms and values prevalent within a particular context. Hence, the 
normative conception stresses ‘a deeper, moral basis for assessing legitimacy’ (Scott, 1995: p. 61). 
The cultural-cognitive pillar refers to the way in which individuals interpret and perceive their 
environment (Scott, 1995). Cognitive elements are ‘constitutive’ meaning that they facilitate ‘the 
creation of social categories that are consequently applied to thought and action in order to provide 
social order’ (Wicks, 2001: p. 665). These subjective elements are common frames of reference and 
beliefs whereby certain practices are taken for granted and remain unquestioned (Price, Bailey, 
McDonald, & Pini, 2011; Scott, 1995). Legitimacy emanates from adopting these common frames of 
reference (Scott, 1995). 
Using Scott’s (1995) three pillars of institutions as the organising framework for our study, we 
investigated the way in which managers make sense of, and legitimize high labour turnover. As such 
our study explains more nuanced and less visible aspects of functional labour turnover than cost-
benefit approaches have done so in previous studies.  
CONTEXT: LABOUR TURNOVER IN THE ETHIOPIAN CUT FLOWER INDUSTRY  
The Ethiopian cut flower industry makes an interesting case to study since it captures the typical 
features of labour-intensive industries, where high labour turnover may be seen as a functional 
characteristic of the organisation. Costs related to recruitment and training of the workforce are 
considered low. Jobs are mainly allocated to low-skilled women (around 80% of the workforce), of 
which there is an ample supply in a developing country context marked by high unemployment figures 
(Mano, Yamano, Suzuki & Matsumoto, 2011). Moreover, these jobs merely consist of routine tasks 
such as weeding, picking and packaging flowers — for which little training is needed (Barrientos, Dolan, 
& Tallontire, 2003). At the same time, the organisation benefits from high labour turnover. Flower 
farms need a flexible labour force willing to work long hours during the production season but which 
are then ‘disposable’ during off seasons (Riisgaard, 2009). If workers voluntarily quit, flower farms face 
low dismissal costs (Smith et al., 2004). Moreover, farms can keep their wages low and do not have to 
worry about any effective workplace unionization because dissatisfied workers prefer to exit than to 
organise themselves (Elger et al., 1998).  
Some authors have highlighted the high levels of labour turnover in Ethiopian flower farms. In their 
study on the industry’s market formation process, Gebreeyesus and Sonobe (2012) made reference to 
high levels of labour turnover in several Ethiopian cut flower farms. A study undertaken by Mano et al. 
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(2011) showed that on average a flower farm worker was in her early twenties, had already worked in 
1.2 farms and had about six months of working experience in the industry at the moment of hiring, 
despite the relatively young nature of the industry. From these findings, Mano et al. (2011) concluded 
that high labour turnover was a persistent phenomenon in the industry. In a study by Staelens, Louche 
& D’Haese (2014) on job satisfaction among Ethiopian flower farm workers, it was found that more 
than 67% of the workers had less than one year of work experience at a flower farm; 46% of these 
reported a strong intention to leave their job in the near future. So although there are to date no 
official records of labour turnover in Ethiopian flower farms, labour turnover has become a regular 
part of flower farms employment relations.  
Ethiopia currently hosts 81 flower farms (Mano et al., 2011; Melese & Helmsing, 2010). Around 1,500 
ha in Ethiopia are allocated to flower production and this labour-intensive industry provides direct jobs 
for 20,000 to 25,000 low-skilled workers (Mano et al., 2011; Melese et al., 2010). There are eight flower 
farm clusters situated close to the capital Addis Ababa, in the vicinity of the airport. In this article, we 
will focus on one specific cluster located in the region of Debre Zeyit. This cluster is situated close to 
the city centre and its labour pool consists of a good mix between urban workers living in the city of 
Debre Zeyit and rural workers residing near the flower farms. This cluster is particularly interesting 
because at the time of the study, light manufacturing companies (including garments, footwear and 
plastics) were starting operations in the city centre, causing additional competition for labour with the 
neighbouring flower farms.   
METHODS 
For the purpose of this study, we used a qualitative research design. This is particularly suitable for 
gathering rich information on phenomena which previously have been ignored in the research 
literature (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). We conducted two rounds of data collection. The first round 
helped us to identify high labour turnover and to refine our research questions: 1) what kind of 
practices do managers employ to handle labour turnover?; 2) how do they legitimize persistent high 
levels of turnover? Round two served to dig deeper into the issue and to gain a better understanding 
of its various aspects. In the next paragraphs, we will discuss the way the data were collected and the 
way they were analysed.  
Data collection 
The first round of data collection took place in September-October 2012. One of the authors conducted 
open-ended interviews, primarily with general managers of flower farms across Ethiopia. These 
interviews aimed to broaden our understanding of the challenges faced by the relatively new cut 
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flower industry and the opportunities it generates. The interviews lasted between one and two hours, 
and were conducted in English — or Dutch if the general manager was Dutch speaking. To corroborate 
the information retrieved at management level, open interviews were also conducted with key 
stakeholders at sector level, including representatives of the Ethiopian Horticulture Producer Exporters 
Association (EHPEA), the Ethiopian Horticulture Development Agency (EHDA) and the Confederation 
of Ethiopian Labour Unions (CETU). These interviews lasted between one hour and one hour and a 
half. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. In addition, the researcher took extensive notes 
during and after each interview. These notes helped to improve and adjust the interview guidelines at 
every step. Thus the data collection followed a highly iterative approach designed to capture emerging 
themes in fieldwork (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
At the end of the first round of data collection, the responses were coded using NVivo 10, and 
discussed by both researchers to give further guidance to the research project. High levels of labour 
turnover emerged from this analysis. We decided to further investigate this intriguing phenomenon 
and to analyse how flower farms responded to it. We refined our research area by focusing on one 
single cluster of flower farms. This allowed us to investigate the responses to high labour turnover by 
different farms situated in the same setting, and subjected to the same institutional pressures (Gibson 
& Birkinshaw, 2004), and to minimize extraneous variability (Eisenhardt, 1989). Choosing to focus on 
one single cluster also enabled us to investigate labour turnover meticulously and to collect data from 
multiple data sources: workers, managers, and the labour and social affairs department, who viewed 
the phenomenon of labour turnover from diverse perspectives (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The 
second round of data collection took place in June-July 2013 and included a combination of data 
collection methods (in-depth interviews, surveys, focus group discussion).  
In-depth interviews. We conducted in-depth interviews with the general managers of 8 horticultural 
farms in the region (7 producing flowers, 1 producing vegetables), 6 of which had already been 
interviewed during the first round of data collection. The purpose was to increase our understandings 
of managers’ perceptions of high labour turnover and the type of practices they engaged in to deal 
with the phenomenon. Each interview took approximately one to one hour and a half, and was 
recorded and transcribed. We asked managers to describe labour turnover dynamics as they 
experienced it by drawing on the timeline.  
At cluster level we also conducted one in-depth interview with two representatives of the Labour and 
Social Affairs department of the region of Debre Zeyit. This interview had a duration of one hour and 
was recorded and transcribed. The information retrieved from these external informants provided us 
the specific understanding of the context within which the flower farms were operating.  
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Surveys. We collected survey data (n = 375) at workers level on five flower farms, stratified according 
to gender and job functions. The questionnaire included both open-ended and closed questions on 
socio-demographics, working conditions, work experience, overall job satisfaction and job rewards. 
Analysis of the survey data confirmed managers’ assumptions that they could predict workers’ quitting 
behaviour based on workers’ characteristics. In addition the survey data allowed us to reflect on 
managers’ responses, and validated our findings about managers legitimizing persistent turnover and 
their coping practices.  
Focus group discussions. We also organized six focus group discussions: one focus group discussion per 
farm and one focus group discussion combining workers from all five flower farms. Focus groups only 
targeted female workers and included from 4 to 14 participants. Each focus group took approximately 
two hours and was organized on the workers’ day off. Each focus group was held in an informal setting; 
it included a researcher and a local moderator, who fluently spoke both Amharic and Oromo. There 
was a discussion guide, which was not intended to be strictly followed but to aid the researcher and 
moderator during the discussions.  
Participants were asked about their experiences with high labour turnover, the causes of this according 
to them, and how this related with their personal situations. We made use of comparisons between 
farms and other job opportunities in the area in order to unravel the working conditions that really 
mattered and to gain more insights into workers’ perceptions. Each focus group was recorded and 
transcribed, and the accompanying researcher took extensive notes during the discussion. This worker 
perspective on labour turnover helped us to improve the quality of our research since it allowed us to 
triangulate our findings (Yin, 1994).  
Table 1 provides an overview of the data collection tools and of the way the data was used in the 
analysis. As depicted in the table, the 30 interviews at management level form the core of the analysis. 
Data collected at the level of workers, cluster and sector helped to triangulate and corroborate our 
findings.    
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Data analysis 
Phase I: Identifying management practices  
During the first phase of formal analysis, we followed an inductive approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
The first author started reading the raw data collected at management level and coded all practices 
related to labour turnover which emerged from the interviews using NVivo 10 software. Both authors 
then discussed the extensive list of practices and together they reflected on each separate practice, 
asking the following questions: ‘Does this practice reduce turnover? And if not, what is it then that this 
practice achieves?’  
From this analysis three types of codes emerged: (i) practices that served to predict the labour turnover 
pattern; (ii) practices aiming to contain current levels of turnover; (iii) practices aiming to 
accommodate to high labour turnover. We did not find any practices that actually served the purpose 
of reducing labour turnover; nor did we find differences between the practices used by local and 
foreign investors.  
We then turned to the data collected at workers level to augment and validate our findings (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2006). By way of an example, this triangulation of data supported our 
findings that managers could predict labour turnover on the basis of workers’ characteristics. In 
addition, whereas we previously doubted whether small surprise gifts could lower labour turnover, the 
focus group discussions confirmed our intuition to classify this type of practice under the category 
‘containing labour turnover’; because focus group participants sneered at the idea that they would 
become loyal workers in return for a small surprise gift such as a bottle of milk. The first column in 
Figure 1 displays the set of practices — used by managers in relation to labour turnover — that we 
identified. Moving across the figure, the second column presents the analytical concepts that we 
aggregated by clustering the different types of practices. A more detailed table, including 
representative quotes of each type of practice, can be found in the appendix.  
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Phase II: Understanding managerial practices  
During the second phase of data analysis, we followed a deductive approach. The focus of this analysis 
was to understand how managers made sense of persistently high labour turnover. We used Scott’s 
(1995) three pillars of institutions (regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive) as organizing 
framework. During this phase we followed a highly iterative approach, moving back and forth between 
theory, data and literature in order to work out how these pillars fitted in our context (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990). The emerging results were discussed regularly by both authors. At the end of the 
analysis we also shared our findings with several peer researchers to test our insights. We also 
presented our findings in informal settings attended by Ethiopian colleagues who were familiar with 
the context. A more detailed table, including representative quotes of the arguments that managers 
employed to justify high labour turnover, can be found in the appendix.   
98
ARTICLE 2. WHEN THE FARM-GATE BECOMES A REVOLVING DOOR 
 
FINDINGS  
This section is organized around two research questions. The first part presents the practices used by 
managers to cope with labour turnover; these have been classified in three main types. The second 
part analyses the way in which managers make sense of high labour turnover and how they legitimize 
the set of practices they have developed.  
Management practices 
On the surface, general managers described high labour turnover as a time-consuming and challenging 
phenomenon. They sometimes had to deal with labour shortages, which forced them to find 
immediate solutions. All managers argued that they were trying to reduce labour turnover but without 
much success.  
However our data suggests a different picture. An analysis of the practices developed by managers to 
handle high labour turnover reveals that, instead of reducing labour turnover, these practices actually 
helped to sustain a high level of labour turnover. We categorised the practices into three main types: 
(i) predicting the pattern of labour turnover; (ii) containing current levels of labour turnover and (iii) 
accommodating to high labour turnover. Each type is discussed in the sections below.  
(i) Predicting labour turnover  
The first set of practices consisted in predicting labour turnover. To this end, managers developed ways 
to identify patterns of labour turnover. They had a very good understanding of those patterns, which 
they easily could draw on the timeline that we used during the interviews. The different timelines 
collected showed very similar patterns. This knowledge was built up by observing three main elements: 
the worker’s background, the Ethiopian calendar and informal social ties established on the shop floor. 
Those three elements helped managers to predict an individual worker’s quitting behaviour and, more 
generally, the labour turnover pattern.  
The notion of ‘worker’s background’ refers to two parameters: whether the worker is from a rural or 
urban area; and whether it is a school-aged person. In most cases, workers from rural areas have their 
own farming activities and therefore have to quit during the farming season to take care of their plots 
of land. In Ethiopia, more than 80% of the people are subsistence farmers. They mainly grow teff, a 
staple crop and the main food item in Ethiopia. Managers said that they saw rural men leave the farm 
at the beginning of the rainy season to plough and sow their land, followed by the rural women in 
September, who are in charge of weeding. Both rural men and women are involved in harvesting, so 
because of this, managers only saw their rural workers return to the farms at the end of January  — 
when the harvesting season had ended.  
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Urban workers also had a good reason to quit: alternative job opportunities, which were becoming 
increasingly available in the city centre. When flower farms started their activities, the city of Debre 
Zeyit and its surroundings was considered underdeveloped and there were few job alternatives. 
However, over the years the floriculture sector bloomed and other horticultural farms, together with 
light manufacturing industries, located themselves nearby the city centre. This increased competition 
among farms and between other sectors created many job alternatives for the unskilled female labour 
force. In addition to job alternatives in the region, foreign brokers also came to the city offering local 
women the opportunity to work in Arab countries as maids. Managers pointed out that in general 
Ethiopian workers lack means of transportation. Hence, they knew that workers living in the rural 
surroundings of the city were often excluded from these alternative job opportunities. So the increased 
competition was said to largely induce high levels of turnover among the urban workers living close to 
the city centre where these alternative jobs popped up.  
The second parameter concerns workers who are school-aged and most probably want to return to 
school. Although managers expressed great reluctance to hire students, since few of them showed 
long-term commitment to work in the flower farms, students apparently hid the fact that they were 
attending school. However, as with rural farming activities, students looking for a job on flower farms 
followed a recognisable pattern. In other words, managers did take into account that when young 
workers aged between 16 and 18 years came to look for a job at the end of May (when school had just 
closed), they probably would leave the farm in September when the academic year resumed. With this 
information in hand, managers could predict the labour turnover flow to a large extent. Figure 2 
summarises the year-round labour turnover dynamics in flower farms operating in the region of Debre 
Zeyit. 
The second element needed to predict labour turnover is knowledge and understanding of the 
Ethiopian calendar. Managers named two critical moments (Figure 2). The first one is in September: 
during this month, demand for cut flowers in the northern hemisphere starts increasing as it marks the 
end of the summer period in these countries. At the same time the rainy season in Ethiopia ends, 
resulting in a more favourable climate. This is a crucial period for flower farms; they restart production 
and take intensive care of their flowers, which may have been affected by diseases during the rainy 
period. But at the same time, September marks the end of the year for Ethiopians. Students return to 
school, women go to the fields to weed them and all celebrate New Year on 11th September. Hence, 
flower farms are faced with an important number of workers leaving the farm at the same time.  
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The second critical period is towards the end of April or beginning of May, when flowers are in peak 
production. Demand for flowers in the northern hemisphere is high due to Mother’s day and the 
climate is perfect. Night temperatures are very high and the air is dry, right before the rainy season 
begins. Flower farms are fully operational; they need workers willing to work 7/7 and do overtime to 
meet their targets. This period, however, coincides with Ethiopian festivities. It is a common wedding 
time for Christians and many Ethiopians celebrate the fasting season and Easter. As a result, most 
workers wish to go home to visit family and relatives, and flower farms are faced with a shortage of 
workers.     
While managers tried to predict a labourer’s intention to leave on the basis of personal characteristics 
(such as their geographical or educational backgrounds), a third factor influencing a worker’s 
intentions was mentioned: being a member of ‘ikub’ (sometimes spelled differently as iqub or iqqub). 
An ‘ikub’ is a horizontally, informally organized savings scheme among workers of one work unit (e.g. 
a single greenhouse). It involves a small monthly contribution, which is given at the end of the month 
to one member by means of a rotation scheme (e.g. the often mentioned ROSCA schemes) (Anderson 
and Baland, 2002). Being a member of an ikub involves a long-term commitment: to be eligible as a 
member, one needs to contribute as many months as there are members. Although this informal 
system is not visible to non-members, managers referred to this savings net as an important predictor 
of turnover.  
Whereas the two other elements described above were markers of a stronger intention of workers to 
leave, this element meant just the opposite: it was a marker of a strong intention to stay. Indeed, the 
ikub increased loyalty of the workers towards other ikub members by creating a bond between them. 
As a result they were less inclined to leave. Hence, managers put some effort into identifying those 
work units where an ikub had been set up, since labour turnover in those work units were said to be 
drastically lower.   
(ii) Containing labour turnover 
The second set of practices consisted in containing labour turnover to keep a turnover rate that was 
manageable. Interestingly high labour turnover as such was not the problem, however unpredictable 
labour turnover was. To avoid additional unpredictable labour turnover, managers of the flower farms 
developed a number of strategies. The first strategy was to enter into agreements with neighbouring 
farms not to compete with each other. This oral, informal collusion at cluster level included paying 
comparable wages and increasing wage rates on the same day. In addition, managers promised not to 
hire workers coming from neighbouring flower farms. They also agreed to source workers from 
different areas than neighbouring farms. Though promises were not always kept, managers said that 
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these measures did help to discourage worker mobility and inhibited competition within the sector. In 
this way, cluster agreements ensured that turnover did not become uncontrollable. 
A second strategy was to source geographically. Most workers lacked any means of transport to get to 
the flower farms and because land rights are difficult to obtain in Ethiopia, people are reluctant to 
move. Therefore farms need to provide bus services to transport their workers. Managers seemed to 
make use of workers’ lack of mobility by targeting different villages to source their workers than 
competitors. This practice makes it virtually impossible for workers to compare working conditions and 
to choose which farm to work for. Hence, by sourcing from different areas it seemed that managers 
again managed to contain labour turnover caused by internal cluster competition. 
The third strategy consisted in providing small incentives to the workers during peak production and 
at critical moments. Working overtime in the pack house or being shifted from one work unit to 
another to cover remaining work is not an exception at peak times, and alternative job opportunities 
may then become more attractive; moreover, seeing colleagues leave the farm may strengthen this 
feeling. Managers indicated that during these moments it was important to keep the remaining 
workforce and that they did so by providing small incentives, for example giving one litre of milk or 
one kilogramme of bananas at the end of the day. These small presents were said to have a short-
term, lowering effect on labour turnover.  
However managers recognised that containing labour turnover caused by alternative job opportunities 
remained a difficult task, especially because it did not follow a clear seasonal pattern — in contrast 
with rural activities or school activities. Managers said that they could do very little to reduce 
competition for labour with other sectors.  
(iii) Accommodating to high labour turnover 
The first two sets of practices emerging from our data have to do with predicting labour turnover 
patterns and making high labour turnover containable so that it is manageable. A third set consists in 
practices enabling accommodation to the situation of high labour turnover. ‘Accommodation’ means 
that management seeks ways to adapt to the highly fluctuating workforce. In our study, 
accommodating practices included the segmentation of the workforce, task simplification and hiring 
more workers than needed.  
On flower farms there are two main types of jobs. Either one works in the greenhouse or in the pack 
house. Greenhouse workers are responsible for weeding, cleaning and harvesting the flowers. Workers 
assigned to the pack house sort flowers in terms of quality and size, and package them accordingly, 
before they are placed in cold rooms. Both jobs are done by low-educated female workers; however 
managers highlighted the fact that work in the pack house requires some more training, because it is 
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there that a difference in terms of quality control is being made. In addition, work in the greenhouse 
can be rearranged while this is not the case for work in the pack house. For these two reasons (more 
training needed in the pack house together with fewer opportunities for task simplification), managers 
sent rural women who were likely to leave in September to the greenhouse, while more stable 
workers, i.e. urban women, were assigned to the pack house. This segmentation of the workforce is a 
way of accommodating to high labour turnover as it lessens its negative impacts.  
Another practice developed to overcome periods of labour shortage is task simplification and task 
rearrangements in the greenhouse. Workers are asked to postpone less critical tasks, such as weeding, 
or to harvest only twice instead of three times that day. They might also be asked to cover for absent 
co-workers. A last practice that we identified consisted in hiring more workers than were actually 
needed during quiet production periods. This was a way for managers to cover potentially large drop-
outs and to make sure that they would not have to train new workers during peak production.  
Summary of management practices.  
Our analysis reveals that managers of flower farms in Ethiopia have developed many practices to 
handle high labour turnover. They have found ways to predict labour turnover patterns and to identify 
the most stable workers. They negotiate with competing farms and enter into unofficial non-poaching 
and wage agreements. They have adjusted their hiring practices in cooperation with competing farms 
and provide small ‘surprise’ incentives to retain their current work force. They segment their 
workforce, have simplified and reduced tasks and even hire more workers than strictly necessary. All 
these practices serve the purpose of reducing the uncertainty emanating from a highly fluctuating 
labour force and accommodating to prevailing situation. None, however, can be considered to be long-
term, sustainable strategies to reduce labour turnover.  
In sum, this first part of our analysis leads us to conclude that high labour turnover has become an 
integral part of the flower farms. It is a phenomenon that has increasingly stabilised and is repeated 
over the years. Our analysis of managers’ practices shows clearly that managers do not have any 
intention to reduce labour turnover or to shape a more stable workforce. Instead all current practices 
are meant to offset any negative effects that high labour turnover might have on the organisation’s 
performance. This first part of our analysis also makes clear that high functional labour turnover cannot 
be associated with automatically with passive management. On the contrary, maintaining or sustaining 
functional high labour turnover requires the development of many strategies to ensure a certain 
degree of control. It is not because managers do not aim to reduce turnover that they simply ignore or 
tolerate it. 
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Managers’ legitimization of labour turnover through an institutional lens  
In most contexts, a high and persistent labour turnover is perceived negatively (Andrijasevic & 
Sacchetto, 2014). In particular, in a developing country such as Ethiopia, marked by high 
unemployment figures, it looks suspicious when many workers leave a formal job voluntarily. How do 
managers who seek justification vis-à-vis Western consumers legitimize persistent high levels of labour 
turnover?  
In this context, we wished to better understand how flower farm managers in Ethiopia make sense of 
the issue of high labour turnover. Using an institutional perspective, we explored how managers rely 
on institutional systems to construct and interpret high labour turnover. We will argue that managers 
make sense of it by developing coherent accounts based on institutional systems that provide them 
with a justification for the practices they have developed. Building on Scott’s (1995) institutional pillars, 
our analysis reveals that managers mobilise regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive arguments to 
justify high labour turnover.  
(i) Regulative pillar  
Regulative elements are probably the most visible, explicit forms of institutions (Wicks, 2001). They 
constrain and regularise behaviour through the enforcement of rules and laws. Legitimacy arises from 
compliance with the requirements of the regulatory system (Scott, 1995). In the context of the cut 
flower industry, managers blamed Ethiopian policies and labour regulations for causing high labour 
turnover. At the same time, they indicated that they felt constrained by governmental legislations 
when trying to take up more effective measures to high overcome labour turnover.   
Policies and regulations as causing factor. Managers blamed the government for contributing directly 
to high labour turnover. Governmental policies and regulations were criticised for promoting 
alternative livelihood strategies and encouraging education, thereby stimulating rather than stabilising 
labour turnover. For instance, most farms are located in clusters near Addis Ababa, since they are 
export-oriented. However, the government has also allocated land to other industries such as the 
garment industry, in these clusters. This centralisation has resulted in strong competition for labour 
among different industrial sectors. The agricultural sector, to which the cut flower industry belongs, 
finds it difficult to compete with the light manufacturing sectors in terms of wages. Managers also 
blamed the current government for encouraging the migration of low-skilled women to Arab countries 
to work as household maids — flower farms require exactly these same workers. Managers did 
however understand that government was promoting the education of their low-skilled labour force, 
seeing it as an indication of Ethiopia’s ongoing development. Nevertheless they pointed out that higher 
school attendance negatively affected their labour supply. 
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While Ethiopian development policies were said to have an influence on labour dynamics at a macro 
level, Ethiopian labour law was said to induce greater labour turnover at farm level. For instance, 
labour law prescribes that a worker working on a flower farm for 45 consecutive days must receive a 
permanent contract. Although at first sight this measure would seem to protect a worker’s rights, it 
has had a pervasive effect in the sense that workers saw their wages decline once they had become a 
permanent employee. Managers explained that this was because permanent workers had to pay taxes 
and pensions contributions, whereas a daily or seasonal workers did not. As a result, this created 
dissatisfaction among the workers, often resulting in their departure. Although managers 
acknowledged the problem, none of them spoke about making up for the difference by increasing 
wages. Their arguments were about complying with the rules. In other words, legitimacy of this 
practice arose from the taken-for-granted character of the labour law. 
Regulations as constraining factor. Regulations were presented as constraining factors: they were too 
lenient, favouring the workers, protecting their rights too much and leaving managers with no means 
to overcome labour turnover. Managers said that they had no means to “discipline” the workers. This 
sense of powerlessness over workers was touched upon  by many managers through anecdotal 
examples. For instance, a worker is said to be within the parameters of the law if he/she is absent for 
less than ten days a month. Managers stated that giving workers permission to be absent for one third 
of a working month was unimaginable in any other context and that Ethiopian workers abused this 
rule regularly by not showing up for work without notifying their supervisors. Managers said that they 
tried to discipline their workforce by giving warnings but ultimately these warnings were ineffective, 
since labour law does not allow any wage deduction or other form of penalization for less than ten 
absence days a month. In other words, managers emphasised that they did not have any means to 
take action. They perceived the regulative environment as a constraint and though it limited their 
scope for action to reduce labour turnover. This prevented them from doing anything about their 
unpredictable, slippery labour force.   
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(ii) Normative pillar  
Normative elements refer to those “normative rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative and 
obligatory dimension into social life” (Scott, 1995: p. 64). Central to this pillar are norms and values 
prescribing how one is expected to behave. Legitimacy arises from doing things the way ‘it should be 
done’. Normative practices are socially constructed and give rise to social roles (Wicks, 2001). In the 
context of the flower farms, managers explained high labour turnover as a consequence of existing 
gender roles and social obligations.  
Gender roles. The cultural-cognitive frames in which women are viewed as soft, caring and patient, 
while men are seen as strong and tough, underpin socially-accepted work and non-work roles. In 
Ethiopia gender roles are clearly defined (Aguilar, Carranza, Goldstein, Kilic & Oseni, 2015; Kumar & 
Quisumbing, 2015). Men plough and sow the land at the end of June, and women join them in 
September to weed. Teff harvesting in December and January is a joint effort. Men are seen as the 
breadwinner of the family while women are responsible for a multitude of tasks within the household. 
They are expected to go to the market, cook, clean and take care of their children, as well as of elderly 
or sick household members (Lemlem, Bishop-Sambrook, Puskur & Tesema, 2010). These gender roles 
continue at the workplace, where there is a clear job division (Barrientos et al., 2003). Women are 
hired to take care of the flowers while men are only hired for hard work (such as construction of 
greenhouses, working in cold rooms) or hazardous work (such as spraying). As explained by Barrientos 
et al. (2003), higher positions such as supervision or management are most often taken up by a man 
rather than by a woman. Referring to these traditional gender roles, managers considered labour 
turnover as typically female phenomenon. A full-time job on a flower farm is 48 hours spread over six 
days in a week. Managers acknowledged that the combination of work and non-work responsibilities 
for many female workers might be challenging. Thus absenteeism would rise on market days, or 
women would be absent for a number of days without notifying their supervisors in advance. Pointing 
towards these traditional gender roles, managers argued that high labour turnover was an external 
phenomenon, caused by Ethiopian norms and values. Legitimacy here came from acting in line with 
these institutionalised norms and values. In other words, coping with high labour turnover rather than 
trying to reduce labour turnover had become the appropriate action, since reducing labour turnover 
would imply that one challenged these taken-for-granted, institutionalised gender roles.  
Social obligations. Ethiopians are said to be very close to each other and to attach great importance to 
ceremonies. One manager illustrated this powerfully: it was normal that whenever one worker was 
sick, two or three people would be absent to take care of this person. Funerals or weddings would 
attract many people, resulting in high absenteeism on those days; the same was true for other 
important holidays and festivities. Easter for example is one of the most celebrated times of the year 
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especially among Christians in Ethiopia, because for them it falls together with the wedding season. 
Most workers wish to go home to visit family and friends, which some managers perceived as a real 
problem since the Ethiopian Easter coincides with the peak production season. Unsurprisingly, 
managers are very reluctant to give holidays during this period, so many workers just quit their jobs. 
As with gender roles, managers pointed to the social obligations of their Ethiopian workers as a driving 
force of high labour turnover. As such they emphasised that high labour turnover was the product of 
external elements about which they could do nothing; all they could do was to find a way to cope with 
it.  
(iii) Cultural-cognitive pillar 
Finally, cultural-cognitive elements of institutions are those ‘shared conceptions that constitute the 
nature of social reality and create the frames through which meaning is made’ (Scott, 1995, p. 67). 
Underlying this type of institution is the notion that individuals’ response to reality are based on their 
subjective interpretations of the environment. These cultural-cognitive elements are most of the time 
taken for granted, because they are composed of shared frames and beliefs. In the context of the cut 
flower industry, managers would draw on cultural-cognitive elements to make sense of their 
organisation’s structure, to explain the underlying logic of high labour turnover and justify their 
actions.   
Feminine qualities. Worldwide the cut flower industry is dominated by female, unskilled workers. 
According to the managers interviewed, these workers make up around 80% of the total workforce on 
each farm worldwide. There was a shared understanding among managers that women were more 
suited for the jobs on flower farms than men, due to their feminine qualities, which were described 
as: careful, patient and sensitive. It was mentioned that routine work on flower farms was easier for 
women; they were said to be more responsible and less likely to complain. Few managers had ever 
questioned this workforce composition, let alone thought of changing it — even though they 
considered high labour turnover much more common among their female than among their male 
workers. By emphasising these feminine qualities, managers explained why the majority of their 
workforce were women and why they were not going to change this workforce structure, even if this 
meant that the organisation was constantly going to face high labour turnover figures.  
Image of the flower farm worker. Working on flower farms “doesn’t require intellectual or something. 
Just labour horse is needed” (interview1000b). So what workers typically have in common, other than 
being female, is that they are low educated. Managers associated this lack of formal education with 
being irresponsible and incapable of long-term thinking. Thus they explained why their workers would 
voluntarily quit their permanent job at the farm for an alternative job opportunity in the city, for 
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example in the construction sector, on a short-term basis. This image that managers had of their 
workers made them also conclude that workers were susceptible to all sorts of information, making 
them constantly move from one job to another even though, according to the managers we 
interviewed, there was no rational motive to do so. In addition, with flower farms being new in the 
country, most workers would have their first work experience in this sector. Managers associated this 
lack of work experience with a lack of a decent work ethic. Managers illustrated this by pointing out 
that workers often stayed home “for fun” (interview 10.000), or when they “simply have received a bit 
of money” (interview 100.000a). These cultural-cognitive frames, presenting workers as irresponsible 
and irrational, were used by managers to blame their workers for high labour turnover. In addition, 
these frames also affected managers’ practices since managers had to “discipline” them and “teach” 
them proper work ethics.  
Rural vs urban identity. Another characteristic which managers would draw upon to make sense of 
their work context was the worker’s geographical origin. Flower farms hire both workers living in rural 
surroundings and those coming from the nearest towns. Managers described rural employees as hard-
working people who had agricultural experience because they also cultivated their own land. Workers 
with an urban background, on the other hand, were categorized as fast, smart and focused. Because 
of the exposure to city life however, they were also labelled as pickier than rural workers. Drawing on 
these cognitive frames, managers would justify their workforce segmentation. Rural workers were 
more likely to be placed in greenhouses, where they were responsible for agricultural tasks such as 
weeding and harvesting flowers. Urban workers, on the other hand, would be put to work in the pack 
house, where they would have to select flowers according to quality criteria and package them for 
shipping. According to our interviewees, in general urban women preferred working in the pack house 
because this type of job takes place in the shade, and is cleaner than working in the hot, muddy 
greenhouses. In this way, managers legitimized the segmentation of their workforce. The fact that 
greenhouse tasks were less affected by high labour turnover than tasks in the pack houses, and that 
rural workers employed in greenhouses were more likely to leave the farm than urban workers 
employed in the pack houses, was viewed as a coincidence. Managers sought to legitimize their 
workforce segmentation by pointing out that this was the logical thing to do following these cultural-
cognitive frames.  
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Summary of management’s legitimization practices of turnover 
Building on regulative elements, managers made sense of high labour turnover by picturing it as a 
consequence of a macro regulative environment facilitating alternative work opportunities. Presenting 
high labour turnover as a result of institutional factors made it superfluous for managers to question 
their own organisational environment. When they did, they tiptoed around practices that might be 
damaging for workers by emphasising that they simply followed the rules. In this way managers 
covered their own responsibilities with a veil of legitimacy arising from compliance with Ethiopian 
labour law.  
The normative elements helped managers to legitimize their fluctuating labour force. Voluntarily 
leaving a permanent job was attributed to women’s social and cultural obligations. Following this logic 
it becomes clear that in the mindset of managers labour turnover remained largely out of their scope 
since they could not alter existing socio-cultural expectations towards women in the Ethiopian society. 
This left them with few alternatives to deal with labour turnover issues other than the ones they 
already applied  
Finally, the image of workers as unskilled, irresponsible and lacking a decent work ethic constitutes a 
cultural-cognitive construction affecting managers’ practices. They saw it as their responsibility to 
discipline workers, to teach them how to behave in a formal work setting  — focusing much more on 
‘sticks’ than on ‘carrots’. Therefore managers pictured high labour turnover as a phenomenon entirely 
situated on the workers’ side rather than as a problem arising from organisational practices. In 
addition, managers would draw upon their cultural-cognitive frames regarding female, urban and rural 
workers to legitimize their work structure and practices.  
DISCUSSION 
In this article, we proposed an institutional perspective to broaden our understandings of functional 
labour turnover. We investigated two main questions: the practices developed by managers to cope 
with high labour turnover, and the justifications underlying their practices and used to make sense of 
it. Our analysis has enabled us to better understand how institutional systems participated in shaping 
managers’ mindsets with regards to high labour turnover. In this mindset, which plays an important 
role, labour turnover is the outcome of external institutional forces that are outside the managers’ 
scope of action. As a result, managers feel deprived of the means to reduce labour turnover. Figure 3 
presents the manager’s mindset model; it illustrates how managers can accept and justify high labour 
turnover, and to formulate practices helping them to cope with it rather than reduce it. 
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Our study shows that managers did not envisage that the work environment might be a potential cause 
of turnover. Instead they considered high labour turnover to be entirely caused by external pressures. 
This is surprisingly different from what is generally accepted within the academic literature, where 
high levels of turnover are considered to be caused by job dissatisfaction and where retention 
strategies, to be effective, need to focus on improving working conditions so as to improve job 
satisfaction (Mobley, 1977; Mueller & Price, 1990).  
In fact we argue that flower farm managers have re-defined the causes of labour turnover because of 
the conflicting expectations that their stakeholders have towards them. On the one hand, powerful 
Western buyers and retailers employ practices — such as cost-cutting and just-in-time ordering — that 
compel flower farms to promote labour flexibility (Barrientos & Smith, 2007; Riisgaard, 2009). Because 
of this, workers need to be both available and disposable, and high labour turnover becomes 
beneficial. On the other hand, growing consumer awareness and NGO campaigns demanding better 
working conditions at the bottom of global value chains have resulted in the proliferation of private 
social standards. Implicitly these standards condemn labour flexibility as they strive for a better 
protection of workers’ rights, permanent contracts and better working conditions (Riisgaard, 2011).  
For these stakeholders large dropouts of workers cannot be associated with low job satisfaction 
resulting from poor working conditions. Hence, flower farms encounter a vexing predicament: if these 
farms were to adhere closely to Western societal norms and expectations, they would be unlikely to 
maximize their profits and take full advantage of having relocated to a low-wage country. Conversely, 
if these farms openly violate Western societal expectations, they are likely to lose their Western 
consumers. Consequently, to protect themselves from being questioned, managers have constructed 
a mindset that supports the notion that high labour turnover is not their fault. The process of re-making 
sense of turnover as a phenomenon entirely out of their scope is arguably not a deliberate one, nor an 
intentional strategy to avoid claims of negligence. It is more likely that managers unconsciously try to 
align conflicting Western pressures from both the consumers and the buyers sides. 
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Contributions to the research field 
This study extends the work on functional labour turnover in several ways. First, we have shown that 
managers can develop numerous practices to cope with persistently high levels of turnover. While 
prior research has focused on delineating successful retention strategies designed to reduce 
dysfunctional turnover (McEvoy & Cascio, 1985; Rainlall, 2004; Taplin, Winterton & Winterton, 2003), 
few studies have focused on identifying the types of practices followed by managers in contexts where 
labour turnover is considered functional. By exploring the practices developed by managers to cope 
with rapid turnover, we addressed this research gap and showed that functional turnover also requires 
active strategies. Nevertheless our analysis of coping practices is only a first tentative step towards 
improving our understanding of the type of practices followed by managers to cope with functional 
turnover.  
Second, by drawing on institutional theory we are introducing a different perspective on functional 
turnover, that is a more subjective view. Our findings show that managers seek legitimacy both for 
high turnover and their own coping practices. Whereas prior studies concluded that some types and 
some extent of turnover could be considered beneficial for an organisation as long as the benefits of 
turnover outweighed its costs (Abelson et al., 1984; Dalton et al., 1982; Siebert et al., 2009; Williams, 
2000), our study argues that this economic argument does not suffice for managers to accept high 
turnover levels. In order to acquire and maintain legitimacy in the eyes of their stakeholders and 
society at large, they need to construct a mindset that supports the notion that labour turnover is 
entirely out of their scope. This mindset draws on the three pillars of institutions. Hence, this study is 
extending the previous theory on functional turnover by using a more subjective lens, which broadens 
our understanding of functional turnover beyond the purely rational economic argument. 
Third, we are contributing to the turnover literature by placing the mindset of the managers at the 
centre of our analysis. We have widened previous studies, which had researched functional turnover 
mainly from an organisation’s perspective, by including the managers’ perspective. By drawing 
attention to the manager and his legitimacy-seeking behaviour, we are able to explain the logics behind 
current coping practices. Furthermore, our findings show how these institutional arguments used by 
managers to legitimize turnover have put them in a deadlock, whereby current coping practices remain 
the only appropriate and proper tools at their disposal. As a result, this study highlights the complexity 
and ambiguity of functional labour turnover dynamics, and the need to understand not only 
organisational objectives but also managers’ perceptions within the larger institutional context in 
which they operate. Our findings imply that functional labour turnover cannot be fully understood 
without emphasizing the interplay between the institutional environment and managers’ actions.  
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Implications and future research directions  
Our study provides insights that carry important implications for both practitioners and academics. For 
academics, the fact that managers seek legitimacy and social acceptance for functional labour turnover 
illustrates the need for more contextual research that will serve to improve our understanding of the 
complexities of this phenomenon. While we acknowledge that our analysis has been based on a single 
industry in a specific country context, and that legitimization practices of managers are specific to the 
empirical setting of the study, it can be envisaged that similar patterns may occur in other situations 
bringing together functional turnover and stakeholders (e.g. consumers, NGOs) who are concerned 
about poor working conditions. In this regard, further research should be conducted in other low-
skilled, labour-intensive industries and other institutional country contexts, in order to verify and 
expand upon the managers’ legitimation and coping practices presented here.  
As for practitioners, and more specifically certification bodies, our results show that it is important to 
understand the institutional logics that managers draw upon to legitimize turnover — because this has 
far-reaching consequences for the organisational structure and managerial practices. As much as high 
turnover can be considered to be functional for an organisation, it may also persist because of the 
various institutional logics that drive managers into deadlock. 
Our findings suggest that managers do not see themselves as purely pursuing a profit-maximizing 
corporate agenda. Certification bodies with an interest in improving working conditions need to treat 
these managers as allies in their endeavour to achieve better working conditions. Otherwise several 
criteria of certification schemes will only exist on paper or will miss their goals. By way of example, 
certification schemes prescribe that workers should have the right to freedom of association and 
collective bargaining. They also prescribe that workers need to receive a permanent contract after a 
probation period (Riisgaard, 2011). In a context with high labour turnover, however, labour unions lack 
bargaining power because dissatisfied workers choose to exit the farm rather than to formulate their 
grievances (Elger et al., 1998) and permanent contracts are basically not valued very much by workers 
who wish to leave (Smith et al., 2004).  
These examples illustrate the necessity for certification bodies to understand the local dynamics at 
play and how managers’ construction of these local realities influence their practices. For these 
reasons we join the call of Locke, Amengual and Mangla (2009) who proposed a more commitment-
oriented approach to improving labour standards based on a process of root-cause analysis, joint 
problem solving and information sharing rather than a compliance-focused approach whereby 
auditors simply tick off the boxes on their checklists.  
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w
ill
 u
se
 th
at
, w
e 
w
ill
 e
m
pl
oy
 th
em
. A
t l
ea
st
 th
ey
 w
ill
 g
iv
e 
yo
u…
 sc
ho
ol
 w
ill
 st
ar
t o
n 
Se
pt
em
be
r, 
on
 Ju
ly
 th
er
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
th
is 
m
ov
em
en
t. 
St
ill
 a
lm
os
t S
ep
te
m
be
r, 
en
d 
of
 S
ep
te
m
be
r t
he
y 
w
ill
 w
or
k 
fo
r y
ou
. W
e 
em
pl
oy
 th
em
 o
nl
y 
fo
r g
ra
di
ng
 w
ho
le
. P
un
ch
in
g.
 (1
b)
 
M
ai
nl
y 
th
e 
pa
ck
 h
ou
se
 g
irl
s t
he
y 
ar
e 
co
m
in
g 
fro
m
 D
eb
re
 Z
ey
it 
Ci
ty
 a
nd
 th
e 
gi
rls
 th
at
 a
re
 co
m
in
g 
fr
om
 th
e 
ru
ra
l a
re
as
, 
fr
om
 a
ro
un
d 
th
e 
fa
rm
s, 
if 
th
ey
 d
on
’t 
ha
ve
 a
ny
th
in
g 
to
 d
o 
on
 th
ei
r f
ar
m
, t
he
 o
ne
s t
ha
t a
re
 co
m
in
g.
.. 
if 
it 
is 
no
t 
ha
rv
es
tin
g 
se
as
on
 o
r s
ow
in
g 
se
as
on
, w
e 
us
e 
th
e 
fa
rm
er
s. 
So
 th
e 
gr
ee
nh
ou
se
 w
om
en
 a
re
…
 m
os
t o
f t
he
m
 a
re
 fr
om
 th
e 
ru
ra
l a
re
as
. (
10
b)
 
Se
gm
en
tin
g 
 
la
bo
ur
 fo
rc
e 
  
Ac
co
m
m
od
at
in
g 
to
 la
bo
ur
 
tu
rn
ov
er
 
W
e 
tr
y 
to
 d
o 
ou
r b
es
t t
o 
fo
cu
s o
nl
y 
on
 h
ar
ve
st
in
g 
in
st
ea
d 
of
 d
oi
ng
 th
e 
ot
he
r j
ob
s. 
So
 w
e 
pi
ck
 o
nl
y 
flo
w
er
s a
nd
 th
en
 
w
e 
w
ill
 a
lso
 h
el
p,
 e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 in
 th
e 
ar
ea
 w
he
re
 w
e 
ha
ve
 m
os
t p
ro
du
ct
io
n,
 w
e 
sh
ift
 la
di
es
 fr
om
 a
no
th
er
 g
re
en
ho
us
e 
to
 
fin
ish
 th
ei
r j
ob
. S
o 
in
 su
ch
 a
 w
ay
 w
e 
w
ill
 tr
y 
ou
r b
es
t t
o 
fin
ish
 th
e 
jo
b.
 B
ut
 it
 is
 d
iff
icu
lt 
fo
r u
s. 
Yo
u 
kn
ow
, w
e 
do
n’
t t
ak
e 
ou
t r
ej
ec
te
d 
st
em
s s
om
et
im
es
, w
e 
w
ill
 n
ot
 a
pp
ly
 a
ny
 p
ra
ct
ice
 li
ke
 b
en
di
ng
 o
n 
tim
e.
 S
o 
it 
w
ill
 a
ffe
ct
 o
ur
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
. 
(1
00
b)
 
Th
ey
 [r
em
ai
ni
ng
 la
bo
ur
er
s]
 co
ve
r t
he
ir 
pl
ac
e 
an
d 
th
ey
 le
av
e 
th
e 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
an
d 
te
rt
ia
ry
 jo
bs
 a
nd
 th
ey
 fo
cu
s o
nl
y 
on
 
th
e 
pr
im
ar
y 
an
d 
th
ey
 su
pp
or
t t
he
 g
re
en
ho
us
e 
at
 th
at
 m
om
en
t. 
(1
0.
00
0)
 
[D
ur
in
g 
m
om
en
ts
 o
f l
ab
ou
r s
ho
rt
ag
e]
 w
e 
se
t p
rio
rit
ie
s i
n 
w
or
k.
 L
et
’s 
sa
y 
w
e 
do
n’
t w
ee
d 
or
 so
m
et
hi
ng
. (
10
0.
00
0b
) 
Si
m
pl
ify
in
g 
ta
sk
s  
 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
tim
es
 th
at
 w
e 
co
ul
d 
do
 w
ith
 le
ss
 p
eo
pl
e,
 b
ut
 a
ct
ua
lly
 th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f p
eo
pl
e 
is 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
m
ax
im
um
 
ne
ed
s. 
Be
ca
us
e 
if 
it 
is 
re
al
ly
 b
us
y,
 a
nd
 y
ou
 st
ill
 n
ee
d 
to
 g
o 
fin
d 
th
em
 a
nd
 tr
ai
n 
th
em
…
 (5
0)
  
W
e 
w
an
t t
o 
ha
ve
 e
xt
ra
 w
or
ke
rs
, b
ec
au
se
 o
f t
he
 tu
rn
ov
er
 y
ou
 k
no
w
. T
hi
s i
s t
he
 m
aj
or
 a
re
a 
w
hi
ch
 h
as
 th
e 
m
os
t 
tu
rn
ov
er
 o
f l
ab
ou
r. 
Be
ca
us
e 
of
 th
e 
in
du
st
rie
s t
ha
t a
re
 fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
co
un
tr
y,
 in
 th
e 
cit
y.
 Y
ou
 k
no
w
, w
e 
ar
e 
al
w
ay
s 
co
m
pe
tin
g 
fo
r l
ab
ou
r. 
So
 w
e 
w
an
t t
o 
ha
ve
 a
lw
ay
s e
xt
ra
 w
or
ke
rs
 in
 th
e 
fie
ld
. S
o 
th
at
 is
 w
hy
 w
e 
ha
ve
 3
20
. B
ut
, w
he
n 
w
e 
se
e 
th
e 
to
ta
l d
em
an
d 
of
 th
e 
w
or
ke
rs
, i
t i
s a
bo
ut
 2
80
 o
r 2
90
. (
10
0a
)  
Be
ca
us
e 
w
he
n 
yo
u 
ar
e 
de
sp
er
at
e,
 y
ou
…
 o
n 
th
es
e 
se
as
on
s w
e 
ca
nn
ot
 tr
ai
n 
pe
op
le
. Y
ou
 d
on
’t 
w
an
t t
o 
tr
ai
n 
an
yo
ne
 
w
he
n 
yo
u 
ha
ve
 y
ou
r h
ig
h 
se
as
on
, y
ou
 k
no
w
, l
ik
e 
I s
ai
d,
 b
ec
au
se
 th
e 
ris
k 
is 
m
uc
h 
hi
gh
er
. W
e 
ca
nn
ot
 a
ffo
rd
 to
 lo
se
 
qu
al
ity
, n
ot
 a
ffo
rd
 to
 m
ak
e 
de
m
an
ds
 a
nd
 to
 a
vo
id
 th
os
e 
th
in
gs
 w
e 
w
an
t t
o 
hi
re
 so
m
eo
ne
 w
ho
 u
nd
er
st
an
ds
 th
e 
pr
oc
es
s. 
(1
0b
)  
Hi
rin
g 
m
or
e 
la
bo
ur
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Ap
pe
nd
ix
. M
an
ag
er
s’
 le
gi
tim
iza
tio
n 
of
 h
ig
h 
la
bo
ur
 tu
rn
ov
er
 th
ro
ug
h 
an
 in
st
itu
tio
na
l l
en
s 
Re
pr
es
en
ta
tiv
e 
qu
ot
es
 
Re
gu
la
tiv
e 
pi
lla
r  
Po
lic
ie
s a
nd
 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 a
s 
ca
us
al
 fa
ct
or
  
No
w
 y
ou
 re
al
ly
 n
ee
d 
to
 g
o 
lo
ok
 fo
r t
he
m
. B
ec
au
se
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
so
 m
an
y 
ne
w
 g
ar
m
en
t f
ac
to
rie
s a
nd
 so
da
 fa
ct
or
ie
s 
an
d 
ot
he
r g
re
en
ho
us
es
 a
nd
…
 w
el
l i
t i
s h
ar
d 
to
 fi
nd
 w
or
ke
rs
. S
o 
it 
is 
a 
lit
tle
 b
it 
th
e 
pr
ob
le
m
 o
f t
he
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t, 
I 
th
in
k.
 B
ec
au
se
 th
ey
 tr
y 
to
 ce
nt
ra
liz
e 
ho
rt
icu
ltu
re
 a
nd
 in
du
st
ry
, b
ut
 th
at
 d
oe
sn
’t 
re
al
ly
 m
at
ch
 w
ith
 th
e 
la
bo
ur
 
su
pp
ly
 n
ow
 d
oe
s i
t. 
(5
)  
Th
e 
m
ai
n 
re
as
on
 w
hy
 w
e 
lo
se
 w
or
ke
rs
 is
 b
ec
au
se
 th
ey
 m
ig
ra
te
 to
 th
e 
M
id
dl
e 
Ea
st
 to
 w
or
k 
as
 a
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 sl
av
e 
an
d 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t d
oe
sn
’t 
do
 a
ny
th
in
g 
ab
ou
t i
t!
 O
n 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ry
, t
he
y 
ar
e 
be
hi
nd
 it
. E
ve
ry
 m
on
th
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
so
 
m
an
y 
th
ou
sa
nd
s o
f t
he
m
 g
oi
ng
 to
 S
au
di
 A
ra
bi
a 
an
d 
so
 o
n,
 a
nd
 th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t e
ve
n 
ha
s m
ad
e 
de
al
s w
ith
 th
es
e 
co
un
tr
ie
s:
 so
 m
an
y 
pe
r m
on
th
 w
e’
ll 
de
liv
er
. I
t i
s j
us
t a
 b
us
in
es
s, 
m
od
er
n 
sla
ve
ry
 (2
a)
.  
 
W
he
n 
w
e 
st
ar
te
d 
he
re
 th
er
e 
w
as
 h
ar
dl
y 
an
y 
sc
ho
ol
. N
ow
ad
ay
s e
ve
n 
if 
th
ey
 a
re
 1
6,
 1
7,
 1
8,
 1
9,
 2
0…
 p
eo
pl
e 
st
ar
t 
re
ad
in
g,
 st
ar
t l
ea
rn
in
g 
sc
ho
ol
 a
nd
 g
o 
to
 sc
ho
ol
. B
ac
k 
th
en
 th
er
e 
w
er
e 
no
t a
 lo
t o
f s
ch
oo
ls 
to
 le
ar
n.
 N
ow
ad
ay
s t
he
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t i
s p
us
hi
ng
 th
e 
fa
th
er
 o
r t
he
 m
ot
he
r o
r t
he
 p
ar
en
t t
o 
se
nd
 it
s k
id
s t
o 
sc
ho
ol
. B
ut
 n
ot
 b
ef
or
e,
 it
 w
as
 n
ot
 
ha
pp
en
in
g.
 S
o 
w
e 
st
ar
t w
ith
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
th
e 
co
un
tr
y.
 W
he
n 
th
er
e 
is 
a 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f t
he
 co
un
tr
y,
 it
 d
oe
s b
ec
om
e 
m
or
e 
of
 a
 te
nd
en
cy
 a
m
on
g 
w
or
ke
rs
 [t
o 
le
av
e 
th
e 
fa
rm
] (
1b
). 
 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
 a
s 
co
ns
tr
ai
ni
ng
 fa
ct
or
  
An
d 
th
ey
 w
ill
 b
e 
ab
se
nt
 fo
r f
ou
r d
ay
s.
 F
iv
e 
da
ys
 m
ea
ns
 th
ey
 w
ill
 b
e 
fir
ed
. W
ith
ou
t n
ot
ify
in
g,
 a
fte
r f
iv
e 
da
ys
 th
ey
 
w
ill
 b
e 
fir
ed
, i
t i
s a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 th
e 
la
w
 o
f t
he
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t. 
O
n 
th
e 
fo
ur
th
? 
Th
ey
 w
ill
 co
m
e 
an
d 
th
ey
 w
ill
 w
or
k 
fo
r 
on
e 
w
ee
k 
or
 so
m
et
hi
ng
 a
nd
 th
en
 th
ey
 w
ill
 b
e 
go
ne
 a
ga
in
…
 (1
b)
  
In
 E
th
io
pi
a,
 w
e 
ha
ve
 a
 se
rio
us
 p
ro
bl
em
 w
ith
 a
bs
en
te
ei
sm
 a
nd
 fr
au
du
le
nt
 si
ck
 le
av
e.
 W
hi
ch
 is
 v
er
y,
 v
er
y 
di
ffi
cu
lt 
to
 
co
nt
ro
l u
nl
es
s a
 d
e d
uc
tio
n 
is 
m
ad
e 
fro
m
 th
e 
w
ag
e,
 if
 a
bs
en
te
ei
sm
 o
r s
ick
 le
av
e 
go
es
 o
ut
sid
e 
th
e 
ac
ce
pt
ab
le
 
pa
ra
m
et
er
s. 
An
d 
so
 o
ne
 o
f t
he
 re
as
on
s i
t i
s s
o 
di
ffi
cu
lt 
to
 co
nt
ro
l i
s t
ha
t t
he
 cu
rr
en
t l
ab
ou
r l
eg
isl
at
io
n 
al
lo
w
s a
 
pe
rs
on
 to
 b
e 
ab
se
nt
 u
p 
to
 1
0 
da
ys
 a
 m
on
th
. S
o 
ju
st
 to
 a
llo
w
 to
 b
e 
ab
le
 to
 b
e 
ab
se
nt
 1
0 
da
ys
 a
 m
on
th
! T
ha
t i
s 
qu
ite
 d
iff
er
en
t t
o 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 co
nd
iti
on
s. 
So
 if
 w
e 
ar
e 
al
lo
w
in
g 
ou
r s
ta
ff 
to
 b
e 
ab
se
nt
 o
ne
 th
ird
 o
f t
he
ir 
w
or
ki
ng
 
tim
e,
 ro
ug
hl
y,
 h
ow
 d
o 
w
e 
an
tic
ip
at
e 
an
d 
pr
ed
ict
 w
ha
t t
he
 st
af
f c
om
po
ne
nt
 is
 g
oi
ng
 to
 b
e 
on
 a
ny
 o
ne
 d
ay
? 
(2
0)
 
W
el
l, 
w
e 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
tr
yi
ng
 v
ar
io
us
 th
in
gs
. W
e’
ve
 b
ee
n 
tr
yi
ng
 to
 b
e 
st
ric
t i
n 
te
rm
s o
f a
 d
isc
ip
lin
ar
y 
pr
oc
es
s;
 in
 a
 
pr
oc
es
s i
n 
w
ar
ni
ng
s. 
Bu
t e
ve
n 
th
os
e 
w
ar
ni
ng
s a
re
 in
ef
fe
ct
iv
e,
 b
ec
au
se
 w
e 
do
n’
t h
av
e 
th
e 
m
ea
ns
 to
 ta
ke
 a
ct
io
n.
 
W
he
n 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
as
 te
n 
w
ar
ni
ng
s o
n 
hi
s f
ile
, w
e 
st
ill
 d
on
’t 
ha
ve
 th
e 
m
ea
ns
 to
 ta
ke
 a
ct
io
n 
be
ca
us
e 
he
 is
 w
ith
in
 
th
e 
pa
ra
m
et
er
s o
f t
he
 la
w
; t
he
 la
w
 sa
ys
 h
e 
m
ay
 ta
ke
 u
p 
10
 d
ay
s i
n 
a 
m
on
th
. S
o 
ve
ry
 d
iff
ic
ul
t t
o 
m
an
ag
e 
(2
0)
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N
or
m
at
iv
e 
pi
lla
r 
Ge
nd
er
 ro
le
s 
W
om
en
 w
ill
 b
e 
m
or
e 
ab
se
nt
 th
an
 m
en
 b
ec
au
se
 th
ey
 a
re
 ta
ki
ng
 re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 in
 th
e 
fa
m
ily
. I
f a
 ch
ild
 m
ay
be
 is
 si
ck
, 
m
or
e 
sh
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
re
sp
on
sib
le
 a
nd
 to
 d
o 
di
ffe
re
nt
 th
in
gs
, s
he
 w
ill
 b
e 
m
or
e 
re
sp
on
sib
le
 in
 th
e 
fa
m
ily
 ca
se
s. 
Th
at
 is
 
w
hy
 it
 is
 m
or
e 
fo
r w
om
en
 t o
 b
e 
ab
se
nt
. (
10
00
b)
  
I d
on
’t 
kn
ow
…
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
so
 m
an
y 
th
in
gs
. T
he
y 
ha
ve
 th
ei
r o
w
n 
lif
e.
 S
om
et
im
es
 th
ei
r l
ife
 re
qu
ire
s t
he
m
 to
 re
m
ai
n 
at
 
ho
m
e.
 T
he
y 
ha
ve
 to
 d
o 
so
m
et
hi
ng
, I
 d
on
’t 
kn
ow
…
 w
he
n 
th
ey
 a
re
 n
ot
 co
m
in
g 
he
re
. A
nd
 so
m
e,
 w
om
en
 a
re
 a
lso
, 
so
m
e 
of
 th
em
, h
a v
e 
ch
ild
re
n 
w
ho
 a
re
 b
ei
ng
 si
ck
, t
he
y 
ha
ve
 to
 lo
ok
 a
fte
r t
he
m
. A
nd
 a
 lo
t o
f r
ea
so
ns
. (
10
0b
) 
Li
ke
 m
al
es
, a
bs
en
te
ei
sm
 w
ill
 b
e 
al
m
os
t z
er
o.
 I 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 w
om
en
 th
ey
 h
av
e 
of
 co
ur
se
 so
m
et
hi
ng
 to
 d
o 
at
 th
ei
r 
ho
m
e.
 M
en
 th
ey
 a
re
 b
re
ad
w
in
ne
r, 
th
ey
 b
re
ad
-w
in
 o
nl
y 
on
 o
ne
 lo
ca
tio
n.
 W
he
re
? 
O
ur
 fa
rm
. B
ut
, f
em
al
es
 o
f c
ou
rs
e,
 
th
e 
m
on
ey
 th
ey
 m
ak
e,
 o
r t
he
 m
on
ey
 th
at
 h
e 
gi
ve
s t
o 
hi
s w
ife
, t
he
 w
i fe
 w
ill
 b
e 
re
sp
on
sib
le
 to
 b
uy
, t
o 
go
 to
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t. 
Eu
hm
.. 
to
 o
rd
er
 th
e 
pr
od
uc
ts
 a
nd
 to
 b
rin
g 
it 
to
 th
e 
ho
us
e.
 O
f c
ou
rs
e 
yo
u 
al
so
 h
av
e 
to
 tr
ea
t t
he
 ch
ild
re
n.
 
Ty
pi
ca
lly
 it
 is
 fo
r w
om
en
, f
em
al
e.
 (1
b)
  
So
ci
al
 o
bl
ig
at
io
ns
  
Pe
op
le
 d
on
’t 
sh
ow
 u
p 
fo
r w
or
k 
es
pe
cia
lly
 w
ith
 th
ei
r h
ol
id
ay
s, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 a
re
 re
lig
io
us
, t
he
y 
ha
ve
 d
iff
er
en
t 
ho
lid
ay
s. 
An
d 
th
e 
ot
he
r r
ea
so
n 
is 
pe
rs
on
al
 p
ro
bl
em
s, 
be
ca
us
e 
es
pe
cia
lly
 h
er
e 
in
 E
th
io
pi
a 
pe
op
le
 a
re
 in
tim
at
e,
 v
er
y 
in
tim
at
e 
w
ith
 e
ac
h 
ot
he
r. 
If 
so
m
eb
od
y 
is 
ou
t o
r s
ick
 o
r s
om
et
hi
ng
, m
ay
be
 tw
o 
or
 th
re
e 
pe
op
le
 w
ill
 b
e 
ab
se
nt
. 
Be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 a
re
 in
tim
at
e 
an
d 
al
so
 th
e 
fu
ne
ra
l c
er
em
on
y,
 ju
st
 fo
r t
he
 ce
re
m
on
y 
20
0 
or
 3
00
 p
eo
pl
e 
ar
e 
sit
tin
g 
th
er
e,
 so
…
 b
ut
 y
ea
h 
ok
ay
. (
10
00
b)
 
Th
ey
 m
ar
ry
 in
 se
as
on
s. 
In
 th
e 
ra
in
y 
se
as
on
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
le
ss
 w
ed
di
ng
s a
nd
 a
lso
 d
ur
in
g 
fa
st
in
g 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
no
 w
ed
di
ng
s. 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
ce
rt
ai
n 
pe
rio
ds
 in
 w
hi
ch
 e
ve
ry
bo
dy
 n
ee
ds
 to
 g
et
 m
ar
rie
d .
. s
o 
th
en
 e
ve
ry
th
in
g 
is 
tu
rn
ed
 u
ps
id
e 
do
w
n.
 
(2
a)
  
Fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e 
in
 A
pr
il 
or
 so
m
et
hi
ng
, t
hi
s i
s t
he
 co
m
m
on
 w
ed
di
ng
 ti
m
e 
fo
r t
he
 E
th
io
pi
an
s, 
th
is 
is 
m
aj
or
. B
ec
au
se
 
th
er
e 
is 
a 
ho
lid
ay
 o
f E
as
te
r, 
an
d 
af
te
r E
as
te
r t
he
re
 is
 fa
st
in
g 
an
d 
af
te
r f
as
tin
g,
 e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 th
e 
m
aj
or
ity
 o
f w
or
ke
rs
 
ar
e 
Ch
ris
tia
ns
, t
he
 m
ar
ria
ge
 is
 h
er
e 
an
d 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
ho
lid
ay
s a
nd
 th
e 
pe
op
le
 th
ey
 a
re
 g
on
e 
to
 v
isi
t t
he
ir 
fa
m
ily
 o
r 
so
m
et
hi
ng
. S
o 
at
 th
is 
tim
e 
w
e 
w
ill
 a
lso
 h
av
e 
sh
or
ta
ge
 o
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ARTICLE 3 
Identifying the impediments to workplace unionism in 
Agricultural Value Chains: an integrated framework 
Abstract. This article studies the impediments to workplace unionism in the cut flower industry in 
Ethiopia. To identify these impediments, we combined a vertical (governance and structure of Global 
Value Chains) lens and a horizontal (socio-economic context) lens. Such an integrated approach helped 
us to find several impediments which are rooted in socio-cultural norms and values, and at the same 
time are the outcomes of commercial dynamics inherent to vertical integration. We argue that there 
is no quick fix for improving trade union rights at the bottom of agricultural value chains. We conclude 
by discussing ways in which some of these impediments can be overcome.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are considered intrinsic principles of 
social justice (Anner, 2012; Barrientos & Smith, 2007; Elliott & Freeman, 2003). They aim to give 
workers a voice to formulate their grievances and enables them to negotiate specified conditions of 
employment, such as minimum wages, working hours and health and safety issues (Barrientos & Smith, 
2007; Egels-Zandén & Merk, 2014; Frenkel, 2001; Riisgaard, 2011). These are fundamental worker 
rights which help workers to protect their own rights and which allow them to decide which issues to 
pursue and which battles to fight with their employers (Elliott & Freeman, 2003; Van Buren & 
Greenwood, 2008). Hence, when it comes to making sustained improvements on the work floor, 
workers’ voice and representation are considered vital (Egels-Zandén & Merk, 2014; Greenwood, 
2002; Ip, 2008). 
However, workers in the production levels in most agricultural value chains are seldom organised 
(Carswell & De Neve, 2013). Since the 1980s, globalization and trade liberalization has led to the 
relocation of labour-intensive production to low wage countries where there is limited experience with 
trade union participation. Scholars have identified several challenges to collective bargaining in these 
developing, export-oriented countries, ranging from fragmentation of unions, lack funding and 
experience, weak leadership, inter-union rivalry and corruption (Egels-Zandén & Merk, 2014; Lund-
Thomsen, 2013). 
There is a growing research interest in understanding how workers employed at the bottom of global 
value chains (GVC) try to improve their terms of participation in these value chains. Several studies 
have applied a vertical (GVC) lens in studying the potential for collective organisation, focusing their 
research mainly on the presence of private social standards (PSS) regulating the chain and the impact 
these PSS have on workers’ trade union rights (Barrientos & Smith, 2007; Egels-Zandén & Merk, 2014; 
Riisgaard, 2009; Wang, 2005). Other studies have applied a horizontal (socio-economic context) lens 
to study how labour can or cannot change their terms and conditions of employment. Recognizing that 
most workers are unorganized, the focus of these studies applying a horizontal lens has mainly been 
to investigate how unorganized labour tries to improve their working life (Carswell & De Neve, 2013; 
Lund-Thomsen, 2013). Few studies however have integrated both lenses to develop a clear 
understanding of the interaction of GVCs and local socio-economic forces in determining the 
consequences for the organisation of labour.  
The objective of this article is to identify the impediments to workplace unionism at the bottom of 
global value chains. More specifically, this paper seeks to answer the research question: What are the 
impediments to workplace unionism in the cut flower industry in Ethiopia? To answer this research 
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question, this article develops an integrated framework and explores the interplay between vertical 
GVC forces and horizontal local forces. In bringing these two lenses together, we put forward several 
building blocks for a more integrated analytical framework of workplace unionism. First, we expand 
the vertical GVC approach, which tends to focus on the presence of PSS in GVCs (Lund-Thomsen & Coe, 
2013; Riisgaard & Hammer, 2011), in order to take account of other, often conflicting, vertical forces 
which also affect workplace unionism, such as demand fluctuations, just-in-time orders and downward 
pressures on prices.  
Second, we broaden the research scope by also including non-certified farms in the study on trade 
union rights. Past studies applying a vertical GVC approach rarely compared unionization efforts 
between certified and non-certified farms (Barrientos & Smith, 2007; Egels-Zandén & Lindholm, 2015). 
Implicitly it seems as if these studies assumed that in the absence of PSS, there was simply a lower 
chance of having workplace unionism. This article shows that this assumption is flawed and that we 
need to pursue research agendas that seek to open up this blind spot in literature.  
Third, we integrate the vertical GVC analysis with an understanding of the horizontal, local socio-
economic forces. We argue that the interplay between vertical and horizontal forces varies over time 
and across place, and can result in quite distinct outcomes in terms of workplace unionism. Hence, an 
integrated approach is needed to understand why workplace unionism remains at the fringes and to 
help those who wish to make collective organization of workers possible.  
The article is structured as follows. First, the vertical (GVC) and horizontal (local socio-economic 
context) forces that according to literature are important facilitators or constrainers to workplace 
unionism are identified. Second, an introduction is given to our fieldwork site and the methodology 
used for this study. We then present the integrated framework and apply this framework to study the 
impediments to workplace unionism in a cluster of flower farms in Ethiopia. The discussion highlights 
the main findings and raises some suggestions on how to tackle some of the impediments to unionism 
in the Ethiopian cut flower farms. Finally, the conclusion discusses our contributions and makes some 
suggestions for further research.   
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK  
To build our integrated framework, we first need to identify the vertical and horizontal forces which 
may facilitate or hamper workplace unionism. These forces set the contours of the framework. Based 
on an extensive literature review, we identified four vertical forces (including demand fluctuations, 
just-in-time orders, downward pressures on prices, private social standards) and five horizontal forces 
(including livelihood strategies, spatial location of workers, gendered economies, regulatory 
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framework and union tradition). In this section we discuss all these forces separately hereafter and 
show how each single force may affect workplace unionism. 
Vertical lens 
A vertical Global Value Chain approach explores how global industries are organised and structured 
(Gereffi, 1994). It helps to identify the different actors involved in a given industry and the role and 
power they have in controlling the production (Kritzinger, Barrientos, & Rossouw, 2004). The GVC lens 
has been widely adopted to study the consequences of value chain structuring for working conditions 
at the point of production (Barrientos, Dolan, & Tallontire, 2003; Nadvi, 2008; Riisgaard & Hammer, 
2011). 
Applying a vertical lens to agricultural value chains helps us to understand how producers face several, 
sometimes contradictory forces when entering competitive global markets which have important 
implications for working conditions and labour strategies (Kritzinger et al., 2004). Most agricultural 
value chains are buyer-driven, which means that the power lies with the buyers, which are large 
retailers, branded marketers, international processors and international traders (Riisgaard & Hammer, 
2011). They dictate the terms and conditions in which the chains operate, despite the fact that they 
do not have any production capabilities (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2011). 
As a result of their considerable buying power, retailers dominate much of the trade by determining 
the specifications of supply and the high technical, environmental and social standards which 
producers need to meet. At the same time however, retailers allow the market to set the prices and 
offer little guarantees of purchase (Barrientos & Kritzinger, 2004). As such, producers face several, 
sometimes contradictory forces (Kritzinger et al., 2004; Riisgaard & Hammer, 2011). The four forces 
identified that may affect unionism arising from the vertical integration are: seasonal demand and 
demand fluctuations, just-in-time-orders, downward pressures on prices and the presence or absence 
of private social standards.  
First, the seasonal demand of the produce and demand fluctuations may potentially affect workplace 
unionism. Industries such as fruit, vegetables and flowers are all characterised by high levels of 
insecure and seasonal employment (Barrientos, 2008; Tallontire, Dolan, Smith, & Barrientos, 2005). 
This brings with it several challenges for labour to organize themselves. To begin with, workers 
employed on an insecure basis may not be interested in collective action because they only have a 
short-term vision towards work. Many of them may also be scared to join a union because workers on 
short-term contracts are easily ended by management (Egels-Zandén & Merk, 2014; Tjandraningsih & 
Nugroho, 2008). At the same time a highly fluctuating workforce makes it extremely difficult to keep 
up with union recruitment, organisation and activity (Wills, 2005). 
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Second, the fact that buyers try to overcome demand instability by seeking greater organizational 
flexibility and to place just-in-time orders may affect unionism (Kritzinger et al., 2004). By doing so, 
they have managed to pass on the costs of risk and uncertainty to producers. To be able to meet these 
ever-changing requirements of the buyers however, producers are in need of a flexible workforce that 
is willing to work long hours and overtime to provide high quality products within specified delivery 
times (Riisgaard, 2009). This means however that workers, who are predominantly women in these 
type of sectors, face a ‘double burden’ (Kidder & Raworth, 2004): it is quite challenging to combine 
reproductive work with productive work which requires 48 hours and excessive overtime. Hence, 
workers often have little spare time to take part in organising campaigns (Wills, 2005).  
Third, workplace unionization may be affected by the downward pressures on prices which many 
producers are facing due to high levels of competition and price volatility (Barrientos & Kritzinger, 
2004). This is at the expense of workers who are paid extremely low wages for their work. These low 
wage levels may hamper workplace unionism. Smith et al. (2004) found that workers were reluctant 
to pay membership fees because they preferred to use their money for today’s concerns rather than 
to invest in uncertain long-term changes. In response to this, unions lowered membership fees which 
resulted in limited resources obstructing union’s recruitment, training and collective actions. As was 
argued by Smith et al. (2004) this created a vicious circle, whereby the workers most in need of union 
representation (i.e. low wages and insecure workers) were the least likely to be recruited.  
Fourth, to meet consumer concerns, large supermarkets demand agricultural producers to adhere to 
strict private social standards (PSS), which labour can exploit into their advantage (Riisgaard, 2011). 
These standards demand farms to promote and respect core ILO Conventions, including the right to 
collective bargaining and freedom of association (87, 98 and 135 respectively) (Barrientos & Smith, 
2007). Hence, labour could be more effectively organized in certified farms than in farms that do not 
adhere to PSS. However, the impact of these PSS on workplace unionism needs to be nuanced. Several 
studies have found that the impact of PSS on workplace unionism remains rather limited. One stream 
of researchers have argued that current monitoring mechanisms are unable to detect violations of 
trade union rights (Anner, 2012; Brown, 2013; Vegt, 2005; Wang, 2005). Another stream of researchers 
have reasoned that the actors in the value chain, including both buyers and suppliers, have limited 
incentives to actually promote and respect trade union rights (Barrientos & Smith, 2007; Jiang, 2009; 
Sum & Ngai, 2005). A final stream of researchers have detected limitations in the content of these 
codes, showing that by allowing parallel means of organising, and by lacking effective grievance 
mechanisms, PSS may even undermine trade union rights (Brown & O'rourke, 2007; Egels-Zandén & 
Merk, 2014; Yu, 2009). Past studies therefore imply that though PSS in theory provide workers room 
for collective organising through their criteria, this is in practice not necessarily guaranteed.  
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Horizontal lens 
In this article we complement the ‘vertical’ analyses of value chains with a ‘horizontal’ approach to 
account for the local socio-economic context in which labour-intensive industries operate (Carswell & 
De Neve, 2013). Such a horizontal approach explores the role of local factors in facilitating or 
constraining workers’ ability to improve their overall working lives and livelihoods (Lund-Thomsen, 
2013). Though we recognise that organised and collective forms of resistance are only one of the 
abilities to act by labour, we believe that collective forms of labour agency are the most promising to 
improve the working lives of labour (Coe & Jordhus-Lier, 2011).  
We highlight five horizontal forces that may facilitate or hinder workplace unionism at the bottom of 
agricultural value chains in developing countries. These forces are livelihood strategies, spatial location 
of workers, gendered economies, regulatory framework and union tradition (Carswell & De Neve, 
2013; Lund-Thomsen, 2013).  
Livelihood strategies refer to the portfolio of activities and social support systems on which households 
can build their livelihoods (Ellis, 1998). The number and combination of strategies workers have to 
their disposition, can facilitate or constrain workplace unionism. In many developing country settings, 
individuals engage in multiple income generating activities. For instance, agricultural activities are 
combined with petty trade and/or formal wage work as to cope with potential income shocks and to 
improve one’s standard of living (Barrett, Reardon, & Webb, 2001; Ellis, 1998). Workers who have 
several livelihood options may find it easier to opt in and out of wage work. On the other hand workers 
whose income is entirely dependent on one income source, and who have few alternatives to turn to, 
may find it much harder to leave a formal job. Industries that employ workers of whom the vast 
majority can decide to opt in and out of work because they can engage in other livelihood activities, 
are much more difficult to organize than industries where there is a stable workforce of workers whose 
sole income is dependent on this wage work (Wills, 2005). Whether individuals have the opportunity 
or not to engage in several income generating activities is dependent on local factors such as location, 
access to assets (e.g. land), barriers to entry and seasonality (Ellis, 1998).  
Second, the spatial location of workers in terms of the distance between worker’s home and 
workplace; and/or between co-workers may facilitate or hinder workplace unionism (Lund-Thomsen, 
2013). Labour markets for low-paid jobs often attract a broad range of workers, including workers 
living in urban settings, workers residing in rural surroundings of the factories and migrant workers 
who left the countryside to take their chances in new factories (Carswell & De Neve, 2013). This 
segmented nature of the labour market (including rural, urban, migrant workers) can introduce 
problems with communication and a differentiated identity, which makes it particularly challenging for 
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unions to organize workers collectively (Wills, 2005). Moreover the distance to and from the 
workplace, when combined with a lack of mobility, may hamper the possibility to participate in union 
activities such as attending union meetings held outside the workplace or helping to organise 
campaigns.   
A third factor which may facilitate or hinder workers to collectively organize themselves on the work 
floor, are gendered economies. The notion of gender is used to describe how male and female roles 
are socially constructed (Annandale & Clark, 1996). Gender studies aim to understand how these 
constructed gender roles influence both the productive and reproductive economy (Barrientos et al., 
2003). With regards to the productive economy, it appears that men in developing countries have 
access to better paid and more stable jobs compared to women, who often need to engage in more 
temporary, low paid and informal jobs (Barrientos et al., 2003; Lund-Thomsen, 2013). This gender 
division even becomes more clear in the reproductive economy, where women are often the sole 
responsible for unpaid domestic work and child care related activities (Barrientos et al., 2003). At the 
bottom of agricultural value chains, the majority of the workforce are women who are hired in low-
skilled, routine jobs such as picking and packing, and processing activities because they are perceived 
as more productive, responsible and skilled to perform delicate tasks (Kidder & Raworth, 2004). Men 
on the other hand are hired for hazardous work or supervisory jobs which are more permanent of 
nature and pay better (Barrientos et al., 2003; Korovkin & Sanmiguel-Valderrama, 2007). Existing 
gender roles also affect union participation and more general workplace unionism. Historically, trade 
unions have been organizing working men, while women appeared to be left out of these organisations 
(Wills, 2005). Time is often an issue; women face a double work burden, in the sense that they combine 
both productive and reproductive activities, and therefore often have little spare time to take part in 
organising campaigns (Kidder & Raworth, 2004; Wills, 2005). Hence, in sectors which are dominated 
by female workers, which is the case for most low-technology, labour-intensive industries where we 
see a ‘feminization’ of the workforce (Barrientos et al., 2003), it may be particularly difficult for unions 
to enter the workplace.  
Four, the regulatory framework within the country may facilitate or hinder workers’ organisation to 
develop and function. For instance, some countries (China for example) have policies which legally 
constrain union activities. In these countries, workers voices are effectively curdled and workplace 
unionism has little chances of surviving (Egels-Zandén & Merk, 2014). Governments may however also 
indirectly affect workers’ ability to collectively act, for example through their favourable investment 
laws and incentives. By way of illustration, the absence of minimum wages or ill designed labour laws 
(e.g. making strike actions illegal, not protecting union representatives on the work floor from easily 
being fired) may hamper workers’ collective strategies .  
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A final factor affecting workplace unionism is union tradition in the host country. The question whether 
workers can defend their interests in export industries is to a large extent dependent on the network 
they can draw upon. Within an organisation, shop stewards play a crucial role in recruiting, organising 
and mobilizing the workforce. However without support from the outside, success remains limited 
(Blyton & Jenkins, 2013). In settings with little tradition of trade unionism and where workers have 
little experience in joining, organising or leading union organisations, it may be extremely hard to 
bargain better working conditions. In many export-oriented countries, unions are often highly 
fragmented, lack funding and are sometimes even corrupt (Egels-Zandén & Merk, 2014). In such 
contexts individual workers may find themselves isolated. On the other hand, where unions have 
strong historical roots, there is scope for collective organisations. Workers employed in factories which 
are clustered even have an extra advantage. By clusters we mean those ‘geographical spaces, or 
regions, where farms in similar and cognate activities are located within well-defined spatial 
boundaries wherein proximity promotes a range of economic benefits’ (Lund-Thomsen & Nadvi, 2010, 
p. 204). These local clusters especially offer high potential for local joint action because union 
representatives from different farms can work together to exchange information and threaten with 
widely supported boycotts and community-based actions (Lund-Thomsen & Nadvi, 2010; Riisgaard & 
Hammer, 2011; Wills, 2005).  
The four vertical forces and five horizontal forces we identified in this section, set the contours of our 
framework. The vertical forces will be mapped on a vertical Y-axes. These forces are related to the 
governance and structure of the Global Value Chain. These forces are context-independent. The 
horizontal forces will be placed on a horizontal X-axes. These forces are related to the local socio-
economic context and are consequently very much context-dependent. By integrating both levels of 
analysis in this study, we show the importance of both sets of forces in creating several impediments 
to collective labour organisation in the cut flower industry in Ethiopia.  
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FIELDWORK SITE AND METHODS 
In the previous section, we outlined the contours of the integrated framework that seeks to identify 
the impediments to workplace unionism at the point of production in agricultural value chains. In this 
section, we introduce our fieldwork site and methodology used for this study.  
We aim to apply the integrated framework to empirically study the impediments to workplace 
unionism in the Ethiopian cut flower industry. This industry makes an exemplary case for studying the 
obstacles to workers’ union rights at the bottom of agricultural value chains for several reasons. To 
begin with, due to the existence of two value chain strands for flowers -the auction and the direct 
strand-, the industry comprises both adopters and non-adopters of PSS, which allows a close 
comparison between different value chain governance structures.  
The auction strand is the most popular mechanism through which flowers from East Africa are sold 
(Riisgaard & Hammer, 2011). Auctions are basically distribution centres. They collect large quantities 
of flowers which are then sold to buyers all over the world. This means that suppliers and buyers 
maintain loose ties. These market-based transactions are less transparent and suppliers are easily 
replaceable by other suppliers. Here PSS are not a requirement to sell flowers through the auction 
(Hale & Opondo, 2005; Riisgaard & Hammer, 2011).  
The direct strand mainly involves European retailers who directly source from flower farms hereby 
circumventing the auction (Riisgaard, 2011). This strand is more strictly co-ordinated and buyer-driven 
than the auction. Large retailers have the power to demand growers to implement strict social 
standards as a response to consumer concerns. These standards facilitate coordination between buyer 
and supplier by providing credible information on the nature of the flowers and the conditions under 
which they have been grown (Henson & Humphrey, 2010; Ponte & Gibbon, 2005; Riisgaard, 2011). 
Hence, growers with a desire to sell directly are obliged to comply with external certification of 
standards (Hale & Opondo, 2005; Riisgaard & Hammer, 2011).  
In addition, the demand for flowers is seasonal. European consumers tend to buy cut flowers with 
Valentine’s day and Mother’s day whereas they buy less flowers during the summer period (June-July-
August) (Hale & Opondo, 2005). Because of these uneven demand patterns, workers are often hired 
on an insecure basis and are required to work very long hours during months of peak demand 
(Barrientos & Kritzinger, 2004). In Ethiopia, workers can easily work up to 60 hours a week during peak 
production moments (48 hours a week topped with 12 hours overtime). To end, the world market for 
cut flowers has grown consistently since the early 1980s as more countries have started producing cut 
flowers. However the demand has not grown at the same pace. This has resulted in high competition 
and downward pressures on prices (Riisgaard & Hammer, 2011). Because of this, extremely low wages 
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dominate the industry. In Ethiopia wages are around one dollar per day. In summary, the vertical forces 
we identified in previous section are all present in this sector.  
In Ethiopia, the cut flower industry is a relatively young, but rapidly growing sector. The first flower 
farms started their operations in Ethiopia early 2000s. Early 2008 it was estimated that there were 
already 64 farms operational (Mano, Yamano, Suzuki, & Matsumoto, 2011; Melese & Helmsing, 2010). 
This success can be attributed to the Ethiopian government which has managed to create an attractive 
investment climate and the cheap labour supply partially due to the absence of minimum wages (Mano 
et al., 2011). Ethiopian flower farm workers earn up to three times less than the neighbouring Kenyan 
flower farm workers (Riisgaard & Gibbon, 2014). As with most labor intensive industries the majority 
of these workers (around 70%) employed in the cut flower industry are women who live either in the 
rural surroundings of the farms or neighbouring towns.  
Trade unionism in Ethiopia has only a short history, even by African standards (Praeg, 2006). Founded 
in 1977, the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions (CETU) still faces many obstacles typical for trade 
unions operational in developing and transition economies, including a lack of funding, bargaining 
experience and a government that keeps a close watch (Praeg, 2006). As such, our setting provides a 
horizontal context in which we could expect to find more visible impediments to workplace unionism 
than would be the case in other contexts.  
Our study focuses on one cluster of flower farms from a total of eight flower farm clusters in Ethiopia. 
Within this cluster, we purposefully selected five (out of ten) flower farms. The farms provided us 
variation on two criteria: adopters/ non-adopters of PSS; and, workplace unionism/ no workplace 
unionism. Table 1 provides a detailed overview of the five cases. 
Table 1. Description of cases.  
Start of 
operation 
Number of 
workers 
Targeted market Internationally 
recognized private social 
standards? 
Since when 
recognized? 
Workplace 
unionism? 
Farm A 2005 400 – 450 Auction and direct 
deals 
MPS-ABC  
MPS- SQ  
FFP  
ETI 
2007 
2010 
2011 
2013 
Yes 
Farm B 2005 390 – 455 Auction and direct 
deals 
MPS-ABC 
MPS- SQ 
2009 
2010 
Yes 
Farm C 2005 300 – 340 Auction and recently 
started to target 
direct market 
MPS-ABC 
 MPS- SQ 
2010 
2013 
Yes/No 
Farm D 2006 260 – 330 Auction No Yes 
Farm E 2008 220 – 250 Auction No No 
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A key advantage of our study is that all farms were situated closely to one another in a single setting. 
This makes them exposed to the same institutional forces (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004) and minimizes 
extraneous variability (Eisenhardt, 1989). In addition they were similar in terms of ownership as all five 
farms are local Ethiopian investments. The farms differed mainly in terms of the market they target 
and consequently whether they have adopted PSS or not. Another advantage is that we found a great 
variability in terms of levels of unionization within these similar farms which allowed a rich 
investigation of the impediments to workplace unionism. Table 2 gives an overview of the trade unions 
per farm with their main characteristics.  
As can be derived from table 2, the union in farm D (non-certified farm) had the highest membership 
rate (60.5% of the survey participants with at least 6 months of work experience were a member). At 
the same time, this union seemed very positively perceived by workers. Workers from farm D 
explained that the union was there to help in case there were problems between management and 
workers and that they were there to protect workers’ rights.  
In the older certified farms A and B, 44.7% and 30% of the workers with at least 6 months of work 
experience were unionized. Both unions however suffered from a negative image. In both farms 
workers talked negatively about the union because of bad experiences in the past. Several workers 
stated that the union representatives had stolen membership fees to enrich themselves and that the 
union was incapable of making any changes, that they were simply there to please management.  
Farm C was a recently certified farm and according to the workers on this farm, the union was probably 
established around the time of certification. Around one out of three workers with at least six months’ 
work experience indicated during the survey that they were a member. Interestingly however, we did 
not manage to retrieve any further information about the trade union. Nobody we spoke to could 
point us to a representative and during the focus group discussion there was consensus that there was 
no trade union on the farm.  
Finally, farm E had not implemented any PSS, nor did it have a union on the workplace. Consequently 
we were not able to collect much information on workplace unionism throughout the data collection 
phase. During a focus group discussion which we organized on this farm, the moderator asked why 
workers did not raise any of the issues they had with management. One participant answered:  
“It's because everybody thinks it is wasting breath, they're not going to change it” (focus group 
participant, non-certified farm E) 
Given the lack of data on this farm, we cannot use this case in our analysis on impediments to 
workplace unionism. We do however mention farm E at this point in our paper, to illustrate that it is 
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not evident to have a trade union in the farm. In non-certified farms it is possible that there is no 
collective organisation of workers as is shown by Farm E.  
Table 2. Overview trade unions per farm 
 Membership Workers’ 
perceptions 
Union origins Union position Union leaders 
 <6 months 
employed 
≥6 months’ 
employed 
    
Farm A* 0% 44.7% Negative  Top-down Between manager 
and workers 
Not willing, not 
able to mobilize 
Farm B* 3.2% 30% Negative  Top-down Manager is the 
cause of injustice 
Willing but not able 
to mobilize 
Farm C* 2.5% 35% Negative  Top-down Arm of 
management 
- 
Farm D 5.7% 60.5% Positive  Bottom-up Manager is the 
cause of injustice 
Willing and able to 
mobilize 
Farm E  0% 0% - - - - 
* indicates that a farm was certified with at least one private social standard (PSS)  
Data Sources 
Data was collected in June and July 2013. We collected survey data at workers level. Random sampling 
procedures were used to ensure an adequate representation of on average 75 workers per farm 
performing different job functions within each farm. A total of 375 responses were received. After 
accounting for missing data, we obtained a final sample of 358 cases (237 women, 121 men). Please 
note an overrepresentation of men in the sample to allow for statistical comparison. The survey 
included questions on socio-demographics, working conditions and workers well-being. In addition 
there was a specific section covering (a) workers awareness of union presence on the farm, (b) union 
membership and (c) personal motivation for (not) being a member, which was captured with an open 
question.  
In addition we held six focus group discussions: one focus group per farm and one focus group 
combining workers from all five farms. A focus group discussion included 4 up to 14 female participants 
and had a duration of approximately two hours. Each focus group discussion was held in an informal 
setting and took place on the workers day off. The focus group discussions were moderated by an 
Ethiopian female Master’s student, fluent in Amharic and Oromo, and assisted by one of the authors 
of the article. The Ethiopian moderator received training in how to conduct focus groups and at the 
end of each focus group, both moderators discussed the quality of the discussions and how to 
potentially improve the next focus group discussion. The purpose of the focus group discussions was 
to get a broader picture of workers’ perceptions of their working life and to grasp workers’ perceptions 
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of their capability of changing or influencing their work context. Each focus group was recorded and 
transcribed and the accompanying researcher took extensive notes during the discussion.  
On those farms with established trade unions, we interviewed one trade union representative per 
farm. These semi-structured interviews took place off farm, in an informal setting. Each interview 
lasted for about one hour and included both a researcher and a local moderator who fluently spoke 
Amharic. Purpose of these interviews was to gain insights on the origins of the union, the challenges 
they faced and the experiences they had with workers, management and external stakeholders (e.g. 
auditors, Confederation of Ethiopian Unions (CETU) etc.).   
At management level, we conducted in-depth interviews with the general managers of each farm. The 
interview took approximately one hour up to one hour and a half. Though these interviews differed in 
scope (they were mainly meant to get a deeper understanding of the labour market dynamics in the 
cluster), workplace unionism was mentioned sideways. For the purpose of this study, management 
perception on unionism has been fruitful to triangulate and corroborate our research results collected 
from other data sources.  
To end, at cluster level, we conducted an in-depth interview with two representatives of the labour 
and social affairs department of the region. This interview had a duration of one hour and was 
especially relevant in that sense that it provided a clearer picture of labour issues and trade union 
rights across sectors within one region. All interviews were recorded and transcribed.  
Data analysis 
In line with analytical strategies suggested by multiple case study scholars, we used both within-case 
and cross-case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake, 2013; Yin, 1994). The analysis of the data started with 
open coding of all collected information from the available sources and this provided us a first 
structure.  
To start, as a way to get familiarized with the data, we listed all reasons given by survey participants 
explaining why they were not a member and did not engage in union activities. Once we had compiled 
a complete list of reasons, we clustered the different answers given by workers into nine categories of 
reasons (unaware of union, uninterested in union, no common identity, isolation of workers, exclusive 
membership, no time, too expensive, no trust, no bargaining power).    
Then, we listed all challenges mentioned by union representatives during the in-depth interviews we 
conducted with them. From this analysis it became clear that the union representatives had a very 
clear understanding of why workers did not join the union. Union representatives mentioned several 
of these reasons given by workers for not being a member, as important challenges to tackle in the 
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future (e.g. being more inclusive towards rural workers, lowering membership fees, gaining workers 
trust). In addition, we identified one challenge (‘a lack of external support’) which was raised during 
the in-depth interviews by union representatives as an important issue, but which was not captured 
by the open question (why are you not a member of the union?) of the workers’ survey.    
Finally, we coded the information retrieved from the focus groups, in-depth interviews with managers 
and in-depth interviews with representatives of the labour and social affairs department. From this 
analysis no new reasons for not joining the union or challenges related the trade union emerged. 
Rather this data confirmed that the trade unions were facing in total ten major obstacles to guarantee 
workers’ representation and collective bargaining.   
A second step was then to understand the root causes of these ten impediments. To improve our 
understanding of what potentially could explain these impediments, we conducted a cross-case 
analysis: we identified the similarities and differences in terms of experiencing these obstacles across 
the studied farms. We began by writing individual case summaries based on the multiple sources of 
data available. For each farm we summarized when and how the union originated, how many members 
the union had and how workers perceived this union. We also attempted to understand how the union 
positioned itself, and described who the main leaders were and whether they were willing and able to 
mobilize the workers. From the cross-case analysis it became clear that the unions on the different 
farms had in common that they were all in the early stages of mobilization in the sense that none of 
them had succeeded to agree upon a collective bargaining agreement with management. At the same 
time however it became clear that the union of the non-certified farm D had more potential than the 
other unions given their higher membership rate and the positive perceptions of workers towards this 
union. When trying to explain these differences between the union of farm D and the other unions of 
farms A, B and C, we realised that the union of farm D was facing less obstacles. Three out of the ten 
impediments we identified, were not considered impediments in this farm: workers in farm D did not 
think it was too expensive to become a member, they also trusted the union and believed they had 
the bargaining power to change things on the ground.     
When trying to explain these differences between unions, we turned to the literature and applied a 
vertical GVC lens to interpret our data. Applying this lens, helped us to understand that the differences 
between the unions could be largely attributed to the presence of private social standards in the 
certified farms. At the same time, this lens assisted us in understanding the root causes of other 
obstacles mentioned by workers and union representatives. For example, because of the seasonal 
demand of flowers, workers are often hired on a short term basis and so few workers were aware of, 
or interested in joining the union.   
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Next, we realized that overcoming these vertical forces would not necessarily result in functioning 
workplace unionism because these obstacles are also rooted in socio-economic realities. Hence, we 
applied a horizontal lens to understand the forces in the socio-economic context that were also causing 
these impediments. Finally we combined the vertical and horizontal lens and created an integrated 
matrix of combined forces hampering unionism.    
RESULTS  
The integrated framework which we developed to identify the impediments to workplace unionism is 
presented in figure 1. The vertical forces are presented on the vertical Y-axis, while the horizontal 
forces are displayed on the horizontal X-axis. All these forces combined, create a unique setting in 
which the flower farms operate and set the contours in which the work environment in the flower 
farms is shaped. This setting results in several impediments to workplace unionism. In total we 
identified ten obstacles faced by unions in the Ethiopian flower farms. These impediments are listed 
in figure 1, each of them resulting from both a vertical and a horizontal force. 
Our analysis showed that the unions in the different flower farms did not all face the same 
impediments. Unions in certified farms had to deal with a meddling manager who had an incentive to 
have a union on paper to be able to meet PSS criteria. Because of this, the unions in the certified farms 
had more difficulties than the union in the non-certified farm in terms of gaining workers trust, raising 
their bargaining power and changing workers’ perceptions about being too expensive to join. In figure 
1, the * indicates that an impediment was found in the certified farms (A, B and C) but not in the non-
certified farm where there was a union present (farm D). In the following subsections we explain more 
detailed the ten impediments we identified.  
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Lack of awareness and a lack of interest 
The workforce in the flower farm cluster we researched was highly unstable, with high levels of labour 
turnover. On the one hand, this is because of the seasonal nature of the flower demand: there is a 
peak demand with Valentine’s day and Mother’s day, while there is almost no demand during the 
summer period (June-July-August) in consumer countries (Riisgaard, 2011). Because of this uneven 
consumption pattern, many workers are employed on a short-term basis, and are given a seasonal or 
temporary contract (Barrientos et al., 2003).  
On the other hand, many flower farm workers also left their job voluntarily (Staelens & Louche, 2015). 
A job in the flower farms was mentioned by workers as a last resort. Wages were considered too low 
to make ends meet and rumours went around that female workers employed in the greenhouses had 
difficulties getting pregnant due to being exposed to pesticides. Because of this, many workers aspired 
a better job. Hence, all flower farms located in the flower farm cluster faced high levels of absenteeism 
and labour turnover. Workers were said to be constantly on the move in search for better job 
opportunities. From the 358 workers we surveyed, 67% of them had less than one year of work 
experience in the respective farm. Reasons given for these short work experiences was that they 
juggled between different livelihood and income generating activities, including short term 
assignments such as road construction, farming activities or long term jobs in metal, plastic and 
garment industries. Some female workers also left the country to work in the Middle East as a maid.      
Ironically however, these individual ‘exit’ strategies which are meant to improve the daily 
impoverished reality of the individual worker, at the same time hampered workers’ possibility to 
collectively improve the working conditions on the flower farms.  That is, because of these multiple 
and diverse livelihood strategies individual workers pursued, the workforce became highly fluctuating, 
making it extremely hard for workers to engage in collective action, using their ‘voice’ (Hirschman, 
1970).  
Recently employed workers we surveyed were often unaware of the existence of a trade union on the 
farm and those who did, showed little interest of joining the trade union because they were not 
planning of staying long in this job. Moreover, even among those who were unionized, there were high 
levels of labour turnover. To illustrate, a union representative of farm B mentioned that of all those 
representatives elected last year, more than half already had left the farm. In sum, as was also found 
by Carswell and De Neve (2013), workers’ focus on individual interests and individualised tactics is 
precisely what curbed their ability to engage in collective action on the farm.  
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No common identity, isolation of workers and exclusive membership  
In all five farms managers used workforce segmentation to deal with the fluctuating nature of the 
workforce. Managers appointed rural women, who were likely to leave their job to work on their own 
agricultural lands, to the greenhouses, while more urban women, in se more stable workers, were 
assigned the work in the pack houses. The reason behind this was that work in the pack houses requires 
some training, whereas work in the greenhouses could be rearranged in case there was a sudden fall 
out of workers. The segmented nature of the workforce based on the spatial location of workers 
however had negative repercussions on workplace unionism and this in several ways.  
To begin with, the difference in work units also meant that there was a difference in working 
conditions. Urban workers employed in the pack houses did overtime and as such earned a higher 
wage, they worked in the shade and were not directly exposed to chemicals. Rural workers on the 
other hand were said to have more freedom to do their work as there was less supervision in the 
greenhouses, but due to the heat and the exposure to pesticides, the work was perceived as harder 
and as there was no scope for overtime, remuneration was lower. These differences in working 
conditions made it hard to foster a sense of collective identity – a key ingredient for effective 
bargaining (Kelly, 1998; Wills, 2005).  
In addition, rural and urban workers did not have any contact. Outside the farm they did not spoke to 
one another. Rural workers walked to the flower farms while urban workers were bussed in. Inside the 
farm, there was hardly any time to talk to other workers of other work units as the only (lunch) break 
there was, lasted no longer than one half hour and took place in separate shifts, and in different places 
on the farm. This lack of communication between workers made it extremely hard to promote a 
common identity or to stand up for common concerns.  
Management benefitted from the unawareness of workers about the experiences of other workers in 
other work units. For example, during a focus group discussion, one worker from farm C narrated that 
on one occasion there was unrest in the greenhouse she was working because the workers had not 
received their full wage and as a consequence all of them had stopped working. When the manager 
arrived he just said that he only received these complaints in that particular greenhouse and that if 
they did not like to work there any longer, they were free to go. She could not say whether other 
workers employed in other units had faced similar problems. She only knew that this was the only time 
they had stopped working.   
To end, our survey data revealed that hardly no rural workers were unionized. When we asked them 
why they were not a member, they answered that they had not been invited to be part of the union 
or that because they were from the rural area, they did not have to spent time with the union. In sum, 
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trade unions faced major challenges in creating a common identity, getting individual workers out of 
their isolation and being inclusive to all workers. According to the union representative from farm A, 
creating a common identity was one of her main tasks:   
Interviewer: “What are your main tasks as a representative?” 
Union representative, certified farm A: “The workers don't give a lot of attention to have 
meetings or to discuss, because most of them are not educated and come from rural areas. So 
we are trying to teach them a lot of things” 
Time constraints 
Globalisation and a relocation of low-skilled, labour-intensive industries towards low-wage countries 
have drawn women into wage employment. Female workers are over-represented (65-85% of the 
workforce) in garment, fruit, and cut flower industries (Kidder & Raworth, 2004). Often these jobs are 
precarious of nature, providing limited benefits. The reason why women are so dominant in these 
sectors is because of the gender stereotypical images employers have: women are often seen as more 
skilled to do delicate, repetitive and tedious work. They have nimble fingers, are more productive and 
less likely complain (Barrientos et al., 2003; Kidder & Raworth, 2004).  
Trade union organisations however are historically male bastions. Women’s representation remains 
disproportionately low –even in those unions where the majority of union members are women (Smith 
et al., 2004; Wills, 2005). Throughout the focus group discussions, women argued that they did not 
have time to engage in union activities. On average, a work week is 48 hours, spread over six 
consecutive days of eight hours and one day off. Women combined this work in the productive sphere 
with work in the domestic or reproductive sphere. On their day off, women went to the market and 
prepared food, did laundry and took care of children. Being actively involved in a trade union, for 
example as representative, was described as time consuming, and demanding, while the benefits for 
taking all these responsibilities were considered low. So due to the dual role of women in Ethiopia, 
there was little spare time for actively engaging in union activities and meetings. During the interviews 
with union representatives it became clear that more men than women were representatives even 
though the majority of the workforce were women.  
Too expensive 
Monthly wages in the flower farms ranged between 550 and 600 birr/ month (23 to 25 euro/ month).  
The majority of the survey respondents (84%) considered this wage too low to cover their basic needs. 
From this monthly wage, 1% was asked as membership fee for the union. In the certified farms, some 
workers stated they were not a member because they thought it was too expensive to become a 
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member of the union, especially given that they thought that the returns from it were very low to 
nothing. In the non-certified farm however, not one worker complained about the membership fee.  
The main difference between certified and the non-certified farm was that in case of the non-certified 
farm, the membership fees were automatically deducted from workers’ wages. According to the 
representative of farm D, the membership fees were deposited in one bank account. All three auditors, 
working in different departments of the farm, had access to this account as to guarantee that none of 
the representatives could make abuse of this money: 
“The money is automatically taken from the wage. The auditor will take it and put it in the 
bank. We have a bank account on the name of three auditors. To make sure that one person 
would not abuse it” (union representative, non-certified farm D) 
In all three certified farms however, union representatives had to collect themselves the membership 
fees at the end of each month from each individual member. This appeared to be very difficult. 
Members argued every month, asking what the union had already accomplished or simply said they 
did not have enough money to pay the fee:  
“To have this much members was very difficult for us, because they think that the money they 
pay for the membership will go to our pocket. There is also a problem in collecting the money. 
The rule says this must be on the payroll, but it is not. And we have to ask for the money every 
month. Sometimes they can say that they're not going to pay. So you can't force them” (union 
representative, certified farm B)  
To attract new members the union in one of the certified farms (farm B) was planning on lowering the 
membership fee to less than 1% of the income (3 birr instead of 5 birr) hoping they could retain the 
remaining members.  
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Lack of external support, trust and bargaining power 
All unions in the four farms were facing a lack of external guidance and support. Though union 
representatives understood that the national federation had limited power to actually make changes 
on the ground because none of the farms had already agreed upon a collective bargaining agreement 
(CBA), they felt they were left too much to their own devices. As the representative from farm B 
expressed:  
“Even last time, the president of the confederation came, but I don't know if they don't have 
time to follow up... They didn't change anything. Sometimes we don't pay to the confederation 
monthly, and they didn't even ask why we didn't pay” (union representative, certified farm B) 
At the same time, meetings were rarely held at cluster or industry level with representatives of other 
farms, which made it difficult for representatives to know what was going on in neighbouring farms. 
All unions operated isolated from each other.  
With regards to external support, union representatives explained that the government visited the 
flower farms once a year, but that this was mainly a formality and did not have any impact:  
“They [the government] don't care about the air pollution and soil pollution after the investor 
leaves. They should consider this too, and they also have to follow up on the wages, about how 
much they're paying the workers. […] They [the government] have communication with the 
farm, so they'll come just for the formality. They don't check that much. So coming once a year, 
means letting people to suffer more, the whole year. It would be better if they would come 
more often” (union representative, non-certified farm D) 
We expected to find differences between certified and non-certified farms with regards to external 
support. Unions in certified farms have the advantage over unions in non-certified farms that they 
have better established links with campaigners in consumer markets. These campaigners can pressure 
buyers to demand improvements in working conditions at the level of production (Riisgaard & 
Hammer, 2011). Yet, the representatives from certified farms did not believe that PSS could help them 
improve their bargaining rights. On the contrary, whereas auditors may see these union 
representatives as preferred local partners as they are key informants, representatives had a very 
different understanding of the role and influence these auditors had on daily operations; or the 
support they could get from these auditors. Representatives in farms with certification schemes 
mentioned they avoided telling the truth to the auditors of these schemes because of three reasons. 
Firstly, because they felt the changes these auditors would bring, would only last for one day. These 
changes would not be durable improvements. Secondly, because they felt auditors mainly considered 
the safety of workers and the environmental impact of pesticides rather than being concerned about 
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the grievances workers had on the ground. Thirdly, because they thought that if auditors would know 
the truth, they would want to shut down the farm. In other words, union representatives believed that 
a bad audit would harm the workers more rather than it would help them.     
“I told them [the auditors] this is a waste of time […] They will call us and ask ‘what is the 
problem, what do you want us to do? Do you need another member of the committee?’ They 
might choose a committee on that day. And this is a drama, because it is only for one day. […] 
And also, we don't tell them about this, because we don't want to get fired. Sometimes if they 
don't ask these questions, we won't say anything. When they give the certificate, they mainly 
consider the safety of the workers. But if they would truly know what 's going on in the flower 
farms, they might shut down the farm [….] I don't want them to shut it down because there are 
a lot of workers who have nowhere to go” (union representative, certified farm B) 
While union representatives of certified farms did not trust auditors from the PSS, the workers on 
these certified farms did not trust the union representatives. In the older certified farms (A and B) 
several attempts were made to establish a trade union. Each time, it was the manager who had asked 
the workers to take the initiative to organize themselves. According to the interviewed representatives 
on these farms, it was known that management had a stake in having a union on the workplace. 
Indeed, the PSS which all three farms have adopted, expect that management respects the core ILO 
conventions, including promoting freedom of association and collective bargaining: 
“But around here, [the trade union] it is not functioning because we are under a lot of pressure. 
They [management] want the union only for certification. They don't care about the rights of 
the workers. But they're hurting their own citizens” (union representative, certified farm B)  
Such top-down initiative however was not supported by the workers and each time the union failed or 
fell asleep. In both certified farms A and B, previous representatives had not achieved anything. They 
were being accused of having stolen membership fees and just being an extension of manager’s power. 
During the in-depth interview with the representative from farm A, we got the impression that the line 
between workers and managers in farm A was indeed thin:  
“We are in the middle. We are not on the side of the managers or the workers” (union 
representative, certified farm A) 
In the other, older certified farm (farm B) however, the union representative was frustrated about the 
inability to change the unions’ reputation which had been damaged by previous representatives. 
Though at the time of data collection there were new representatives elected, it was difficult to gain 
workers trust. 
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In the non-certified farm D, the union did not face any problems with regards to workers’ trust. In this 
farm, representatives were there from the start and had been at the forefront of a conflict between 
management and workers, making them experienced and trusted by workers. They had never 
breached this trust and had built in control mechanisms to make abuse of membership fees impossible.  
A final impediment we identified was a lack of bargaining power. Union representatives of the different 
farms mentioned that one of the major challenges they currently were facing was to reach a collective 
bargaining agreement with management. In the non-certified farm D, the union was negotiating a CBA. 
In the certified farms it appeared that the negotiations had not started yet.  
In the certified farms, management had undermined the ability of representatives to blame some 
problems to these managers as it were the managers themselves who encouraged workers to organize 
and who facilitated the election process. By being so publicly in favour of having a union on the work 
floor, management succeeded to frame the overall impression that they supported the trade union. 
However, according to the representative of farm B, in reality they strong-armed representatives by 
threatening to punish them at the moment of wage evaluations. In other words, union representatives 
failed to differentiate themselves from management and did not manage to convince workers of the 
importance of having a CBA agreed upon. In the certified farms, survey respondents answered that the 
trade union did not make a difference, that they simply were an empty box and that they did not have 
any power to change something on the ground. This conception was surprisingly shared by the 
representative of farm A:  
 “I don't think it has that much difference. Even if they have a trade union or not, they have 
their work and are getting paid” (union representative, certified farm A) 
In the certified farm B however, the representative emphasized that the union would  be able to make 
a difference when they would have a CBA agreed upon, but that until then they could not do much:  
“Because you must have a 'collective work agreement' to say this is a problem or to say this is 
your fault to the management or to the workers. But still we don't have the agreement. The 
worker might be fired if he did something, for example if he fights, and then they 'll come to us. 
Just because we don't have the agreement, all we can do is begging the management. If we 
would have an agreement, we could say: 'according to this rule..' and if they don't do anything, 
we can go to the higher trade union. So all we can do is begging to them” (union representative, 
certified farm B)  
In the non-certified farm, management and the union were negotiating the terms and conditions of 
the collective bargaining agreement. Workers knew about this process and believed in the importance 
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of having a CBA. Nevertheless, it was a lengthy and difficult process because management did not 
agree with some of the conditions the union was suggesting:   
“We and the management have the copy of the agreement in two papers, and we check every 
point one by one. And we agreed on some of it, and we didn't agree on others…  [For example] 
if one worker is sick, they 'll use their own transportation with a horse cart. And we consider to 
buy an ambulance and to establish a clinic in the company, and so on. Plus about the wage 
increment, they only increase one birr a year. And we're trying to make it a percentage” (union 
representative, non-certified farm D)  
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DISCUSSION 
Applying both a vertical and horizontal lens to study impediments to unionism, we identified several 
obstacles for trade unions to organise workers on the work floor in the cut flower industry in Ethiopia. 
We recognize that these forces do not operate in isolation. Rather they come together and reinforce 
each other. For example, the very low wages offered by cut flower farms explaining why workers 
thought union membership was too expensive, at the same time explained why workers were seeking 
alternative livelihood strategies and had a short-term vision towards their job, thereby not being 
interested about collective action. Another example of how forces interact is the flexibilization of the 
workforce which goes in hand with a feminization of the workforce. It is often women who are hired 
for seasonal, insecure jobs and who due to their dual role often do not engage in trade union activities.  
However, several forces also conflict with one another. For example, at the vertical level buyers 
pressure producers to meet high quality standards at competitive prices, within specified delivery 
times. At the same time, these buyers ask those same producers to meet stringent social standards 
which demand good working conditions. Another example of two forces which conflict with one 
another are the spatial location of workers and their livelihood strategies. Rural workers did not qualify 
for jobs in the city because of their constrained mobility, and urban workers could not engage in own 
agricultural activities due to a lack of access to land. 
The way these forces interact, reinforce, or compete and conflict with one another at one point in time 
is context specific and may facilitate or constrain workers’ room for manoeuvre. This study undertook 
a first effort to identify the vertical and horizontal forces which create a unique setting in which the 
flower farms operate and consequently determine the impediments to workplace unionism. We 
believe it is useful to distinguish these different forces because it helps us to identify the different 
obstacles workers are facing when trying to unionize.  
Differences between farms  
Though all farms were located close to one another, and therefore exposed to the same horizontal 
forces, we did find some differences between farms. These differences could be largely attributed to 
one vertical force, that is the presence of private social standards (PSS). The role of PSS in relation to 
trade union rights is peculiar. On the one hand, it seems that PSS give workers easier access to trade 
unions through their standard criteria. All certified farms had a union on the work floor, whereas this 
was not the case in one of the non-certified farms (Farm E). On the other hand however, given our 
context of low union tradition, managers in the certified farms had the incentive to facilitate 
unionization, which did more harm than good: it made workers in certified farms distrust the union 
and not seeing the use of it. Workers simply saw it as an empty box. 
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The differences between unions in the certified farms and the non-certified farm may be best 
explained drawing on Kelly’s (1998) mobilization theory. Kelly (1998) identified four crucial stages in 
the mobilization process: (1) the development of a collective sense of injustice, (2) the identification 
of the employer as the cause of this injustice, (3) the recognition that collective action could rectify 
this injustice, and (4) leaders willing and able to mobilize. All four stages were considered vital 
ingredients for collective mobilization.  
Farm D, the non-certified farm, is a perfect illustration of Kelly’s (1998) mobilization theory. All four 
stages took place in this farm and resulted in a union that could count on a high membership rate and 
that was positively perceived by most workers. In farm D, it was a sense of injustice that was at the 
basis of the union (cf. stage 1):  
“They don't get paid a good wage and they don't have a good cafeteria. These are the reasons. 
And sometimes they would get fired without a reason, or they would reduce their wage without 
a reason. Because of these reasons, instead of fighting alone, they thought it was better to 
organize” (union representative, non-certified farm D) 
Management in farm D was clearly seen as the cause of workers grievances (cf. stage 2). According to 
the representative we interviewed, a first attempt to unionize was so forcefully supressed by 
management that it had the adverse effect of creating more workers’ support than before. The union 
in this farm was also ambitious. They were in the middle of negotiating a CBA and already had future 
plans of things they wanted to change through collective actions (cf. stage 3): they wanted four months 
of maternity leave instead of the current three months; they wanted to buy an ambulance or establish 
a clinic on the company so that sick workers did not longer have to use their own transportation with 
horse cart, they were going to bargain wage increments; they were making plans to collect money and 
to purchase basic products such as sugar and oil from the government which they could then sell at a 
cheaper price and so forth. Finally, union representatives in farm D were there from the start of the 
union and had been at the forefront of the conflict between management and workers, making them 
experienced and trusted by workers. They had never breached this trust and had built in control 
mechanisms to make abuse of membership fees impossible (cf. stage 4). 
In the certified farms however, management’s meddling obstructed all four stages of the mobilization 
theory. Because of this, the labour unions established in the certified farms were smaller in number 
and did not enjoy as much workers’ support as the labour union established in the non-certified farm. 
At the basis, there was no sense of injustice (cf. stage 1). Instead, unions were established top-down 
because management had asked the workers to take the initiative to organize themselves. Moreover, 
management undermined the ability of representatives to blame some problems to these managers 
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(cf. stage 2) as it were the managers themselves who encouraged workers to organize and who 
facilitated the election process. Few workers in these farms believed that collective action could rectify 
injustice (cf. stage 3). Especially in farms A and B where there had been more than one attempt to 
unionize, workers were convinced that that the union was not going to be a motor of change or that 
they actually could make some changes on the ground:  
“I am not a member. There was a union before, but it just took our money” (answer to open 
survey question, worker from farm A) 
“In the past, labour unions didn’t work. So this one will stop also” (answer to open survey 
question, worker from farm B) 
“It is not active. They are not struggling for workers’ rights. One friend was a member and he 
got his wage reduced. He went to the labour union and then management fired him” (answer 
to open survey question, worker from farm C) 
Finally, the union representatives were less willing or capable of mobilizing (cf. stage 4). In farm A the 
representative positioned herself between workers and management instead of profiling herself as a 
leader or activist. In farm B the representative was frustrated because she was not capable of making 
any changes on the ground nor capable of changing the image workers had of the representatives as 
being the ‘puppets’ of management:  
“Even I am not happy to continue as a chair person, I am considering to resign. Because 
sometimes when I read the rights of the workers and when I compare it to the facts on the 
farm, it is completely different” (union representative, farm B) 
In sum, the union in the non-certified farm showed the most potential, given that all four stages of the 
mobilization theory had successfully taken place in this farm. The unions in the certified farms faced 
more impediments than the union in farm D because management’s meddling had obstructed these 
four stages. Nevertheless all unions were facing several impediments other than the ones caused by 
PSS and were at the moment of data collection not successful in defending workers’ rights.  
Tackling impediments  
In studying impediments to workplace unionism, we attempt to advance our understandings of why 
labour remains unorganised at the bottom of global value chains and to help those who wish to 
empower workers at the bottom of GVCs. A logical question following our analysis is then whether and 
how these impediments can be overcome.  
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Our analysis shows that several impediments are rooted in socio-cultural norms and values, or are the 
outcomes of commercial dynamics inherent to vertical integration. It is probably impossible to take 
these forces away, however some may be addressed albeit to a limited extent. We cannot offer a 
straightforward answer on how to deal with all these impediments nor do we believe that there are 
single solutions of silver bullets, including on how to make the impact of PSS on trade union rights 
more effective. As several authors have shown before (Barrientos & Smith, 2007; Egels-Zandén & 
Merk, 2014; Wang, 2005), there are many obstacles at different levels in the value chain which need 
to be addressed simultaneously before PSS can positively affect process rights. This study provides 
some insights into the type of improvements which can be made –both at the vertical level and at the 
horizontal level.  
At the vertical level, our findings suggest that a cautious and soft approach by PSS in relation to 
freedom of association and collective bargaining may be the rightful way. Standards cannot push 
management too hard when it comes to the implementation of these process criteria, simply because 
such approach gives management the incentive to push in their turn their employees to establish a 
union. As our findings illustrate, such top-down initiatives result in ineffective workplace unionism 
marked by limited bargaining power and limited workers trust. So though previous studies have 
criticized PSS for not correcting or remediating violations in trade union rights (e.g. Anner, 2012), our 
findings suggest that PSS may not be capable of overcoming these violations. 
This does not mean that PSS have no role to play in relation to trade union rights. Quite the contrary, 
auditors could play an important role in empowering and supporting union representatives. For this it 
is necessary that auditors and representatives find in each other allies and build trust between both 
partners. This study already signalled some aspects that may be addressed in future relations between 
both parties. One is that auditors need to make time to explain more carefully what their role is, and 
to align expectations. In addition, they need to see shop stewards as active agents and treat them as 
partners in their auditing process. Only then will representatives fulfil their watchdog function. 
Moreover, there is a need to move away from a tick-of-the-box approach to an approach that allows 
room for representatives to signal actual workers concerns, regardless of standard criteria. Finally, our 
study signals the importance of being aware of the impediments. Freedom of Association (FoA) 
violations or unions that do not function, are rarely detected (Egels-Zandén & Lindholm, 2015). Being 
aware of the existence of certain forces can help to signal potential violations or malfunctioning 
unions. We would recommend auditors to ask enough probing questions to increasing one’s 
understanding of the levels of (voluntary) labour turnover, the composition of union members, how 
the collection of union fees is done, who the representatives are and how the relationship is with 
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management as we believe that the identification of the impediments is the first step towards tackling 
these impediments and making workplace unionism possible. 
With regards to the horizontal level, our results suggest that there may be room to strengthen 
unionization at cluster level. Currently workers and representatives from different farms do not talk to 
each other. However much can be learned from sharing experiences and comparing working 
conditions and union efforts. Several representatives we interviewed felt isolated and in lack of 
support. They also expressed the need for external support. When exchanging experiences, 
representatives in non-certified farms may use their gained knowledge of better outcome standards 
(e.g. work clothing, sanitary measures, paid leave) in certified farms as leverage in their negotiations 
with their employers. The other way around, representatives of certified farms may also learn from 
union experiences in the non-certified farm. Directing our attention to the Confederation of Ethiopian 
Trade Unions (CETU) we would therefore suggest the creation of such platform where union 
representatives can meet. 
In addition, trade unions should make efforts to become more appealing to female workers. Women 
have different concerns than men on the work floor. By way of illustrations, women in the flower farms 
are more often hired on an insecure basis than men, (unannounced) overtime is more difficult for 
women because they are also responsible for the work in the reproductive sphere, pregnant women 
may be discriminated, and female workers are more often the victim of sexual harassment by their 
male supervisors (Barrientos et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2004). Because of this, it is essential that 
women’s voices are represented in the trade union. This could be achieved by having predetermined 
seats for men and women in union representation, in combination with capacity building programmes 
(Smith et al., 2004). These capacity-building programmes should focus on giving women more 
confidence in their own capacities and on changing the self-image Ethiopian women had of 
themselves, which are rooted in prevailing socio-cultural norms. By way of illustration, more than half 
of the female respondents in our survey were convinced that men were better supervisors or 
managers than women.  
A final entry point to overcome one of the impediments which in our opinion deserves to be explored, 
is to consider ‘ikub’ members as potential union representatives. An ‘ikub’ is an informal savings net 
(Baker, 1992). Some workers sign up for this and make a monthly financial contribution to this savings 
net (Begashaw, 1978). An ikub binds workers together but also ties them to the farm. Hence, workers 
who have become a member of ikub, cannot easily leave the farm. As such, ikub members may be 
ideal shop stewards as they are more likely to stay on the farm long-term than workers who are only 
planning on staying short-term.   
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CONCLUSION  
To date, labour organisation remains at the fringes at the bottom of global value chains. While 
researchers who study this phenomenon tend to focus on different levels of analysis - GVC and local, 
respectively - there is a need for more integrated frameworks that explores how the interaction and 
competition between vertical and horizontal forces curdle workers’ voices, such as the one outlined in 
this paper.  
This study extends the work on workplace unionism in agricultural value chains in several ways. First, 
we have shown that there are several impediments to workplace unionism. While prior research has 
focused on studying and explaining the limited impact of PSS on trade union rights, this study tackles 
a much broader research question and attempted to explain why workplace unionism in general (in 
both in certified and non-certified farms) remains limited. We consider the identification of these 
impediments a first and indispensable step towards the improvement of workers’ representation and 
collective bargaining.   
Second, we developed a new way of identifying the impediments to workplace unionism by developing 
an integrated framework of both horizontal and vertical forces. The interplay between these forces 
varies over time and place and can result in quite distinct outcomes in terms of workplace unionism. 
Though past studies have researched each lens separately, we argue that any initiative to tackle the 
impediments to workplace unionism must pay attention to the interaction between the two levels of 
analysis. Short term employment for example is caused by vertical and horizontal forces. On the one 
hand the seasonal nature of flowers make flower farms in need of hiring seasonal labour (vertical 
pressure). On the other hand it appears that individual workers seek better job opportunities and that 
flower farms face high levels of voluntary labour turnover (horizontal pressure). When one aims to 
tackle the impediments coming forth from these forces (‘lack of awareness’ and ‘lack of interest’ of 
workers), one needs to make sure that workers are employed on a long term basis. It would however 
not suffice to change the production patterns from one that targets peak moments to one that seeks 
a steady supply of flowers. Next to tackling this vertical pressure, one would have to tackle the 
horizontal pressure of workers seeking alternative livelihood strategies by offering better working 
conditions and consequently raising job satisfaction. Hence, this article argued that the interplay of 
vertical and horizontal forces are essential to come up with solutions for these impediments and made 
a first essential step in identifying these forces.  
Third, we broadened the research scope by including non-certified farms in studying workplace 
unionism. Past studies rarely compared unionization efforts between certified and non-certified farms. 
This article showed the necessity of comparing these farms given that our results suggested that unions 
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operating in certified farms face different and more impediments than the union in the non-certified 
farm. It is through comparisons that one can truly explain the limited impact of PSS on trade union 
rights.   
In considering avenues for future research, we would suggest two areas. First, future research needs 
to study how PSS impact trade union rights in contexts with a long union tradition. The question 
whether managers in these contexts also interfere and facilitate unionization on their farms seems 
relevant. This area would further increase our understandings of the conditions in which PSS perhaps 
could  positively impact trade union rights. A second avenue for future research is to continue the task 
of conceptual clarification of the impediments to workplace unionism. This article advanced our 
understandings by identifying the horizontal and vertical forces which mattered for workplace 
unionism. The question however remains how and when these forces interact or conflict, reinforce or 
neutralize one another. This is a particular area that clearly deserves further analysis and research. 
Future studies should make more explicit which combinations of impediments really make collective 
organizing impossible. We also need to pursue studies focusing on understanding whether and how 
certain impediments can be overcome.   
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INTRODUCTION  
This thesis aimed at exploring the potential of workers to improve their working conditions through 
two strategies: ‘exit’ and ‘voice’. Underlying this objective was the recognition that the voluntary 
quitting behaviour of individual flower farm workers had to be interpreted as a form of unorganized 
labour agency. Drawing on a mixed-method approach combining qualitative and quantitative research, 
I sought to answer three research questions:  
1. Why do workers voluntarily ‘exit’ their job?
2. How do managers make sense of high levels of labour turnover? What kind of strategies do
they develop to deal with labour turnover?
3. Why do workers not use their ‘voice’ to formulate their grievances and improve their 
conditions of employment? 
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SYNTHESIS AND FINDINGS 
Each question was addressed in a specific article. Article 1 aimed at understanding why workers in the 
flower farms in Ethiopia voluntarily ‘exited’ their job. It was argued that workers voluntarily left their 
job out of dissatisfaction with the extrinsic rewards (wage, job security and health work environment) 
offered by the flower farms. These extrinsic rewards are related to satisfying one’s basic needs (Centers 
& Bugental, 1966; Gruenberg, 1980). In addition to low levels of job satisfaction, it was found that 
having access to alternative livelihood strategies was also key in determining workers’ quitting 
behaviour: rural workers and students reported higher intentions to leave their job, while ikub-
members reported lower intentions to leave their jobs.  
Article 2 analysed how managers made sense of high levels of labour turnover and the type of practices 
they developed to deal with turnover. This chapter revealed that managers considered labour turnover 
not to be caused by job dissatisfaction but rather to be the outcome of external institutional forces. By 
re-defining the causes of labour turnover as such, managers could accept and justify high levels of 
turnover. The practices they formulated in relation to turnover were then also meant to help them to 
cope with turnover rather than to reduce turnover. Hence, the findings in this chapter suggest that the 
exit option did not lead to improvements to the work environment in favour of labour. I argue that in 
this context, the exit option failed to a large extent due to labour abundance. As workers were easily 
replaced by new ones, the exit option lost its capacity to create change and did not have its usual 
attention-focusing effect.  
Article 3 focused on an alternative strategy for workers, that is the voice option. If the ‘exit’ option did 
not result in positive changes in favour of labour, the question arises why workers didn’t exploit other 
options. Workers could for instance have used their ‘voice’, meaning that they could have articulated 
their grievances and actively have tried to re-work their situation. In general, an individual worker who 
uses his or her voice, may be labelled as disloyal by management, miss out on promotions or even be 
fired (Elger & Smith, 1998; Freeman, 1976). Especially in the context of labour abundance, I argue that 
collective organized ‘voice’ strategies are therefore workers most promising option. Hence, this 
chapter considered the labour union as the most viable actor to represent this ‘voice’ option. The 
analysis in this chapter identified ten impediments to workplace unionism. Applying both a vertical 
(Global Value Chain) and horizontal (socio-economic context) lens helped us revealing impediments 
which are rooted in socio-cultural norms and values, and at the same time are the outcomes of 
commercial dynamics inherent to vertical integration. This chapter concluded that there was no quick 
fix for improving union rights in the cut flower industry in Ethiopia, but did make some suggestions on 
how to strengthen this voice option.   
158
CONCLUSION 
WHERE TO GO FROM HERE?  
The findings of this thesis suggest that the potential of the Ethiopian flower farm workers to improve 
their own working conditions through exit and voice is rather limited: the exit option, which many 
flower farm workers exercised, did not have the expected impact on the managers who ignored the 
signals and managed to accommodate to high labour turnover. The voice option did not work either, 
because of several reasons including the fact that the most aroused and therefore potentially the most 
vocal workers, were the first to quit their jobs at the flower farms. Hence, the ability of labour in the 
cut flower industry in Ethiopia to improve labour rights on a large scale was overridden by the ability 
of capital to determine social structures. Under these circumstances, flower farm workers need 
support to be able to improve their working life and overall livelihoods status. In this section I identify 
several relevant actors who could provide potentially this support and I make some suggestions 
towards these actors on how to fulfil this role.  
The Ethiopian Government can play an important role in reducing the need for ‘exit’ strategies. As 
discussed in Article 1 it is advisable to introduce minimum wages. Moreover legislation needs to be 
strengthened and better monitored to protect workers against potential health hazards, which was a 
major concern among workers. There is a growing body of research documenting a high prevalence of 
respiratory and dermal symptoms among Ethiopian flower farm workers (Hanssen, Nigatu, Zeleke, 
Moen, & Bråtveit, 2015). In addition to reducing the need for exit strategies, policy makers should 
enhance the room for effective voice strategies. Effective social dialogue is necessary for the realization 
of decent work in the sector and for guaranteeing that workers concerns are taken into account. 
However to date, collective bargaining coverage is generally at 2 or 3 per cent or less of total 
employment (Hayter & Stoevska, 2011). Hence, social dialogue structures and processes at the farm, 
sector and national level to resolve labour issues need to be put in place.  
The Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions could play an important role in creating platforms at 
cluster levels where union representatives from different farms can meet and maybe even come up 
with common action plans. As discussed in Article 3, the union representatives I interviewed, all 
expressed the need for external support. Many of them felt isolated. The creation of such platform 
could overcome this and could be an important way of exchanging experiences: representatives in 
non-certified farms may use their gained knowledge of better outcome standards (e.g. work clothing, 
sanitary measures) in certified farms as leverage in their negotiations with their employers. The other 
way around, representatives of certified farms may also learn from union experiences in the non-
certified farm. Moreover, the labour union needs to become more appealing to female workers. After 
all, women are the majority of the workforce in flower farms and they may have different concerns 
than male workers. Article 3 discussed some examples of how the union can become more inclusive 
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towards women, including setting predetermined seats for men and women in union representation, 
and starting up capacity building programmes to give women more confidence in their own capacities.  
Consumers need to become aware of the poor working conditions in flower farms and need to be  
willing to pay better prices for flowers. This thesis has shown that the Ethiopian flower farms provide 
working conditions that currently do not meet workers’ basic needs. Workers complained about poor 
wages, poor job security and an unhealthy environment. While this thesis recognizes that consumers’ 
purchasing behaviour alone will not make the necessary changes, it does make the argument that an 
increased willingness of consumers to buy certified flowers can give an important push in the right 
direction towards a much needed change in governance structure of the cut flower value chain. The 
introduction of more consumer labels for flowers could help raising consumer awareness and changing 
consumers’ purchasing behaviour.  
Buyers, including large retailers, branded marketers, international processors and international 
traders, need to engage in more collaborative partnerships with producers. It does not suffice to simply 
demand adherence to private social standards. By this I mean that it is necessary for buyers to give 
more secure orders to a select number of producers, to pay better prices for the flowers and develop 
and share a better planning so as to avoid last minute orders (Lim & Phillips, 2008). Finally, it would 
entail that buyers engage and invest in long-term capacity building with local factory managers (Lund-
Thomsen & Coe, 2013). How utopian this may sound in our current system, driven by fierce 
competition and downward price pressures, I argue that these changes are essential. Without changing 
the governance structure of the cut flower value chain, from an buyers-driven market model to a 
collaborative partnership (Lim & Phillips, 2008), it will never be possible to give workers a decent wage 
and decent work. It is time for buyers to recognize their responsibility for the poor working conditions 
in the flower farms. Buyers and producers together need to seriously commit themselves to improve 
working conditions. A rhetoric based on ‘my-business-is-my-business’ and ‘your-business-is-your-
business’ is simply outdated.  
Private social standards (PSS) could strengthen their impact by moving away from the current 
compliance-based paradigm towards the adoption of a more cooperative paradigm to improve 
working conditions in global value chains. In short, this would entail three major changes: first, it 
requires the adoption of more work-centred methods in drafting PSS. Second, it includes the 
replacement of the snapshot, tick-box approach of auditing by a more participatory, social auditing. 
Third, it requires the refinement of the criteria to get certification. Simply complying with standard 
criteria should no longer suffice to get certification. These suggestions deserve some further 
explanation. Given the importance of PSS in setting labour criteria in the cut flower farms, and their 
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objective of guaranteeing decent working conditions, the next section elaborates on, and discusses 
these suggestions more in-depth.  
A PROPOSED PATH FOR PRIVATE SOCIAL STANDARDS  
When drawing the context for this study it was mentioned that the three certified farms had better 
working conditions in place than the non-certified farms in terms of job security, healthy work 
environment, paid leave and work clothing. However, this is the only time where we actually found 
differences between certified and non-certified farms. Indeed, when studying workers’ job satisfaction 
and quitting behaviour, the analysis did not show any differences between workers employed in 
certified and non-certified farms. In all five farms, we found very similar levels of job dissatisfaction 
and intentions to leave (cf. Article 1). At the same time we did not find any differences in how managers 
from certified and non-certified farms dealt with and legitimized high levels of labour turnover (cf. 
Article 2). Finally, we argued that labour unions in all farms faced several impediments to become 
effective, and where we did identify differences between certified and non-certified farms, we showed 
that unions in certified farms surprisingly faced more impediments than unions in non-certified farms 
(cf. Article 3). So though there may have been differences in working conditions between farms, the 
perceptions of workers towards their work environment and the way managers treated their workers 
seemed very similar across all five farms. 
With regards to workers’ perceptions it is also worthwhile to mention that workers seemed unaware 
of the existence of private social standards. Workers did not know whether a farm was certified or not, 
and they were largely unaware of the differences in working conditions between farms. On the 
contrary, most workers believed that the flower farms were more or less the same, given that all flower 
farms paid similar wages, and had similar work hours. All farms provided bus services to their urban 
workers, picking them up and dropping them off at the same bus stops. From the outside, this created 
the impression that all farms were the same. Because of this general impression, workers did not 
compare farms. When we asked them why they had chosen to work on their respective farm, we 
received answers unrelated to the work environment. Workers explained that they worked on the 
farm that was closest to their home, where they had a relative or friend working, or where they were 
first hired. Some said they worked on the farm which paid the highest wages –but wages were to a 
large extent kept similar between farms because of the wage agreements and only differed for short 
periods of time when a new farm entered the cluster, which paid a little bit more as to attract trained 
workers from older established farms.  
From these observations, it follows that certification schemes have a very limited impact. Though they 
make some improvements in working conditions, they seem to fail in creating actual changes on the 
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ground. The employer-employee relationship remains largely unaffected, given the similarities we 
found in both certified and non-certified farms. In what follows, I want to argue that this failure to 
create change is to be attributed to the compliance perspective through which private social standards 
are implemented and which involves a box-ticking approach.  
PSS aim to move farms towards ethical behaviour, and certify those farms which have committed 
themselves to ethical practices. Following the definition of Jones (1991) an ethical practice is a practice 
‘that is both legal and morally acceptable to a larger community, while an unethical practice is a 
practice that is illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger community’ (Jones, 1991, cited in Fassin, 
2005, p.274). To move farms towards ethical behaviour, and to be able to verify this behaviour, PSS 
have come up with a checklist of criteria. These criteria are considered guidelines to point farm 
behaviour in what PSS perceive as ethical practices. Examples include no discrimination or child labour 
practiced on the work floor, or respect of freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. 
Farms that comply with these standards, meaning that they can tick the boxes of all these criteria, 
successfully pass PSS’s audits and receive certification.  
I want to raise two problems with regards to this compliance based approach. First, I like to argue here 
that ethical behaviour cannot be fully promoted nor can it be fully captured by a ‘to do’ list of standard 
criteria. Ethical behaviour is a much more complex phenomenon and PSS fail to a certain extent to 
grasp this complexity (Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014). Second, I want to argue that the snapshot 
character of PSS audits fails to convey farm conditions in their full complexity and therefore audits 
need to be reinvented. 
With regards to the first argument I recognize that a fixed list of tasks can offer some ethical guidelines 
to day-to-day activities. However, in the end there will be situations in which managers are confronted 
with difficult situations and ethical dilemmas which they themselves need to solve and for which there 
are no fixed criteria mentioned in the PSS. It is in these situations that the tensions between 
compliance and pragmatism become pronounced (Fassin, 2005). For example, in the cut flower 
industry in Ethiopia, both certified and non-certified farms were facing high levels of labour turnover. 
PSS do not prescribe practices on how to deal with this. One practice which all managers, regardless 
of PSS certification, developed in relation to labour turnover was to hire more workers than 
theoretically was needed. By hiring more people, managers could easily cope with sudden drop outs 
of workers. Such an approach implied that managers did not have to stimulate workers to perform 
well. Because there were more people than required for the job, there was no need to train workers 
to become efficient in their job. Underlying this practice is the belief that workers inevitably will leave. 
One could argue that managers approached workers as a disposable good, having an expiration date. 
From a moral point of view, a human resource (HR) practice focusing on retaining workers making 
162
CONCLUSION 
them more satisfied and more productive would be considered more ethical than the current practice 
of ‘wasting’ workers which was applied. Hence, certification cannot guarantee that managers will 
adopt ethical practices in those situations for which there are no prescribed rules.  
The reason why PSS cannot guarantee ethical behaviour in all situations is because PSS do not require 
managers to adopt and internalize an independent ethical commitment towards creating a sound work 
environment. The ‘to do’ list of standard criteria does not involve any ethical or moral commitment 
from the organisations and managers. It simply allows the managers to ‘execute’ a fixed list of social 
criteria without questioning the why and the what. From this it follows that PSS have de-personalized 
ethical behaviour and reduced ethics to a fixed list of tasks. As a result, managers seek to adopt PSS in 
a ceremonial manner, hereby decoupling compliance activities from their daily core activities. Ethics 
then becomes a matter of executing, ticking boxes, and exploiting the margins the system offers in 
executing these standard criteria (Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014; Pérezts & Picard, 2015). In this 
dominant tick-boxing paradigm, ethical behaviour has been successfully reduced to a list of ‘major and 
minor musts’, ‘recommendations’ while allowing for some ‘minor non-conformities’ (Pérezts & Picard, 
2015). Referring to the cut flower farms in this thesis, our findings suggested that indeed the certified 
farms were in compliance with the minimum requirements of PSS. However, they did not go beyond 
compliance, meaning that they did not really engage in creating a sound environment.  
A second reason why PSS cannot guarantee ethical behaviour is because of the snapshot character of 
PSS audits which is unable to convey farm conditions in their full complexity. Previous impact 
assessment studies have already shown that private social standards improve tangible working 
conditions (also referred to as ‘outcome standards’), such as wage, work hours and occupational health 
and safety, but fail to a large extent to improve less tangible issues (or ‘process rights’), such as 
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining (Anner, 2012; Barrientos & Smith, 2007; 
Wang, 2005). The reason why they fail to improve these intangible rights is because audits fail to detect 
violations of these rights. The findings in this PhD research support this argument.  
The critical in-depth analysis of workplace unionism in Article 3 revealed that labour unions in both 
certified and non-certified farms faced several impediments. It was even argued that in the certified 
farms, unions faced more impediments than the union in the non-certified farm. Managers in the 
certified farms interfered with the union and facilitated the union elections. This interference created 
many obstacles for the unions, including gaining workers’ trust, raising their bargaining power and 
changing workers’ perceptions about being too expensive to join. These impediments to effective 
labour representation however go unnoticed when one exclusively studies the closed ended questions 
in the survey data. When asked ‘is there a labour union on the farm? Yes/No’, many workers in the 
certified farms answered that there was a union, while workers in one of the non-certified farms 
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answered that there was no union. Hence, the close ended questions of the survey were misleading in 
the sense that they suggested that trade union rights were respected in all certified farms, but not in 
all non-certified farms.  
The auditing approach adopted by PSS has the same limitations as our closed ended questions of the 
survey data. It fails to detect Freedom of association (FoA) violations (Wang, 2005). For example, Egels-
Zandén and Lindholm (2015) argued that in less than five percent of the factories they examined, FoA 
violations were identified. They considered this very much problematic given that the stakeholders 
they interviewed, expected extensive violations of this type. 
The reasons why audits fail to detect FoA violations is because they are brief and focus on farm records 
such as timecards or who is on the payroll (Pérezts & Picard, 2015). Some audits do include interviews 
with individual workers, but these interviews usually take place within the farms, sometimes even in 
the presence of managers (Locke & Romis, 2007). During one of the focus group discussions of this 
study, workers explained that officials had visited the farm and had asked questions to workers during 
a tour of the farm. But because the ‘tour guide’ was the manager, workers didn’t dare to say anything. 
Workers narrated that once there had been a worker who had raised his voice to the officials, but 
afterwards he was so publicly embarrassed by management that he shortly after resigned himself.    
As a result of these limitations, the quality of information retrieved from audits is often mixed or 
incomplete (Locke, Qin, & Brause, 2007). Especially process rights such as ‘workers empowerment’ or 
‘trade union participation’ which are not tangible and quantifiable, often remain a ‘blind spot’ for social 
auditing (Wang, 2005). In sum, a tick-box approach conducted during short fly in–fly out visits, 
combined with a lack of workers’ input, cannot convey farm conditions in their full complexity – let 
alone provide guidance on how to overcome labour related problems or improve working conditions 
(Locke & Romis, 2007; Pérezts & Picard, 2015).  
From a compliance-based paradigm towards a cooperation paradigm 
To rectify the shortcomings of current private social standards, I suggest PSS to move away from the 
traditional compliance-based paradigm towards the adoption of a more cooperative paradigm to 
improve working conditions in global value chains (Locke et al., 2009; Locke, 2013). This cooperation 
paradigm is built around three pillars: (i) it takes a worker-centred approach to designing PSS criteria; 
(ii) it adopts a more participatory approach to auditing and (iii) it aspires a commitment approach to
compliance. I discuss these three pillars in the following subsections.
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(i) Towards a worker-centred approach to designing PSS  
I advocate for more worker-centred methods to designing PSS. As such, it is possible to increase 
workers’ awareness about their rights and the role that private social standards can play in improving 
their work context. Moreover such an approach enables the inclusion of workers’ voices when 
formulating and designing private social standards.   
With regards to the inclusion of workers voices, I would argue that workers’ issues can only be 
effectively addressed when workers are part of the process of designing private social standards and 
when standard criteria are rooted in reality. There is a growing body of research that shows that 
workers are leaving PSS-compliant firms because the working conditions in these firms are not in line 
with their aspirations (De Neve, 2009; Lund-Thomsen & Coe, 2013). The main point here is that to be 
effective, private social standards need to start considering their ‘beneficiaries’, that is the workers, as 
active agents rather than as passive victims. The main question is how to do so considering that 
insecure and vulnerable workers often have low confidence and literacy levels, making their voices 
easily excluded in social auditing schemes.  
Auret and Barrientos (2004) suggest several worker-centred, participatory tools that may be of 
assistance here in developing harmonised codes that are locally relevant. These tools aim to ensure 
that minimum labour standards are met and that employment practices reach all groups of workers, 
even the most vulnerable ones (e.g. temporary workers, female workers). These participatory tools 
are used in focus group discussions and are meant to encourage workers to participate, share 
information and think creatively about their work environment. Tools may include, but are not limited 
to: mapping of the work surroundings, role-playing of sensitive core issues, and ranking of work-related 
issues. Using such approach allows to really identify those issues that workers are concerned about. 
Underlying this approach is the idea that workers are no passive victims, but that they should be 
actively engaged in the process of improving their work environment.   
In addition, workers need to be trained in knowing and understanding their basic rights and 
responsibilities (Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014). For example, though certified farms ‘objectively’ 
scored better in terms of health and safety measures than non-certified farms, workers from both 
certified and non-certified farms subjectively scored the work environment as unhealthy and unsafe. 
There were many rumours going around of male sprayers who had fainted or female workers who 
could not get pregnant. From the focus group discussions it became clear that a lack of information 
aggravated these rumours. Workers were often unaware of safety instructions or re-entry intervals. 
Some workers stated that flowers had to be harvested while ‘wet’ from pesticides, while others said 
this was not allowed under any circumstances. When we asked for reasons behind such practice, 
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workers often did not know why they were doing what they were doing. Hence, workers need to be 
better trained to understand the underlying logics of certain practices. Rather than just telling them 
what to do, they also need to be learned why they do it in a certain way. If workers are trained to know 
their basic rights and responsibilities, these workers can pressure managers to receive decent working 
conditions. Such bottom-up pressures can then be complementary with the top-down pressures 
coming from private social standards (Auret & Barrientos, 2004; Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014).  
(ii) Towards a participatory approach to auditing
In light of the limitations of the box-ticking approach adopted by current auditing schemes, several 
actors have initiated a new range of measures to transform current auditing schemes, some of which 
seem very promising in theory but still need to be tested in reality (Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014). 
A major limitation that needs to be tackled is the snapshot character of most audits. Because of time 
and money constraints, most audits are undertaken in one, two or three days. Consequently these 
audits are rather superficial and unable to detect certain violations (Locke & Romis, 2007). To 
overcome this limitation, it has been suggested that auditing schemes need to invest in a close 
cooperation with local resources, such as NGOs and trade unions (Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014). 
These local actors could provide independent and year-round monitoring of the workplace. Because 
they are place-based, they can also be creative in reaching out to workers. For example, by giving 
workers their contact details, workers could contact them throughout the year to bring more easily 
violations to the attention of auditors. A benefit of participatory social auditing is that it could also 
encourage workers in articulating their grievances in ways that might also help them to collective 
organize (Auret & Barrientos, 2004; Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014).  
Such a participatory approach is based on using local auditors who are able to speak the native 
languages of workers, who are aware of the cultural background of these workers and are familiar with 
the local issues and ways in which workers can be exploited (Auret & Barrientos, 2004). Hence, local 
auditors have the advantage that they more easily can approach workers and gain their trust. A 
participatory approach in which third-party auditing is strengthened with cooperation by local actors 
can then also be more effective: information can be triangulated and more sensitive and invisible 
aspects such as freedom of association, sexual harassment and discrimination are more likely to be 
detected. It also focuses more on the processes behind compliance, rather than simply ticking off 
boxes.  
Nevertheless there are some challenges related to such approach. Most importantly, it may be difficult 
to find place-based actors who are up for the job. For example, in the Ethiopian context local civil 
society organizations often lack the funding, expertise and capabilities to be the ‘eyes and ears’ on the 
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ground. The challenge is then also to identify credible local stakeholders who engage in local 
communities and have the financial resources.     
(iii) Towards a commitment approach to compliance 
To get flower farms operating in an ethical manner, I propose an alteration in the governance structure 
of the cut flower value chain, from an buyers-driven market model to a collaborative partnership (Lim 
& Phillips, 2008). The buyer-driven model puts flower producers under intense price pressures and a 
constant fear of losing business to cheaper competitors. While such model may be economically 
benefiting the buyer, and consequently also the consumer, this competitive model drives flower farms 
towards lower wages and poor labour standards (Barrientos & Kritzinger, 2004; Tokatli, Wrigley, & 
Kizilgün, 2008). In such market driven model, flower farms comply with standards solely to secure 
orders. The conflicting pressures from large retailers (e.g. high quality products at lowest prices) 
encourages flower farms to adhere to the minimum set requirements only in a ceremonial manner. It 
makes that flower farms do not really engage creating a sound work environment, rather they stay on 
a superficial level of compliance and consider decent working practices to be of secondary importance 
(Lim & Phillips, 2008). 
A collaborative partnership between buyers and producers would mean that the buyer gives a select 
number of producers secure orders, that they pay better prices for the flowers and develop and share 
a better planning so as to avoid last minute orders (Lim & Phillips, 2008). Finally, it would entail that 
buyers engage and invest in long-term capacity building with local factory managers (Lund-Thomsen 
& Coe, 2013). Such a change in governance structure would imply a deeper, more secure relationship 
between buyer and flower producer. In time, such model could change flower farms approach towards 
decent working conditions. Whereas in the buyer-driven model, ethical behaviour was approached 
from a business logic to secure orders, ethical behaviour would in the new model be approached as an 
end in itself. In other words, it would be possible that ethical values and practices become internalized 
(Lim & Phillips, 2008).  
Through a collaborative partnership, buyers can put more emphasis on working conditions and at the 
same time invest in capacity building for local managers (Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014). During 
human resource management (HRM) trainings, local managers would then learn to see their workers 
as important assets rather than seeing them as a costly input factor. They would be taught that high 
levels of labour turnover brings with it unnecessary costs related to the replacement of the worker. 
These costs are often less visible, but should not be underestimated. Recruiting, hiring, training and 
medical examining of new workers all present unnecessary costs to the organisation. Consequently, 
managers could be advised on how to develop effective retention strategies and how they could create 
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a more satisfied, more stable and consequently more productive work force (Abbasi & Hollman, 2000; 
Eckardt, Skaggs, & Youndt, 2014; Jiang, Baker, & Frazier, 2009).  
When pursuing compliance with private social standards is motivated solely by economic concerns, we 
can only expect minimum compliance (Lim & Phillips, 2008). However, when managers are trained in 
HRM practices and are given secure and stable relationship, it is possible that an commitment to ethical 
practices becomes internalized. This does not only lead to superior compliance, but eventually may 
even lead to the development of an independent ethical commitment to working conditions from 
managers side (Lim & Phillips, 2008). 
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
Previous studies on working conditions at the bottom of GVCs have largely neglected the role and 
potential of workers to make changes in these working conditions. Only recently, scholars have started 
to explore the agency of labour employed in GVCs. This thesis aimed to contribute to this emerging 
field by studying the potential of individual, unorganized ‘exit strategies’ and collective, organized 
‘voice strategies’ of flower farm workers. This research makes a number of significant contributions.   
First, this thesis moved away from a rather simplistic and narrow interpretation of labour as a 
homogenous, undifferentiated input factor. Instead this research applied a more refined 
conceptualization of labour, recognizing the diversity among flower farm workers –in terms of gender, 
age, educational level, location of living and aspirations. It was argued that an understanding of the 
diversity of flower farm workers was key to understand the factors facilitating and constraining their 
individual agency. In Article 1 it was shown that different workers experienced different levels of job 
satisfaction (e.g. higher educated workers were less satisfied with their jobs than low educated 
workers) and had access to different alternative livelihood options (e.g. rural workers could engage in 
own farming activities whereas urban workers had easier access to alternative jobs in the city). In 
Article 2 it was shown how managers took into account the diversity of their workforce when 
developing coping mechanisms to deal with labour turnover (e.g. rural workers were put in the 
greenhouses to work; urban workers were hired to work in the pack houses). Finally, Article 3 revealed 
how voice strategies could be more or less available for workers in flower farms depending on who 
they were and the assets they had to their disposition (e.g. urban workers were more often member 
of the union than rural workers).   
Second, this thesis sought to contribute to a critical understanding of the working conditions employed 
in the cut flower industry through the inclusion of workers’ perceptions of their working life and their 
responses to it. Herein lies the unique contribution of this thesis: I focused on a translation and 
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interpretation of workers’ agency. These subaltern responses, arguably small and often invisible acts 
of resistance, often go unnoticed. As this thesis has shown these ‘exit’ responses, and the lack of ‘voice’ 
responses, are nevertheless essential ingredients when aiming to understand working conditions. I 
argued that the current compliance-based paradigm of PSS does not really reveal farm behaviour. The 
inclusion of workers’ perceptions and responses to the work environment give a fuller picture.   
Third, this thesis contributed to the emerging field of research on labour agency by showing how 
unorganized agency can also be effectively constrained. Probably because of the relative novelty of 
this stream of research, there has been a tendency of previous studies to emphasize isolated success 
stories of labour agency (e.g. Rogaly, 2009; Carswell & De Neve, 2013). This thesis contributes to a 
more nuanced understanding of labour agency by providing evidence of a not so successful story. In 
Article 2 it was shown that the exit strategies of workers were not so much of a concern to managers 
who easily could find new workers to fill in vacancies and therefore lost their attention-focusing effect. 
In Article 3 it became clear that the voice option was curdled partially due to a high prevalence of exit 
strategies.  
  FURTHER RESEARCH AVENUES 
The results put forth above lead to new routes of research, beyond the initial research questions, but 
still aligned with the objective of developing a nuanced, critical understanding of labour agency and its 
potential to change the status quo in favour of labour. I identify three avenues for further research.  
A first avenue is research on the impact of economic upgrading (i.e. the process by which firms move 
from low-value to relatively high-value activities) on labour agency. This study has shown how the exit 
strategies of Ethiopian flower farm workers went to a large extent unnoticed by managers. The cut 
flower industry in Ethiopia is still a relatively young sector, but rapidly growing. High levels of labour 
turnover may be a typical infant problem. Ethiopian farms currently target peak production moments 
(e.g. Valentine’s day and Mother’s day) and because of this they need the flexibility to grow and decline 
over quite compressed periods of time. Hence, high levels of voluntary labour turnover could be 
considered beneficial for the farms, providing them this flexibility. In neighbouring country Kenya, the 
cut flower industry stabilized in 2005 and is nowadays based upon a system of continuous mass 
production of largely standardized products (Riisgaard & Gibbon, 2014). They do not longer target peak 
moments but aim for a steady supply of high quality flowers. Moreover, Kenyan flower farms have 
adopted more modern technology and are growing a larger variety of flowers. Because of these 
features, flower farms in Kenya require a stable and trained workforce. Previous studies have shown 
that economic upgrading does not necessarily lead to social upgrading (i.e. improvements in rights and 
entitlements of workers) (Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi, 2010). Consideration of labour agency within 
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these studies is however limited. Therefore a first potential avenue would be to research if and how 
labour agency gains from economic upgrading. It would be interesting to test the hypothesis that 
flower farm workers in Kenya have more power to improve their working conditions because of their 
long-term retention and accumulated skills than the Ethiopian workers in this study had. More 
generally, it would be interesting to understand how different trajectories of economic upgrading 
affect labour agency in different sectors.  
A second avenue of research could be to engage in more disaggregated concepts of agency. In this 
study I distinguished two forms of agency. Flower farm workers could engage in individualised ‘exit’ 
strategies or they could engage in more collective forms of agency, by means of ‘voice’ strategies. 
However I recognize that labour has more abilities to act than just these two forms. Katz (2004) for 
instance distinguishes three levels of labour agency: resilience (i.e. coping with daily lives), reworking 
(i.e. efforts of workers to materially improve their lives by focusing on reforming the current system) 
and resistance (i.e. actively challenging the current systems through the development of alternative 
systems of production). I believe this to be a promising typology and that it is necessary to further 
advance our understandings of the type of agencies there are. The focus needs to be directed to 
workers as research participants and to broaden our understanding of the low-key and often invisible 
ways workers make viable lives. Interpreting, mapping and categorizing practices more creatively can 
advance this emerging field on labour agency in identifying those forms of agency worth considering.   
A third avenue for further research is to examine pathways to better established links between workers 
and other actors concerned about decent work and workers’ well-being. As highlighted in this study, 
the cut flower industry is a highly codified sector. There are several actors involved aiming at regulating 
the work environment. Traditionally private social standards (PSS) have been designed by western 
actors, providing top-down pressures to producers. This study has highlighted the importance of taking 
the local context and workers’ perceptions and aspirations into account when formulating, 
implementing and auditing PSS. I already provided some suggestions to practitioners on how to involve 
workers more into the process of getting improved working conditions. Labour research in global value 
chains need to investigate the effects of these suggested changes and think of other ways to bridge 
the gap between workers and other actors.  
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CONCLUSION 
The significance of this thesis resides in the critical approach it adopted to contribute to the body of 
knowledge on working conditions at the bottom of GVCs. I showed how workers were not particularly 
satisfied with the working conditions in Ethiopian flower farms and consequently sought to exit these 
flower farm jobs. We saw that managers however did not pick up these warning signals and that the 
working conditions did not improve in favour of labour. One of the lessons we learned from this thesis 
is that compliance with regulations cannot be limited to a tick-box approach. Though the cut flower 
industry is a highly codified sector, this does not necessarily result in ethically behaving farms. 
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  SUMMARY  
 
Globalization and global competition has led to a relocation of low technology, labour intensive 
industries towards countries where labour is cheaper. Past research has focused on the working 
conditions of workers employed in these industries. What is missing in this field of research is any 
inclusion of workers’ own perceptions about their working conditions; how workers themselves 
evaluate and seek to improve the quality of their working life. This thesis addresses this research gap. 
More specifically, it examines the potential of flower farm workers in Ethiopia to improve their own 
working conditions through two strategies: ‘exit’ and ‘voice’  
By ‘exit’ I mean the voluntary quitting behaviour of flower farm workers. During my first round of data 
collection in 2012, several managers complained about high levels of labour turnover. In this research 
I study the potential of the ‘exit’ strategy to improve working conditions. This because an 
unpredictable, slippery workforce makes workers somewhat difficult to control. Managers who want 
to have a stable and productive workforce would have to come up with retention strategies which 
focus on improving the work context. By ‘voice’ I mean the articulation of one’s grievances. Instead of 
leaving the farm, workers could also have chosen to stay and communicate their discontent through 
collectively organized strategies, which in turn could have led to improvements in the work 
environment. 
The thesis is structured around three articles. In the first article I seek to understand why Ethiopian 
flower farm workers massively quitted or ‘exited’ their formal wage work in the flower farms. Drawing 
on the workers’ survey data we’ve collected in June-July 2013, I study workers’ levels of job satisfaction 
and intentions-to-leave. The results show that there were three job characteristics contributing to 
workers’ job satisfaction: wage, job security and a healthy environment. Dissatisfied workers reported 
higher intentions to leave their job in the flower farms. Hence, this article concluded with the powerful 
message that flower farms aiming at securing a stable work force needed to focus on improving these 
three job attributes.  
In the second article I research how flower farm managers made sense of the high levels of workers 
‘exiting’ their farm and the type of strategies they developed to deal with this labour turnover. The 
findings suggest that managers did not seek to reduce labour turnover, instead they engaged in 
practices that sustained labour turnover. This is because labour turnover was considered functional: 
the costs of facing labour turnover were lower than the costs of actually reducing. In the second part 
of this article I then explain how managers legitimized having high levels of labour turnover on their 
work floor. I show that managers have constructed a mind-set that supported the notion that labour 
turnover was entirely caused by external institutional elements and had nothing to do with the work 
environment.  
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Finally, in the third article I examine why workers did not use their ‘voice’ to formulate their grievances 
and to improve their conditions of employment. Given that the exit option which many flower farm 
workers exercised, did not result in positive changes in favour of labour, the question arose why 
workers did not exploit other options, such as the ‘voice’ option. In essence, the trade union represents 
the ‘voice’ option for workers to articulate their grievances. In this article, I build a two-levels 
framework to identify the impediments to workplace unionism in the cut flower industry in Ethiopia. 
This framework recognises the need to study both ‘vertical’ (structure and governance of global value 
chains) and ‘horizontal’ (the socio-economic context) barriers to collective organizing at the work floor. 
To conclude, this thesis suggests that the potential of the Ethiopian flower farm workers to improve 
their own working conditions through exit and voice is rather limited: the exit option, which many 
flower farm workers exercised, did not have the expected impact on the managers who ignored the 
signals and managed to accommodate to high labour turnover. The voice option did not work either, 
because of several reasons including the fact that the most aroused and therefore potentially the most 
vocal workers, were the first to quit their jobs at the flower farms. Hence, the ability of labour in the 
cut flower industry in Ethiopia to improve labour rights on a large scale was overridden by the ability 
of capital to determine social structures. Under these circumstances, flower farm workers need 
support to be able to improve their working life and overall livelihoods status. In the conclusion I 
identify several relevant actors who could provide potentially this support and I make some 
suggestions towards these actors on how to fulfil this role.  
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  SAMENVATTING  
 
Globalisering en internationale competitie hebben ertoe geleid dat laag technologische en 
arbeidsintensieve sectoren hun toevlucht zochten tot landen met goedkope arbeidskrachten.  Hoewel 
voorgaand onderzoek zich reeds heeft toegelegd op het bestuderen en evalueren van 
arbeidsomstandigheden binnen deze sectoren, was er tot nog toe geen aandacht voor het standpunt 
van de werknemer zelf: hoe zij hun omstandigheden percipiëren en evalueren en hoe zij zelf proberen 
de kwaliteit ervan te verbeteren. Dit doctoraat probeert op bovenstaande vragen een antwoord te 
formuleren. Het objectief van dit doctoraat is te onderzoeken of sierteeltarbeiders in Ethiopië de 
mogelijkheid hebben om hun eigen werkomstandigheden te verbeteren door middel van twee 
strategieën: 'exit' en 'voice'.  
‘Exit’ staat synoniem voor het vrijwillig ontslagnemen van werknemers. Tijdens mijn eerste 
dataverzameling in 2012, klaagden verschillende managers over het grote arbeidersverloop binnen 
hun bedrijf. Dit fenomeen zette me ertoe aan te onderzoeken of deze ‘exit’ strategie al dan niet leidt 
tot betere arbeidsomstandigheden. Managers zijn immers niet gebaat bij een snel veranderend 
werkbestand dat zorgt voor weinig controle. De hypothese is dat managers die een stabiel en 
productief personeelsbestand beogen, strategieën zullen bedacht hebben om werkomstandigheden 
te verhogen en aldus arbeiders aan zich te binden. Tegenovergesteld aan ‘exit’ in deze context, verwijst 
de ‘voice’ strategie naar het communiceren van klachten waarbij werknemers collectief hun 
misnoegen uiten ten opzicht van directie en management, in plaats van het bedrijf te verlaten.  
Het doctoraat bestaat uit drie artikels. In het eerste artikel onderzoek ik waarom Ethiopische 
sierteeltarbeiders vrijwillig ontslag nemen. Gebruikmakend van survey data die werden verzameld in 
juni-juli 2013, bestudeer ik de werktevredenheid en intentie-om-weg-te-gaan bij werknemers. De 
resultaten tonen aan dat drie job karakteristieken bijdragen tot werktevredenheid: loon, job zekerheid 
en een gezonde werkomgeving; en dat ontevreden werknemers een grotere intentie rapporteren om 
hun job te verlaten. Vandaar dat dit artikel eindigt met de krachtige boodschap dat sierteeltbedrijven 
die een stabiel personeelsbestand wensen, zich moeten concentreren op het verbeteren van de drie 
bovengenoemde eigenschappen.  
In een tweede artikel richt ik me op de managers van sierteeltbedrijven. Meer bepaald hoe zij het grote 
arbeidsverloop verklaren en welke strategieën zij bedacht hebben om ermee om te gaan. De resultaten 
tonen aan dat managers niet proberen het arbeidsverloop te verminderen, in tegendeel, ze houden 
het bewust in stand net omdat een groot arbeidsverloop gezien wordt als iets functioneel: kosten die 
gepaard gaan met een groot verloop zijn immers lager dan de kosten om dit verloop te reduceren. In 
het tweede deel van dit artikel probeer ik te verklaren hoe managers dit grote arbeidsverloop trachten 
te legitimeren. Hierbij toon ik aan dat managers geloven dat het grote personeelsverloop te wijten is 
aan externe institutionele factoren en dat de werkomgeving hierin helemaal geen rol speelt. 
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Tenslotte buig ik me in een derde en laatste artikel over de vraag waarom werknemers niet gebruik 
maken van hun ‘voice’ strategie om hun werkontevredenheid te uiten en aldus hun situatie proberen 
te verbeteren. Deze vraag komt voornamelijk voort uit de observatie dat ondanks dat velen de ‘exit’ 
optie hanteerden, er geen positieve veranderingen plaatsvonden. Deze ‘voice’ optie vindt zijn 
gedaante in de vakbond. In dit artikel bouw ik een kader bestaande uit twee niveaus om de 
belemmeringen te identificeren waarmee vakbonden in Ethiopische sierteeltbedrijven worden 
geconfronteerd. Dit kader erkent de noodzaak om zowel ‘verticale’ (de structuur en het bestuur van 
de globale waardeketen) als ‘horizontale’ (de socio-economische context) belemmeringen van 
collectieve organisaties te bestuderen.  
Deze thesis concludeert dat de mogelijkheid van Ethiopische sierteeltwerknemers om hun 
arbeidsomstandigheden te verbeteren aan de hand van ‘exit’ en ‘voice’ beperkt is. De ‘exit’ optie, die 
door vele arbeiders werd gekozen, had niet de verwachte impact omdat managers de signalen 
negeerden en erin slaagden hun voordeel te halen uit het grote arbeidsverloop. De ‘voice’ strategie 
werkte ook niet, omwille van verschillende redenen, onder andere omdat de meest geïrriteerde en 
mondige werknemers vaak de eersten waren om de ‘exit’ optie te kiezen. Met andere woorden, het 
vermogen van managers om sociale structuren te bepalen verhindert Ethiopische sierteeltarbeiders 
hun arbeidsomstandigheden eigenhandig te verhogen. Externe steun is dus nodig om werkomgeving 
en algemene levensstatus van deze werknemers te verbeteren. In de conclusie identificeer ik 
verschillende relevante externe actoren die dergelijke ondersteuning zouden kunnen bieden en 
formuleer ik een aantal suggesties over de wijze waarop zij die rol zouden kunnen vervullen.  
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